

COMPLETE

0856-A-13

PREX 3.18: W 19

An Intelligence Monograph

AS WORLD WAR II
PROGRESSED IN THE
PACIFIC, U.S. MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN LEADERS FACED
THE PROSPECT THAT
OBTAINING AN
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER
FROM JAPAN MIGHT REQUIRE
INVADING ITS HOMELAND.
THE JAPANESE CORRECTLY
IDENTIFIED KYUSHU ISLAND
AS A LIKELY INVASION SITE.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN
SPRING-SUMMER 1945
SHOWED THAT JAPAN WAS
DRAMATICALLY EXPANDING
ITS DEFENSE FORCES ON THE
ISLAND, ENSURING LARGE
U.S. CASUALTIES IF AN
INVASION MATERIALIZED.

The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision

by Douglas J. MacEachin

99-022564



This publication is prepared for the use of US Government officials, and the format, coverage, and content are designed to meet their specific requirements. US Government officials can obtain additional copies of this document directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Other requesters can obtain subscriptions to, or specific editions or copies of, this and some other unclassified CIA publications by addressing inquiries to:

Documents Expediting Project (DOC EX)
ANA Division—Government Documents Section
Library of Congress
101 Independence Ave., S.E.
Washington, DC 20540-4172
Phone: (202) 707-9527
Fax (202) 707-0380

or **National Technical Information Service**
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Phone: (703) 605-6000 or 1-800-553-6847
Fax: (703) 321-8547

Queries on the availability of this publication may be directed to the DOC EX Project or the NTIS Office of Customer Services at the respective addresses or phone or fax numbers indicated above. Publications are not available to the public from the Central Intelligence Agency.

This document will be available soon on the Internet at www.odci.gov/csi.

Copyright pending. Not for distribution or reproduction without permission of the author, the Center for the Study of Intelligence, and Harvard University.

<p>Opinions expressed in this study are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other component of the US Intelligence Community.</p>



AN INTELLIGENCE MONOGRAPH

An Intelligence Monograph

The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision

by Douglas J. MacEachin



I

Foreword

This monograph was produced under the auspices of CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and the Harvard University program for Studies of Intelligence and Policy. The idea was to examine the role of signals intelligence* in US military planning during the final stages of the war with Japan in 1945—particularly its contribution to planning for an Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland.

This study was *not* intended as an argument for or against the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Obviously, the importance of the bomb in concluding the war was of such magnitude that it is not plausible to examine intelligence related to invasion planning without addressing the question of whether and to what extent that same intelligence might have influenced the decision to drop the bomb. It also is not plausible to argue that the military calculus concerning an invasion of Japan does not bear directly on evaluations of the bomb decision. Nonetheless, the debates and historical studies supporting or condemning the use of the bomb involve factors that go well beyond the scope of this monograph.

The study's basic objective is not to pass judgment on the decisions that were made, but rather to examine the intelligence that was available at the time and to weigh the role this intelligence played or might have played in the deliberations on an invasion.

The author wishes to express his appreciation to those who reviewed drafts of this study and provided constructive comments—particularly military historian Edward Drea.

* In modern intelligence parlance, the term signals intelligence, or SIGINT, is often used to refer to a broad range of intercepted communications.



A Note About the Author

Douglas J. MacEachin, the author of this monograph, was Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency from March 1993 until June 1995. He joined the CIA in 1965 and, for the next 24 years, worked mainly on research and analysis of Soviet and European security affairs. He was Director of the Office of Soviet Analysis from 1984 until March 1989, when he became Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control.

Mr. MacEachin holds baccalaureate and master's degrees in economics from Miami University of Ohio. During the period 1964-65, he was a full-time member of the faculty there.

Before retiring from the CIA in 1997, Mr. MacEachin was a CIA Officer-in-Residence at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is now a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School. Comments on this study may be directed to him at his office there (617-495-0816), or to the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, which published the monograph (703-613-1751).

Table of Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Foreword	iii
A Note About the Author	iv
I. Setting the Goals—Debating and Planning for a Ground Invasion	1
Examining the Options	1
Invasion Preparations Begin	2
Invasion Date Set, Commander Named	2
II. Assessing the Opposing Forces	5
SIGINT Provides the Window	5
Evidence of Japanese Preparations	6
III. President Truman Discusses Invasion Plans With His Military Advisers	11
Centrality of the Casualty Issue	11
Presenting the Case	14
President Gives the Okay	15
IV. Tracking the Japanese Buildup As Allied Leaders Meet at Potsdam	17
A Burst of Discoveries	17
SIGINT Picture Raises Concerns for Invasion Plans	19
V. Top US Officials' Views of the SIGINT Picture	25
What Did They Know and When Did They Know It?	25
Did the SIGINT Picture Affect the Discussions at Potsdam?	26
VI. The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb	29
VII. What If the A-Bomb Had Not Been Ready?	33
Re-Evaluation of the Casualty Estimates?	33
The Argument for Staying the Course	34
Looking for a Middle-Ground Strategy	36
Implications of Soviet Entry Into the Pacific War	37
Weighing Alternatives	37
Japanese Perspectives	38

Appendixes

A.	References	39
B.	Data Annex	45
C.	Selected Archival Documents	51

Japan 1945



I. Setting the Goals—Debating and Planning for a Ground Invasion

As World War II progressed in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confronted the prospect that getting an unconditional surrender from Japan might require invading the Japanese homeland. A number of key Navy and Army Air Force officers led by Fleet Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, and General H. H. "Hap" Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, argued that a combination of sea blockade and aerial bombardment could produce a Japanese surrender without the need for a ground invasion. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall and his Army planners, however, believed that Japan's surrender on the terms being demanded by the Allies could be assured only by invasion of its home territory. Both sides made legitimate arguments, but the debate also appears to have reflected organizational competition.¹

Examining the Options

By mid-1944 a consensus had begun to develop on the need at least to plan and prepare for an invasion, even though some officials evidently continued to believe there was a good chance it would not have to be carried out. In early July the JCS approved a report by its Joint Planning Staff (JPS)² that said unconditional surrender was to be achieved by undermining Japan's ability and

will to resist through sea and air blockades, intensive air bombardments, and destruction of Japanese air and naval strength—and ultimately by invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese industrial heartland. The report called for invasion of the Ryukyu island of Okinawa and the "home" island of Kyushu in order to establish bases for a decisive ground invasion of the Tokyo Plain, the region around the Japanese capital on the central island of Honshu.³

This report became the basis for an agreed statement at the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings in Quebec during September 1944. That pronouncement defined Allied military objectives in the Pacific as "invading and seizing objectives in the heart of Japan," after "establishing [a] sea and air blockade, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength."⁴

The US military leadership did not treat the situation as an "either-or" choice of invasion versus blockade and bombardment, but rather as a melding of the two strategic concepts. For General Marshall and those on the planning staffs who agreed with his view, the JCS/JPS report and the Quebec statement amounted to a commitment to plan, prepare, and ultimately carry out the actions they believed would be necessary to gain Japan's surrender on the "unconditional" terms demanded by the Allies.

General Marshall and his Army planners believed that Japan's surrender on the terms being demanded by the Allies could be assured only by invasion of its home territory.

¹ Overviews of the evolution of strategic planning from late 1942 to early 1945 are in John Ray Skates, *The Invasion of Japan* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), chapters 4 and 11; and Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Codenamed Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), chapter 6.

² The Joint Planning Staff (JPS) was composed of two senior representatives each from the Army and Navy planning organizations. It reported directly to the Joint Chiefs. The JPS in turn was served by the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), which—with assistance from such specialized support groups as the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Logistics Committee—produced basic plans that were reviewed and amended as deemed necessary by the JPS and forwarded to the Chiefs. See Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington DC: GPO, 1951), pp. 103-104.

³ The background descriptions herein of the planning lineage from mid-1944 to April 1945 are mainly from Grace Pearson Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 627-630, 651-712—especially pp. 627-630, 655-661, and 686-707, which draw heavily on the minutes of the JPS meetings that produced the various documents and operational directives described in Hayes' book. The specific report referred to in this paragraph is "Operations Against Japan..." Report by JPS, JCS 924, 7 July 1944. It was the first of 16 iterations incorporating various modifications produced over the ensuing nine months. Copies of most of the 16, including the final versions in April 1945 that articulated the JCS consensus on an invasion of Kyushu (see footnote 9), are in RG 165, ABC 384, Pacific (1-17-43) Entry 421, Box 457, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 701-702.

**Admiral King
(Chief of Naval
Operations) and
Admiral Leahy
(Chief of Staff for
the President) . . .
remained
reluctant to treat
the invasion
decision as a fait
accompli.**

For Admiral King and General Arnold, the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration was a commitment to continue and even intensify their campaign of aerial destruction and naval strangulation. They saw an invasion of Kyushu—if it should prove necessary—as a means of gaining bases from which to launch an even more devastating air and sea campaign and thereby produce a surrender without having to mount a ground invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

The debate nonetheless continued through the rest of 1944 and the first few months of 1945. Admiral King, while nominally sticking to the position that the end-game would be an invasion of the Japanese homeland, advocated various operations to be undertaken between the seizure of Okinawa and the invasion of Kyushu—for example, attacks on small islands and coastal areas of Japanese-occupied China between Formosa (Taiwan) and Japan. Some analysts have postulated—plausibly—that these operations were seen by their advocates as a way of creating more time for the bomb-and-blockade campaign to produce the surrender they believed could be obtained without an invasion of the homeland.⁵

Considerable debate also took place on the question of an amphibious assault on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The strategic outline accepted by the Joint Chiefs in July 1944 had specifically named Kyushu as the site for the initial invasion. But some planners—with support from General Arnold—argued for attacking Hokkaido first.

Although these discussions initially focused on Hokkaido as an interim step between Okinawa and Kyushu, the debate evolved into an examination of Hokkaido as an alternative to Kyushu. Nearly all members of the Joint War Plans Committee (see footnote 2), however,

strongly supported targeting Kyushu rather than Hokkaido. They also objected strenuously to any diversion of resources toward an interim operation.⁶

Invasion Preparations Begin

On 3 April 1945 the Joint Chiefs formally directed Gen. Douglas MacArthur, then Commander in Chief of US Army Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC), and Adm. Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA), to develop plans and begin preparations for an invasion of Kyushu.⁷ This was strictly a planning directive, not an order for implementation.

Even at this stage, Admiral King and Adm. William Leahy (who was Chief of Staff for the President and who functioned as ex officio chairman of the JCS) remained reluctant to treat the invasion decision as a fait accompli. While not directly opposing an invasion, they continued to advocate intermediate objectives along the China coast. But with the invasion of Okinawa in early April 1945, US military and civilian leaders clearly felt growing pressure to nail down the next step in the Pacific strategy. By the end of April, agreement was reached that instructions would be formulated for Pacific commanders to proceed with an invasion of Kyushu.⁸

Invasion Date Set, Commander Named

Still to be resolved was the naming of an overall commander for the invasion. The choice was between the Army's General MacArthur and the Navy's Admiral Nimitz. While this was being worked out, MacArthur

⁵ See Barton Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 230-231.

⁶ Hayes, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 656-657.

⁷ Command and Operational Directives for the Pacific, JCS 1259/4 and 1259/5, 3 April 1945, RG 165, ABC 381 Pacific Ocean Area (1-29-43, Sec. 3), NARA.

⁸ Report by JPS, "Pacific Strategy," JCS 924/15, 25 April 1945, RG 165, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Entry 421, Box 457, NARA.

and Nimitz issued a joint recommendation on one point on which they did agree—that the target date for invading Kyushu should be 1 November 1945.

The planning directive of 3 April had given 1 December as the invasion date for Kyushu and 1 March 1946 for Honshu. Both MacArthur and Nimitz argued that scheduling the invasion of Kyushu as late as 1 December would subject the operation to weather uncertainties that could cause it to be set back to the spring of 1946, creating a significant delay in ending the war. On 25 May 1945 the JCS finally sent a directive assigning MacArthur "primary responsibility for the conduct of Operation OLYMPIC" (the codename for the Kyushu invasion) and setting the date as 1 November. The invasion of Honshu (codenamed CORONET) remained slated for 1 March 1946.⁹

The JCS sent a directive assigning MacArthur "primary responsibility for the conduct of Operation OLYMPIC" ... and setting the date as 1 November 1945.

⁹ The MacArthur-Nimitz recommendation regarding the date of a Kyushu invasion is JCS 1331/1, 30 April 1945. The Joint Planning Staff recommendation for resolving the command issue is in JCS 1331/2 of 14 May. JCS 1331/3, "Directive for Operation 'OLYMPIC,'" 25 May 1945, assigns the command to MacArthur and sets the 1 November date. RG 165, ABC 384, Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434, NARA. Also see Appendix C of this monograph.

II. Assessing the Opposing Forces

In mid-1944, as the planning process was picking up momentum, the Japanese Army forces that US intelligence had identified on Kyushu consisted of only one combat division and two depot divisions. (A combat division was the principal mixed-weapon ground combat unit of the Japanese Army, with a troop complement of 16,000. Depot divisions essentially were pre-positioned stocks of equipment and weapons, garrisoned by manpower pools and training staffs; their roles included marshalling replacement forces and creating new combat divisions.) The US War Department's Military Intelligence Service (MIS) believed that more than half of the Japanese military personnel then on Kyushu were Navy ground troops and ground support personnel of the Army and Navy air forces. Japan's 16th Area Army Headquarters, located in northwestern Kyushu, exercised overall command on the island.¹⁰

As part of the planning process in mid-1944, the Joint Intelligence Committee (see footnote 2) projected that by the time of the contemplated invasion in autumn 1945, the Japanese would have augmented their Army ground forces on Kyushu to six combat divisions while also maintaining the two depot divisions. The Committee estimated that once the invasion began, the Japanese might be able to reinforce the six combat divisions with up to four more, but that ten was about the maximum they could sustain because of geography and supply constraints. This projection would remain the agreed forecast until mid-1945.¹¹

SIGINT Provides the Window

Knowledge of the strength and disposition of Japanese defenses that would be encountered in an invasion was heavily dependent on intercepted communications. Allied intelligence services had no effective agents or spy networks in the homeland, nor were there Western sympathizers with access to this kind of information in any detail.

Aerial reconnaissance played an important role in detecting force movements and identifying physically definable targets such as aircraft, airbases, and concentrations of weapons and vehicles. Its overall utility, however, was constrained by weather, darkness, and technology. Prisoner-of-war interrogations had been a source of intelligence for Allied forces throughout the Pacific campaign, but prisoners available as of the spring of 1945 had little if any knowledge about measures being undertaken for the defense of the main islands.

US intelligence units had been intercepting and decrypting Japanese *diplomatic communications* since well before the outbreak of World War II. Intelligence of this kind was obtained on a regular basis (with short interruptions as the Japanese changed their encryption systems) from 1935 to the end of the war. Japanese *naval communications* had been deciphered from the beginning of the war in the Pacific. But it was not until April 1943 that a major break was achieved in deciphering Japanese *Army ground communications*, and significant quantities of this high-grade cipher message traffic did not begin to be available to

Knowledge of the strength and disposition of Japanese defenses that would be encountered in an invasion was heavily dependent on intercepted communications.

¹⁰ JIC 191/1, "Japanese Reaction to an Operation against Southern Kyushu," 24 June 1944, RG 165, ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.

¹¹ *Ibid.* The same projection is found in Annex D of JWPC 235/3, "Plan for Operations Against Kyushu," 4 September 1944, RG 165, ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-C; and in JWPC 235/4, 16 November 1944, JIC 284, 30 April 1945, and JIS 191/7, 16 May 1945—all in RG 165, ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B. It is also presented in a report by the intelligence staff under MacArthur's command in the Pacific: GHQ, USAFPAC, MIS, GS, "G2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu in November 1945," 25 April 1945, RG 165, Entry 418, Box 1842, NARA.

It quickly became clear [from intercepted communications] that the Japanese had identified Kyushu as a likely invasion site.

US intelligence staffs until the end of that year.¹²

Evidence of Japanese Preparations

In the weeks following the dispatch of the planning directive to MacArthur and Nimitz on 3 April 1945, intercepted communications already were showing that the Japanese were expecting attempts to invade their homeland.¹³ A message sent by the German naval attaché in Japan, for example, described a report by the Japanese concerning their preparations for Allied landings in the homeland. The report said they expected an assault on Okinawa "shortly" and anticipated that the Allies ultimately would mount an attack on the Tokyo Plain.

It quickly became clear that the Japanese had identified Kyushu as a likely invasion site. Messages in early April 1945 dealt with Japanese mining of harbors and coastal areas of Kyushu and the evacuation of civilians from Kyushu's "areas of coastal defense." Other communications dealt with the assignment of suicide aircraft to Kyushu.¹⁴

¹² In the parlance of signals intelligence, codes and ciphers are different things. At the risk of oversimplification, a statement that "the dove has landed," utilized to indicate that an action has been carried out, could be considered a code. If this phrase is then transcribed into numbers representing the letters, and the numbers are scrambled according to a system that requires a key to unscramble, it can be defined as enciphered. Exploiting the substantive contents of intercepted Army messages usually required both deciphering and decoding. The contents were then provided to military force analysts to interpret their meaning relative to force deployments, strengths, and activities. A detailed discussion can be found in chapter 1 of Edward J. Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA: Code Breaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992).

¹³ The communications intelligence reports on Japanese military forces cited throughout this paper are located in Record Group 457, "Record of the National Security Agency," NARA: Entry 9001—MAGIC Far East Summaries": Box 5, folder 14 (SRS 381-410, 5 April through 5 May 1945); Box 6, folder 15 (SRS 411-444, 6 May through 7 June 1945), and folder 16 (SRS 445-490, 8 June through 23 July 1945); and Box 7, folder 17 (SRS 491-509, 24 July through 11 August 1945). Also, Entry 9002—"War Department (MID) Military Intelligence Service, Japanese Ground Order of Battle Bulletins," SRH 195, Part I (7 April through 2 June 1945), Box 76, and Part II (9 June through 11 August 1945), Box 77.

¹⁴ SRS Nos. 383, 385, and 393 of 7, 9, and 17 April 1945.

Other intercepted messages at that time provided evidence of large-scale Japanese troop movements from the Asian mainland to the Japanese islands. Based on the listing of vessels involved, intelligence analysts calculated that 30,000 to 60,000 troops were being moved. By mid-April, intercepts confirmed that one of the units being shifted was a combat division previously identified in Manchuria, and that components of it were already arriving on Kyushu. At about the same time, other messages noted that units were moving from the Kurils to the main islands, although their specific destinations could not be determined at that point.¹⁵


An assessment by MacArthur's intelligence staff near the end of April concluded: "It is apparent [that the Japanese] now consider invasion certain if not imminent," and that their troop movements and unit dispositions reflected preparations for an all-out defense of their homeland. The report said new combat formations were being created on the main islands, the flow of reinforcements to outlying areas had ceased, "troops guarding the close approaches to Japan: [such as Okinawa] were dying in place in desperate delaying actions," and Japanese forces were being sent from Manchuria to Japan "to provide strength for a final defense of the Empire."¹⁶

In early-to-mid-May, with the completion of the movement of the combat division from Manchuria to Kyushu, the US Military Intelligence Service estimated the number of Japanese troops on the island to be 246,000, including 128,000 in Army ground force units. The Intelligence Service estimated that the four additional divisions expected by 1 November, along with a requisite increase in support units, would add roughly 100,000 more Army ground troops.

¹⁵ SRS Nos. 388, 394, and 396 of 12, 18, and 20 April 1945; SRH 195, Bulletin Nos. 59 and 60, 21 and 28 April 1945. The unit from Manchuria was the 57th Division.

¹⁶ *Idem*, USAFAC G-2, 25 April 1945.

Figure 1
Mined Areas Disclosed in Intercepted Message of 7 April 1945



747224AJ (R02635) 12-98

In early-to-mid-May . . . the US War Department's Military Intelligence Service estimated the number of Japanese troops on Kyushu to be 246,000.

**Table 1
Projected Force Structure Compared to Components Identified on Kyushu by Mid-May 1945^a**

Projected Invasion date of 1 November 1945	Current 12 May 1945
Northern Kyushu	
(Army Headquarters) ^a	
Combat Division	Combat Division ^b
Combat Division	
Combat Division	
Depot Division	Depot Division
Depot Division	Depot Division
Miscellaneous Independent Brigades/Regiments	Independent Tank Regiment
Southern Kyushu	
(Army Headquarters) ^a	
Combat Division	Combat Division
Combat Division	
Combat Division	
Miscellaneous Independent Brigades/Regiments	

^a Although not stated in the 1944 estimates, subsequent Military Intelligence Service assessments made clear that the projections included the expectation that an Army headquarters would be established in both northern and southern Kyushu to take command of the forces being deployed in each of these areas.

^b This was the division that had recently been moved from Manchuria.

This table is Unclassified.

**Table 2
Japanese Troop Strength on Kyushu—
Projected Versus Current, Mid-May 1945^a**

	Projected (for 1 November 1945)	Current (as of 12 May 1945)
Total	350,000	246,000^b
Army Ground	230,000	128,000
Navy Ground	25,000	25,000
Air Ground	95,000	93,000

^a On projections, see JIC 284, 30 April 1945, RG 165, ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944), Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434. On the 12 May figures, see SRH 195, Bulletin Nos. 62 and 66.

^b MacArthur's staff gave its own estimate of current (including the 57th Division) and future troop strengths. Its overall current total was slightly less than the MIS figures—228,000 rather than 246,000. This reflected a lower number of troops ascribed to base and service support functions. The staff's projections of Army and Navy ground troops—225,000 and 25,000 respectively—were almost identical to the War Department MIS figures. MacArthur's staff thought Japanese Air Force ground support personnel would be cut by as much as 50,000 as air units were removed to locations on other islands from which they could still provide air support with less risk from the invading force. This difference did not materially affect the ground combat potential in the force projections of the two intelligence services.

This table is Unclassified.

The US Military Intelligence Service in mid-June increased its estimate of Japanese military manpower on Kyushu to 300,000.

During May and the first half of June, intercepted communications disclosed the movement of two more divisions to Kyushu—one from Hokkaido and the other from the Korean Peninsula.¹⁷ Messages also showed that an Army-level headquarters had been established in southern Kyushu and that another was situated in the northern part of the island. Because normal Japanese organizational practice was to subordinate three combat divisions under an Army headquarters (roughly comparable to a US Corps), US intelligence analysts viewed the discovery of these two headquarters as tending to confirm their long-held projections of six divisions evenly divided between northern and southern Kyushu.¹⁸

Intercepted communications also continued to reflect preparations for extensive use of suicide tactics. One series of messages indicated that up to 2,000 obsolete planes and trainers were being assigned to equip and train units for *kamikazi* missions. Instructions were issued to outfit biplanes and other older model aircraft with night operations equipment.

Other intercepted transmissions contained information on the construction of underground hangars and new, concealed dispersal airfields on Kyushu—which the analysts presumed would be used by suicide aircraft. A message in mid-June contained a Japanese naval base commander's description of progress being made on construction of suicide boats, and others dealt with measures to disperse and conceal unmanned "boat bombs." One

intercepted order revealed the presence of a base for piloted suicide torpedoes (*kaiten*) on the southeastern tip of Kyushu.¹⁹

Also during this period, intercepted messages began revealing the assignment of naval ground support personnel to missions normally performed by Army troops. These missions included operation of antiaircraft sites around key points such as bridges and roads, and static defense of bases and depots. A series of transmissions also indicated that one of the units being pulled from the Kuril Islands—a force below division size that was specially tailored for combatting amphibious assaults—was headed for southern Kyushu.²⁰

As a result of these developments, the US War Department's Military Intelligence Service in mid-June increased its estimate of Japanese military manpower on Kyushu to 300,000. This estimate was disseminated just two days before President Truman was to meet with his senior military advisers to discuss planning for an invasion of Japan. The force developments it described were still consistent with the projections made a year earlier regarding Japanese forces likely to be defending Kyushu by the time of the planned invasion on 1 November 1945.

¹⁹ SRS 425, 19 May 1945; SRS 454 and 459, 17 and 22 June 1945.

²⁰ SRS 424 and 437, 18 and 31 May 1945; SRH 195, Bulletin No. 66, 9 June 1945. The unit from the Kurils was the 3rd Amphibious Brigade. After the war it was learned that this unit had been reconstituted into the 125th Independent Mixed Brigade, a regular ground combat unit, but because it continued to use the call number of the amphibious brigade it was carried as such in the MIS force assessments.

¹⁷ SRS 431, 25 May, and SRS 452, 15 June 1945; SRH 195, Bulletin Nos. 66, 68, and 71, 6 and 23 June and 11 July 1945. The division from Korea was the 25th Division and the one from Hokkaido was the 77th.

¹⁸ SRS 409, 410, and 422 of 3, 4, and 16 May 1945; SRS 444 of 7 June 1945. The headquarters in southern Kyushu was identified as the "57th Army." It would be several weeks before the identity of the one in the north would be confirmed as the "56th Army," but analysts assumed this was its designator on the grounds that they had already identified newly created armies in various locations carrying the designators 55th, 57th, and 58th.

Table 3
Japanese Troop Strength on Kyushu—Projected
Versus Current, Mid-June 1945

	Projected (for 1 November 1945)	As of (12 May 1945)	Current ^a (16 June 1945)
Total	350,000	246,000	300,000
Army Ground	230,000	128,000	160,000
Navy Ground	25,000	25,000	45,000
Air Ground	95,000	93,000	95,000

Note: The division suspected to be moving from Hokkaido was still in transit on the date this estimate was disseminated, and, pending confirmation, it was therefore not included in the Military Intelligence Service's Kyushu manpower estimate for this date.

^aSRH 195, Bulletin No. 67, 16 June 1945.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 4
Projected Force Structure Compared to Components
Identified on Kyushu by Mid-June 1945

Projected (Invasion date of 1 November 1945)	Identified	
	12 May 1945	16 June 1945
Northern Kyushu		
(Army Headquarters)		Army Headquarters
Combat Division	Combat Division	Combat Division
Combat Division		
Combat Division		
Depot Division	Depot Division	Depot Division
Depot Division	Depot Division	Depot Division
Miscellaneous Independent Brigades/Regiments	Independent Tank Regiment	Independent Tank Regiment
Southern Kyushu		
(Army Headquarters)		Army Headquarters
Combat Division	Combat Division	Combat Division
Combat Division		Combat Division
Combat Division		(Combat Division) ^a
Miscellaneous Independent Brigades/Regiments		Amphibious Brigade

^a See Note with Table 3 regarding movement of the division from Hokkaido.

This table is Unclassified.

III. President Truman Discusses Invasion Plans With His Military Advisers

After the German surrender on 8 May 1945, arrangements were made for Truman, Churchill, and Stalin to meet in Potsdam, on the outskirts of Berlin, to try to settle the postwar arrangements for Europe and to reach agreement on coordinated Allied military operations against Japan. This Tripartite Conference was scheduled to open on 15 July—just three months after President Truman had taken office.

A month before the conference, Truman met with his senior advisers to go over plans for ending the war with Japan and to prepare himself for Potsdam. In a 14 June memorandum to the service chiefs setting up this meeting, his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, said the President wanted to:

... discuss details of our campaign against Japan. He expects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and prospects in preparation for his discussions with Churchill and Stalin. He wants an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper. He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air forces. It is his intention to make his decision on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives. Economy in the use of time and money cost is comparatively unimportant. I suggest that a memorandum discussion of the above noted points be prepared in advance for delivery to the President at the time of the meeting. . . .²¹

Leahy's memorandum was forwarded immediately to the Joint Planning Staff and the Joint War Plans Committee. The latter body had the task of preparing the initial draft of the paper Leahy had requested for the President.²²

Centrality of the Casualty Issue

Leahy's description of Truman's intent to make his decision on the basis of casualty calculations apparently caught some senior planners offguard. The archival files of papers for this meeting include a memorandum of a telephone conversation on 14 June between the senior Navy representative on the Joint Planning Staff, Adm. Donald Duncan, and his Army counterpart, Gen. George A. Lincoln. Focusing specifically on the "decision" sentence in the Leahy memorandum, Duncan said he found it "a little disturbing . . . it is late in the day to be making decisions . . . when there is a firm directive to do certain things." (He was evidently referring to the 25 May directive.)

After Lincoln affirmed that he considered the commitment to the Kyushu operation to be "a matter of fact," Duncan pointed out that while this commitment may have been made without having been reviewed and cleared by the President, "the Heads of State did approve the overall objective which this directive supports."²³ (He was almost certainly referring to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting in Quebec.) Discussions among various planners over the next few days focused not only on what the proper casualty estimate would be, but also on whether an estimate should even be offered.

Leahy's description of Truman's intent to make his decision [on an invasion] on the basis of casualty calculations apparently caught some senior planners offguard.

²¹ "Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff" from Admiral Leahy, enclosure to JPS 697/D, 14 June 1945, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," RG 165, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944), Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428, NARA.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ "Memorandum for the Record," Telephone Conversation, 14 June 1945, Admiral Duncan and General Lincoln, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428, NARA.

On 15 June 1945, the Joint War Plans Committee submitted its draft of the requested paper to the Joint Planning Staff.²⁴ The paper presented essentially the same case for an invasion of Kyushu that had been made in the earlier debates preceding the operational directive of 25 May. It also incorporated the same forecast of Japanese forces (six combat divisions, two depot divisions, 350,000 men) that had been presented in intelligence estimates going back to mid-1944.

In response to the presidential request for casualty estimates, the Joint War Plans Committee report laid down strong caveats on uncertainty and emphasized that the level of opposition and the time required to complete the operation could result in major variations. The report then offered the following figures as an "educated guess":

Invasion Scenarios	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Southern Kyushu, followed by Tokyo Plain	40,000	150,000	3,500	193,500
Southern Kyushu—Northwestern Kyushu (Japan surrenders)	25,000	105,000	2,500	132,500
Southern Kyushu—Northwestern Kyushu—Tokyo Plain	46,000	170,000	4,000	220,000

Note: The JWPC assessment did not give a specific breakdown for each area individually, but a nominal breakdown can be derived by comparing the component figures given for each scenario. For example, the differences between the second and third scenarios for total casualties and numbers

killed are 87,500 and 21,000, respectively. The operational difference between these two scenarios is the inclusion or absence of an attack on the Tokyo Plain. Thus, an interpretation could be made that the estimated casualty total for the attack on the Tokyo Plain was 87,500, including 21,000 killed. Subtracting these figures from the first scenario would yield figures for southern Kyushu of 106,000 total casualties and 19,000 killed, and a similar calculation shows 26,500 total casualties and 6,000 killed for northwestern Kyushu. These breakdowns have been used by some scholars for analysis of the JWPC estimates. Such calculations, however, need to be read with the caveat that the JWPC figures were scenario-driven. For example, an estimate for an attack directly on northwestern Kyushu not preceded by an attack on southern Kyushu would probably result in figures that were different from those obtained through this derivative process.

A revised version of the 15 June report was circulated the following day to the Joint Chiefs through the Joint Planning Staff, which had made a few changes to the language. Although most of these were little more than minor modifications to the wording, there were two important exceptions: the Joint Planning Staff version deleted both the entire casualty estimate table and the figure that showed total US personnel (766,700) who would be involved in the Kyushu operation. The JCS draft offered no descriptive language or numbers to replace these deletions.²⁵

In an apparent effort to close or narrow the gap between presenting no casualty figures at all and presenting numbers that the Joint Planning Staff was unwilling to use with the President, the Army's Director of Operations, Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, asked his staff for casualty figures for operations on Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Leyte and Luzon (both in the Philippines), and "overall figures on MacArthur's operations to

²⁴ JWPC 369/1, 15 June 1945, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," RG 165, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Entry 421, Box 428.

²⁵ JCS 1388, 16 June 1945, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," RG 165, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428, NARA. For deletions, compare JWPC 369/1, Section 3, 2nd paragraph and Section 7, 3rd paragraph, with the corresponding paragraphs in this document.

date." He said these could be used as background at the upcoming meeting with the President, whom Hull described as "very much disturbed over losses on Okinawa." Hull then incorporated the following casualty figures into a summary of the longer report that had been prepared for the President's meeting.²⁶

Islands Invaded Earlier	US Killed, Wounded, and MIA	Japanese Killed, Prisoners (Not including wounded)	Ratio (US to Japanese)
Leyte	17,000	78,000	1:4.6
Luzon	31,000	156,000	1:5
Iwo Jima	20,000	25,000	1:1.25
Okinawa	34,000 (ground) 7,700 (Navy)	81,000 (Not a final count)*	1:2

Normandy: First 30 days—42,000 US casualties

MacArthur's operations overall (March 1944–May 1945)—Killed: 13,742 US; 310,165 Japanese.
Ratio: 1:22

***Note:** The struggle on Okinawa was ongoing, and ground force casualties there continued to mount. The figures were updated in an 11 July report that was made part of the package of background papers for use at the Potsdam Conference, which took place over the latter half of July. By 11 July, according to the report, the numbers for US casualties on Okinawa since it was invaded in early April had risen to "39,000 ground, 7,700 Navy" versus a "Japanese total of 119,000."

At the same time that General Hull was pulling these figures together, Marshall cabled MacArthur asking for the "estimate you are

using for planning purposes on battle casualties in OLYMPIC up to D plus 90." The response from MacArthur's staff (received in Washington on 17 June) projected battle casualties of 50,800 for the first 30 days of the invasion and a total of 105,050 for the first 90 days. It also anticipated 12,600 nonbattle casualties over the same 90-day span. These numbers applied only to operations to seize the southern part of Kyushu.²⁷

Marshall then cabled MacArthur again, asking if the figures provided by the latter's staff were intended purely for planning medical requirements or were actual estimates of battle results. Marshall prefaced his question by emphasizing Truman's concern about casualties. Many readers of the original text of this cable have interpreted it as intending to convey the message that the figures provided by MacArthur's staff might be viewed as unacceptably high.²⁸

The CINCPAC's answer was delivered to Marshall in time for him to quote from it during the meeting with the President on 18 June. In this message, MacArthur downplayed the figures his staff had sent earlier, describing them as simply cautious logistic planning estimates and maintaining that actual battle losses were likely to be far less. He did not, however, include an explicit figure for what he thought the casualty total would be.²⁹

²⁷ See Skates, *The Invasion of Japan*, pp. 80–81. Also Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, p. 204, quoting "To GHA AFPAC (MacArthur) from Marshall, 16 June 1945," WD1050, and "From CINCPAC," 17 June 1945, WD1052, both in RG#4, Folder 4 (War Department 1000-1095) 29 April–2 August 1945, MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives, Norfolk, VA.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, citing 19 June 1945, WD1056. The archival copy of this cable and the one cited below are dated according to Manila time. For comments on motives see Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 210; Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, p. 204; and Skates, *The Invasion of Japan*, p. 81.

²⁹ *Idem*, 19 June 1945 WD1057, MMBA RG 4.

²⁶ Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," fr. J.E. Hull, RG 165, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944), Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Bcx 428, NARA. The 11 July version (JCS 1388/3) is in the same box. For Hull's request see Allen/Polmar, p. 203, citing Hull-Lincoln correspondence: Memo, 16 June 1945, Marshall Library, Lexington, VA.

[In the 18 June meeting with the President,] Marshall cited the longstanding estimate that by November the Japanese would have eight divisions (six combat and two depot divisions) and a total of 350,000 military personnel on Kyushu.

MacArthur's disclaimer notwithstanding, the numbers offered by his staff were very close to the figure for southern Kyushu derived from the estimates contained in the Joint War Plans Committee paper of 15 June. (See the Note, earlier in this section, accompanying the Joint War Plans Committee's casualty estimates.) They were also consistent with a 30-day casualty estimate prepared by Admiral Nimitz's staff:

	First 30 Days	Total
MacArthur's Staff	50,800	105,050
Joint War Plans Committee		106,000
Nimitz's Staff ^a	49,000	

^a JCS 1388/1, 20 June 1945, "Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, US Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations," RG 165, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 426, NARA.

Presenting the Case

The 18 June meeting with the President was attended by General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, Admiral King, Lieutenant General Eaker representing General Arnold, and the recorder, Brigadier General McFarland. Marshall presented the summary report that General Hull had prepared, including the casualty figures from various operations in the Pacific. The report also included the judgment that "There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon."³⁰

Admiral Leahy challenged the Luzon comparison; he contended that the casualty rate from an invasion of Kyushu would be more likely to resemble the experience on Okinawa.

³⁰ A copy of the official minutes of this meeting is contained in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960), pp. 902-911. Hereafter referred to as *FRUS*.

Noting that the rate on Okinawa had been 35 percent,³¹ Leahy suggested that applying that percentage to the number of US personnel to be committed to the Kyushu operation would produce a more realistic casualty estimate. He asked Marshall what the resulting number would be. Marshall did not respond directly; he merely stated that the total number of US personnel committed to the Kyushu operation would be 766,700—the same number that the Joint Planning Staff had deleted from the Joint War Plans Committee's draft of 15 June. The minutes do not show Marshall or any of the other participants taking the logical next step—calculating what a 35-percent share of this total would be.³²

The minutes of the meeting also reflect little discussion of the size of the Japanese forces expected to be encountered in an invasion of Kyushu. The only reference is a one-sentence statement by Marshall, and even that was made in answer to a question from the President. Marshall cited the longstanding estimate that by November the Japanese would have eight divisions (referring to six combat and two depot divisions) and a total of 350,000 military personnel on Kyushu.³³

³¹ This percentage would increase to 39 with the updated figures that appeared in the 11 July report.

³² According to Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, p. 145, citing "Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Operation Plan No. 10-45, Central Pacific Area: OLYMPIC, 8 August 1945," Naval Historical Center, the portion of the total forces to be landed in the invasion were in 14 divisions with at most some 350,000 troops. Skates, *The Invasion of Japan*, p. 71, gives a similar figure ("353,000 soldiers and marines"), citing Sixth Army Field Order #74, Troop List, 28 July 1945, Records of the Strategic Plans Division, Box 187, also at the Naval Historical Center.

³³ These were the figures given in Tabs D and G of the draft of JCS 1388 that had been prepared specifically for the President's meeting. At the time of the meeting, however, the Joint Chiefs had not reached agreement on the wording of the text of JCS 1388, and thus the paper itself was not given to the President; only the digest prepared by Hull was presented. See "Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary, WDGS," 25 June 1945, from G.A.L.[Incoln], RG 165, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944), Sec. 1-B, NARA.

Most of the discussion about Japanese forces focused on prospects for US air and naval forces to succeed in constraining Japanese reinforcement of the island. Marshall repeatedly emphasized the assessment of the Joint Planners that air and naval power had already reduced movement of Japanese shipping south of Korea and should in the ensuing few months "cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely."³⁴ According to Marshall, these judgments were shared by MacArthur and Nimitz. Later, still reading from the Hull memo, Marshall said that by 1 November "our sea action and air power will have cut Japanese reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions." He made the same point when responding to Leahy's criticism of using Luzon as a model for casualty predictions, stressing that although Japanese reinforcement from other areas was still possible, it was becoming "increasingly difficult and painful."

President Gives the Okay

Truman's questions and comments during this exchange reflected his own continuing unease over the level of US casualties. He asked about the possibility that reinforcements would be sent to Kyushu from other Japanese islands, rather than from the mainland. Marshall assured him that all avenues for such movement were being cut.

The President also expressed concern that an invasion of the homeland by Americans could carry a racial connotation in the minds of the Japanese that would unite them for a fight to the finish. Stimson said there was every indication that this would be the case. At the meeting's end, Truman said he agreed that the

plan presented by the Chiefs was the best choice under the circumstances, but he added that he "had hoped there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other."³⁵


Truman gave the go-ahead to continue preparations for the Kyushu operation; he said the decision on a follow-on invasion of Honshu could be made later. That had been the stance proposed in the paper prepared in advance of the meeting. The minutes of the meeting indicate that an explicit rationale for this postponement was to enable the President and his advisers to take into account the impact of the Kyushu campaign and the anticipated Soviet entry into the war. The upcoming test of the atomic bomb may have been an unspoken factor in the Honshu postponement.³⁶

³⁵ Some authors have cited as further indication of Truman's concern a comment he made earlier in the meeting that Kyushu would "create another Okinawa closer to Japan." In the context of the discussion at the point at which he inserted this comment, however, the issue was the value of Kyushu as a base for air attacks on the Japanese homeland. This comment by Truman, therefore, can just as plausibly be interpreted as endorsing the value of seizing Kyushu, as opposed to bemoaning the cost in casualties. In any event, any reading of the minutes will indicate there is no need to stretch for indications of Truman's concern over casualties. See *FRUS*, Vol. I, Minutes... p. 908.

³⁶ *FRUS*, Vol. I, p. 910. The minutes state that the President and his advisers then discussed "certain other matters," which the records compilers speculated, and which others have asserted, meant the issue of whether the Japanese should be given a specific warning about the atomic bomb. See also page 889ff of *FRUS*, Vol. I.; John McCloy, *Challenge to American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp.42-43; and Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 70-71. For a contesting view see Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb," p. 237.

³⁴ *FRUS*, Vol. I, Minutes, p. 904 and 907. This statement by Marshall, recorded in the minutes, was read verbatim from the memorandum prepared by Hull.

Figure 2
Estimated Japanese Dispositions on Kyushu, 9 July 1945



IV. Tracking the Japanese Buildup As Allied Leaders Meet at Potsdam

On 7 July, Truman boarded a ship bound for Potsdam, arriving there on the 15th. Up to the time of his departure for the conference, intelligence had shown the buildup of Japanese forces on Kyushu to be generally consistent with the earlier projections. As of 18 June—the day he met with his military chiefs to discuss plans for invading Japan—only three combat divisions had been fully confirmed on Kyushu, with a fourth believed to be on the way. By the time Truman reached Potsdam, the presence of the fourth division on Kyushu had been confirmed and two newly created divisions had been discovered, bringing the number of confirmed divisions there to six.³⁷

Intercepted communications in this time period continued to show Japanese preparations for extensive use of suicide weapons and tactics. Messages in late June described additional bases for piloted suicide torpedoes (*kaiten*) and preparations for using oil and gasoline incendiary devices. Intercepted transmissions in July dealt with the deployment of a flotilla of 940 suicide aircraft to 18 concealed bases on Kyushu, as well as extensive efforts to reconfigure floatplanes for suicide missions. The same communications also showed training for night suicide attacks. It was becoming increasingly clear that Japanese naval air elements had been completely turned over to the suicide mission.³⁸

³⁷ SRS 476 and 480, 9 and 13 July 1945; SRH 195, Bulletin Nos. 68 and 71, 23 June and 14 July 1945. The two additions were the 206th and 212th Divisions. Unlike the divisions previously discovered on Kyushu, these—and all subsequently discovered divisions on the island—were newly created from a combined process of conscription, consolidation of smaller units, and utilization of "depot division" resources.

³⁸ "Kaiten...", SRS 463 and 465, 26 and 28 June 1945. "940 aircraft...", SRS 467, 30 June 1945. "Floatplanes...", SRS 483 and 485, 16 and 18 July. "Night tactics...", SRS 483, 16 July 1945. "Naval air focus...", SRS 486, 20 July 1945.

All of the Japanese force buildup and other defensive preparations that had been identified on Kyushu up to the start of the Potsdam conference in mid-July fell within the original projections. But they had been achieved much sooner than expected. In fact, the estimated manpower level for this force was 375,000—25,000 higher than the forecast provided by Marshall for 1 November.³⁹ US Military Intelligence Service analysts, moreover, would subsequently learn that the fifth and sixth Japanese divisions discovered on Kyushu had actually been there as far back as the first week in May.⁴⁰

This meant that at the time of the President's meeting on 18 June with his senior military advisers, the number of divisions on Kyushu had already reached the level that Marshall gave as the forecast for the situation on an invasion date still more than four months down the road. One can only speculate as to how much of an impact this information might have had on the discussions at the 18 June meeting had it been known at the time and conveyed to the President. In any event, the long-held projections would be completely shattered by the end of the first week of the Potsdam Conference.

A Burst of Discoveries


On 21 July the Military Intelligence Service's daily summary on Japanese forces reported that three entirely new divisions had suddenly been discovered on Kyushu. Another was discovered within the next few days, bringing

³⁹ SRS 480, 13 July 1945; SRH 195, Bulletin Nos. 71 and 72 of 14 and 21 July 1945.

⁴⁰ This discovery resulted from learning the meaning of a special communications term for 'division'... SRH 195, Bulletin No. 73, 26 July 1945.

Intercepted communications continued to show Japanese preparations for extensive use of suicide weapons and tactics.

Figure 3
Estimated Japanese Dispositions on Kyushu, 2 August 1945



747222AJ (R03035) 13-96

The MIS weekly summary report of 2 August showed that estimated Japanese military manpower on Kyushu had reached 534,000.

the confirmed total to ten combat divisions and two depot divisions. Intercepted communications provided tenuous evidence that an eleventh combat division was being moved there from Honshu.⁴¹

At about this same time, analysis of a series of messages and their addressees disclosed that an Army headquarters, which had formerly controlled Japanese forces on southwestern Formosa, had recently been moved to southern Kyushu. After this was confirmed, a further review of the messages indicated that this army headquarters (the 40th) probably had been on Kyushu since June.⁴² Analysts had been looking for evidence of an additional army-level headquarters because of the number of combat divisions that were showing up in southern Kyushu.

By 2 August, as Truman was beginning his voyage back to the US from Potsdam, the Military Intelligence Service had confirmed the arrival of the eleventh combat division on Kyushu; it also reported evidence that two more were present or en route.⁴³ The intelligence data on the continuing Japanese buildup on the island also included a significant number of specialized combat units below division size—such as mixed brigades, tank

regiments, and artillery brigades—and a substantial increase in the strength of naval ground troops assigned to defense of bases and support facilities.⁴⁴

The MIS report of 2 August showed that estimated military manpower on Kyushu had reached 534,000.⁴⁵ As substantial as this increase was, it still did not include the full personnel of the recently confirmed eleventh combat division because analysts believed this division was not yet fully deployed. Nor did the new estimate include any manpower for the two suspected but yet-to-be-confirmed divisions. These forces together represented the potential for another 40,000 troops.

SIGINT Picture Raises Concerns for Invasion Plans

These numbers clearly demonstrated that the previously predicted cutoff of Japanese reinforcements—confidently anticipated by Marshall and others in the 18 June briefing of the President—had not happened. A palpable sense of alarm over the implications of this intelligence was exhibited in a paper circulated by the chief of MacArthur's intelligence staff, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, on 29 July:

The rate and probable continuity of Japanese reinforcements into the Kyushu area are changing that tactical and strategic situation sharply.

⁴¹ SRS 488, 492, and 493 of 21, 25, and 26 July 1945; SRH 195, Bulletin No. 73, 28 July 1945. The four confirmed new divisions were, in rough order of discovery, the 146th, 154th, 156th, and 145th.

⁴² SRS 494, 20 July 1945; SRH 195, Bulletin No. 73, 28 July 1945.

⁴³ SRS 500, 2 August 1945. Confirmation of the presence of the 312th Division raised the total to eleven. Other newly detected units included the 4th, 5th, and 6th Tank Brigades. By this time, messages also indicated the presence of the 216th and 303rd Divisions, but analysts initially left open the possibility that these were misinterpretations of signals from divisions already detected. See SRS 497, 30 July 1945.

⁴⁴ SRS 487, 490, and 494, of 20, 23 and 27 July 1945. Also SRH 195, Bulletins 72 and 73 of 21 and 28 July 1945.

⁴⁵ SRS 500, 2 August 1945. This total excludes personnel subordinate to the Area Army Headquarters but not actually located on Kyushu. See note with Table 6.

Table 5
Projected Force Structure Compared With
Components Identified on Kyushu by
2 August 1945

Projected (Invasion date of 1 November 1945)	Identified		
	12 May 1945	16 June 1945	2 August 1945
Northern Kyushu			
(Army Headquarters)		Army Headquarters	Army Headquarters
Combat Division	Combat Division	Combat Division	Combat Division
Combat Division			Combat Division
Combat Division			Combat Division
Depot Division	Depot Division	Depot Division	Combat Division ^a
Depot Division	Depot Division	Depot Division	Depot Division
Miscellaneous Independent Brigades/Regiments	Independent Tank Regiment	Independent Tank Regiment	Independent Tank Regiment
Southern Kyushu			
(Army Headquarters)		Army Headquarters	Army Headquarters
Combat Division	Combat Division	Combat Division	Army Headquarters
Combat Division		Combat Division	Combat Division
Combat Division		(Combat Division) ^b	Combat Division
Miscellaneous Independent Brigades/Regiments		Amphibious Brigade	Combat Division
			Combat Division
			Combat Division
			Combat Division
			Combat Division
			Independent Brigade
			Independent Brigade
			Independent Brigade
			Artillery Command
			Independent Tank Brigade
			Independent Tank Brigade
			Independent Tank Brigade

^a The 2 August Military Intelligence Service daily summary showed four combat divisions in the north, but two days later MIS analysts learned that one, the 206th, had redeployed south. The same day, a new division, the 351st, was discovered in the north, bringing the total to 12—four in the north and eight in the south. A few days later, the presence of two more divisions, the 216th and 303rd, was confirmed—one moving into the north and one into the south. These were the two for which there had been earlier but unconfirmed indications. This total of 14 divisions on the island was confirmed after the war. MacArthur's Intelligence Staff carried the total as 13, with one still in transit.

^b The 77th Division from Hokkaido was thought to be in transit at this time, but this was not confirmed, and the division's manpower was not added until about a week later.

This table is Unclassified.

"This threatening development [the much-larger-than-expected influx of Japanese forces onto Kyushu], if not checked, may grow to a point where we attack on a [troop] ratio of one-to-one, which is not the recipe for victory."—From report by MacArthur's Intelligence Staff, 29 July 1945.

Table 6
Japanese Troop Strength on Kyushu:
Projected Versus Current as of 2 August 1945

	Projected	As of		Current
	1 November	12 May	16 June	1 November ^a
Total	350,000	246,000	300,000	534,000 ^a
Army Ground	230,000	128,000	160,000	346,000 ^a
Navy Ground	25,000	25,000	45,000	90,000
Air Ground	95,000	93,000	95,000	98,000 ^a

^a The figures listed in disseminated official estimates for 2 August (see figure 3) included 9,000 additional personnel in Army ground units and 2,000 more in air-ground components. These forces, however, were not actually on Kyushu; they were stationed on the outer Ryukyus but had been resubordinated to the 16th Area Army headquarters on Kyushu. For purposes of consistency over time, such troops from the outer Ryukyus have been excluded from this study's comparisons of forces on Kyushu at different points in time.

This table is Unclassified.

At least six (6)⁴⁶ additional major units have been picked up in June/July; it is obvious that they are coming in from adjacent areas over lines of communication that have apparently not been seriously affected by air strikes.

There is a strong likelihood that additional major units will enter the area before target date; we are engaged in a race against time by which the ratio of attack effort vis-a-vis defense capacity is perilously balanced.

Unless the use of these [Japanese land and sea] routes [to Kyushu] is restricted by air and/or naval action ... enemy forces in southern Kyushu may be still further augmented until our planned local superiority is overcome, and the Japanese will enjoy complete freedom of

action in organizing the area and in completing their preparations for defense.⁴⁷

Referring to the fact that the original estimates had said the projected force of six combat divisions might be reinforced with three or four more "after the operation begins," the Willoughby report said "these divisions have since made their appearance and the end is not in sight." The report acknowledged that some of the new units on Kyushu were at that time not yet fully manned or equipped, but it nonetheless went on to state that "this threatening development, if not checked, may grow to a point where we attack on a ratio of

⁴⁷ General Headquarters, US Armed Forces Pacific, Military Intelligence Summary, General Staff, "Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation with Respect to Kyushu (dated 25 April 1945), 29 July 1945. The paper is cited in Skates, *Invasion of Japan*, p.141, noting the source's location as the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle, PA. It is also quoted in Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, p. 223, and p. 238, which identifies the location as the National Archives. Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 216, cites the MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives as his source.

⁴⁶ MacArthur's G-2 carried one division, the 145th, as being in transit; thus it cited six divisions, bringing the total to nine, whereas on this date the MIS would have said—correctly as postwar information confirmed—seven new divisions, bringing the total to ten. See also Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 220.

[The Joint War Plans Committee stated that] "this buildup and concentration" of Japanese forces should prompt US field commanders to ... "prepare plans for operations against ... alternate objectives."

one to one, which is not the recipe for victory." This report, moreover, was disseminated before MacArthur's intelligence staff knew of the tenth and eleventh divisions on Kyushu or of the evidence that at least two more were there or en route.

- The intercepted communications also made clear that this buildup had taken place primarily in southern Kyushu, where the US was planning to conduct its landings. Seven of the eleven identified Japanese divisions and most of the independent brigades and regiments were deployed there. This meant that the number of Japanese combat divisions and equivalent forces in southern Kyushu was already more than double the number originally forecast for that part of the island; in fact, it exceeded what had been forecast for all of Kyushu by the invasion date. US intelligence analysts believed that some 320,000 troops—about 60 percent of the total estimated to be on the island—were deployed in the south.⁴⁸

This aspect of the buildup was the focus of an assessment by the intelligence staff of the Sixth Army, which had primary responsibility for ground combat operations in the OLYMPIC operation.⁴⁹ The assessment concluded that the invasion of Okinawa in April had "convinced the Japanese that an assault on southern Kyushu would in all likelihood follow soon afterwards," and that they consequently had "spared no effort to build up the mobile combat potential in Southern Kyushu." The report went on to emphasize that "as many combat divisions . . . have been disposed in Southern Kyushu alone as earlier estimates had computed would be allotted to the whole of Kyushu by [the] target date."

Focusing on the contrast between the level of reinforcement already accomplished and the earlier optimism regarding the ability to cut off any significant movements between the islands, the US Sixth Army's G-2 concluded: "[The] ever increasing aerial offensive can be expected to hamper the execution of the enemy's movements and redispersions, [but] it cannot . . . prevent such movements from being taken prior to [invasion] day" (Emphasis added.) The judgments offered in this report are all the more noteworthy in view of the fact that—although it was disseminated on 1 August—the authors were working with data that were more than a week old, and they were unaware of the full extent of the buildup that would be confirmed by the time their report was issued.

Apparently the stark messages being circulated by the various US intelligence staffs received immediate attention, with the implications flagged in memos circulated at senior military planning levels. Records show, for example, that a summary of the Willoughby report landed on the desk of General Lincoln, who in addition to being the Army's senior representative on the Joint Planning Staff was Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department Operations Division.⁵⁰

The sharply increased numbers presented in the 2 August Military Intelligence Service report were incorporated two days later in a Joint War Plans Committee memorandum to the Joint Planning Staff, recommending that: "The possible effects on OLYMPIC operations of this buildup and concentration" of Japanese forces should prompt US field

⁴⁸ SRS 500, 2 August 1945.

⁴⁹ Sixth Army G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation; OLYMPIC Operation, RG 165, Records of War Department, General and Special Staffs, Entry 418, Box 1843, NARA.

⁵⁰ "Memo to Chief, S&P Group. Subject: 'Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimate OLYMPIC,'" RG 165, ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944), Sec. 1-F, Entry 421, Box 435, NARA.

***Soon the figure
[for Japanese
military
manpower on
Kyushu] was
upped again to
600,000.***

commanders "to review their estimates of the situation... and prepare plans for operations against... alternate objectives."⁵¹ Although this memo was cautiously worded, its message was clear: the dimensions of the opposing forces and defensive preparations on Kyushu mandated a fundamental re-examination of US invasion plans.

Even as this memorandum was being disseminated, intercepted messages confirmed another new division and provided further evidence on the two that had been suspected to be moving to Kyushu. Confirmation of all the communications

⁵¹ JWPC 397, "Alternates to 'OLYMPIC,'" 4 August 1945, RG 165, ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434, NARA. This memo's Enclosure B incorporates the data from the 2 August figures in SRS 500.

evidence would bring the total number of divisions on Kyushu up to 14, more than twice the original estimate. Nine of these were in or being deployed to the south—three times the number of divisions that US analysts had initially projected for that part of the island, where the US landings were to take place. Allowing for partial deployment of these divisions prompted another hike in the Kyushu manpower estimate, this time to 549,000. Soon the figure was upped again to 600,000.⁵²

⁵² SRS 502, 4 August 1945; SRH 195 Bulletin 75, 8 August 1945. The confirmed new arrival was the 351st Division. The earlier suspected and now confirmed divisions were the 216th and the 303rd. The 303rd was headed to southern Kyushu; the 216th went to central Kyushu, replacing the 206th, which also moved south, bringing the number there to nine.

V. Top US Officials' Views of the SIGINT Picture

This alarming intelligence picture did not really begin to come together until about the time the Potsdam Conference was getting underway. The record on how much of it reached the senior US officials there is fragmentary. It seems likely that at least the basic information on the overall dimensions of the buildup reached the key military advisers and perhaps the President, but even this is an inferential judgment.

What Did They Know and When Did They Know It?

The buildup of Japanese forces on Kyushu, including the appearance of new combat units, was reported in signals intelligence summaries addressed to senior US policymakers. Special channels were set up to handle such material addressed to Potsdam, and a scaled-down map room, modeled on the setup at the White House in Washington for charting such information, was established. Both Truman and Stimson confirmed in later years that they had received reports in Potsdam on intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications.⁵³

In a brief given to the "Tripartite" military chiefs on 24 July, Marshall said troop strength on Kyushu and on the outlying Ryukyu Islands other than Okinawa totaled some 500,000.⁵⁴

⁵³ Stimson's and Truman's revelations on their receipt of intercepted Japanese Foreign Ministry cables at Potsdam are described in *FRUS*, Vol. I, p. 873. See also Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb," pp. 242-43, footnote 45 on Marshall's access to this channel at Potsdam. On the Map Room, see George M. Elsey, "Some White House Recollections," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 12, (Summer 1988), pp. 357-364; Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 386, and McCullough, *Truman*, p. 448.

⁵⁴ *FRUS*, Vol. II, p. 346. The Military Intelligence Service manpower estimate for Kyushu (including the outer Ryukyus) for 21 July 1945 was 455,000; four days later it was 525,000. See SRS 488 and 492, 21 and 25 July 1945.

As noted in the footnote with Table 6, the US Military Intelligence Service was including some forces that were located in the outer Ryukyus in its total of troops "subordinate" to the command on Kyushu. The total cited by Marshall—500,000—would have been a rounded version of the fast-rising US estimate of Japanese troops under this command at that time.

Nonetheless, official records of discussions between the President and his key advisers while at Potsdam make no reference to information on the sharply increasing Japanese forces on Kyushu. Nor do the memoirs and diaries produced by so many of the participants in those discussions.⁵⁵ Admiral Leahy said in his memoirs that "military matters occupied a relatively minor role" in the discussions at Potsdam.⁵⁶

Some academic specialists have suggested or implied that the absence of references to the intelligence stems from the secrecy imposed on the signals intelligence source material codenamed "ULTRA"—secrecy that endured well after the war ended:⁵⁷

- US military historian Edward Drea, who is generally acknowledged as having carried

⁵⁵ The search included *FRUS*; Truman, Vol. I: *Year of Decision* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1956); Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950); Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947); Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947); and Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. I, "Decision to Drop the Bomb on Japan," University Publications of America, 1995.

⁵⁶ Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 395.

⁵⁷ In the early World War II period, the US used the term MAGIC to mark cryptanalysis of high-level Japanese communications systems. The British used the term ULTRA to mark cryptanalysis of high-level German systems. As US-British cooperation increased during the war, the US also marked high-level Japanese systems as ULTRA. The US, however, continued to issue a daily summary of Japanese decrypts under the heading of MAGIC.

The buildup of Japanese forces on Kyushu . . . was reported in signals intelligence summaries addressed to senior US policymakers.

Their sensitivity to the secrecy of signals intelligence did not constrain Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal from recording in their diaries the fact that they were receiving intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications.

out perhaps the most extensive research into the use of ULTRA for intelligence on Japanese Army deployments, has pointed out that the sensitive nature of intelligence derived from deciphered Japanese radio messages precluded extensive or explicit note-taking or recorded minutes during planning and decisionmaking sessions.⁵⁸

- British scholar Christopher Andrew, who has written extensively on intelligence practices, has said that ULTRA remained so highly classified until nearly 20 years after the end of the war ("compartmentalized," in the intelligence lexicon) that Truman and most of his advisers were not able to cite references to it in their published memoirs.⁵⁹

Their sensitivity to the secrecy of signals intelligence, however, did not constrain Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal from recording in their diaries the fact that they were receiving intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications. These diary entries are dated at the time they received the information. Forrestal's diary material was published openly in 1951. Stimson's was made publicly available shortly thereafter, and excerpts were incorporated into the 1960 unclassified State Department History of Foreign Relations publication on the Potsdam meetings. In January 1956, President Truman stated at an open conference that he had known of Japan's efforts to enlist Soviet help in brokering conditions for ending the war in the Pacific, and that he had been aware of this before Stalin informed him.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p.xii.

⁵⁹ Christopher Andrew, *For The President's Eyes Only* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), p.151)

⁶⁰ *FRUS*, Vol. II, p.1266—footnote 4 has an excerpt from Stimson's Diary for 16 July; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*: pp.74-76 describes his reading of the Japanese messages. Truman's comments are described in *FRUS*, Vol. I, p. 873.

Did the SIGINT Picture Affect the Discussions at Potsdam?

Some scholars also have suggested that knowledge of the level of Japanese reinforcement efforts was reflected in a statement Truman described some years later as having been made by Marshall at Potsdam. In a 12 January 1953 letter responding to a query from an Air Force historian, the President noted that, after he had learned of the successful nuclear weapon test, he asked Marshall about casualties that would be incurred in carrying the planned invasions through to the Tokyo Plain. The published version of Truman's letter states that Marshall told him it would cost "at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties and might cost as much as a million."⁶¹

A plausible inference some observers have made is that the fact that these numbers were dramatically higher than those which Marshall had presented at the 18 June meeting with the President was probably the result of knowledge that the Japanese were positioning a much larger defense than had been forecast.⁶² This notion carries a further implication that Marshall's statement was influential in the decision to use the atomic weapon. If true, this would establish a link between the intelligence reporting and the decision to drop the bomb.

The origins and validity of the statement attributed to Marshall, however, have been a matter of considerable debate. The "million" end of the range, in particular, has been widely challenged as being without basis and as a

⁶¹ The Truman letter is reproduced in Wesley Frank Craven and James L. Cate, editors, *The Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. 5, "The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki," June 1944 to August 1945, (Chicago, 1955), between pp. 712-713. The query was from Cate, and a copy of it can be found in Merrill, *Documentary History of Truman Presidency*, p. 511.

⁶² See for example Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 222.

product of an *ex post facto* campaign to put forth a rationale for having used the atomic bomb.

A review of documents from the Truman Library shows that Truman's initial draft response to the query describes Marshall only as saying "one quarter of a million would be the minimum." The "as much as a million" phrase was added to the final draft by Truman's staff, so as not to appear to contradict an earlier statement given in a published article by Stimson (which has been widely challenged).⁶³

A quarter of a million is roughly the level—220,000—that the Joint War Plans Committee, in its paper prepared for Truman's 18 June meeting, had estimated would result if Japan's surrender required seizing all of Kyushu plus the Tokyo Plain. As was noted earlier in this study, those figures, taking into account various scenarios and the duration of the operation for which the casualties were estimated, were consistent with estimates made at the same time by the staffs of MacArthur and Nimitz.

To many observers at the time, the quarter-million figure put forward in June by the Joint War Plans Committee could well have seemed intimidating. By comparison, the combined casualty figure for MacArthur's campaign through the Philippines, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima was 133,000. For Normandy, from D-Day through 48 days of conflict, losses were

63,360. For the Battle of the Bulge they were 59,000.⁶⁴

The casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan had been constructed before the receipt of evidence that defensive forces on Kyushu would be much higher than initially expected. Even so, they were excluded from the presentation to Truman on 18 June, apparently because of concern over how the President might react. If, as the evidence seems to show, Marshall was indeed in possession of the latest Kyushu estimates at the time the detailed report of the Alamogordo test was being read in Potsdam (21 July), he would have known even then (a) that the overall number of Japanese combat divisions on Kyushu already exceeded what had been expected by the invasion date still three months away, and (b) that the number for the south—where the landings were to take place—was at least double what had been forecast. Under those conditions, it is not unreasonable, as has been argued, to postulate that Marshall could have—without stretching—responded to a question on expected casualties by citing estimates that he had known about earlier but had considered higher than he wanted to accept, or higher than he thought the President could accept.

Such an interpretation, while not unreasonable, is nonetheless conjecture. Whether in fact Marshall actually made such a statement remains a matter of some ambiguity. And even if one concludes that the intelligence on the Japanese force buildup was fully digested by the US officials in Potsdam, there remains the question of whether and in what way it affected the actions taken there.

⁶³ Merrill, ed., *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*. Vol. I, pp. 510-526 contains copies of the paper trail of this drafting process, beginning with a copy of the request from Air Force historian James Cate, through the various memos from staff assistants suggesting changes, to the final draft as it appeared in the 1953 publication by Cate. The Stimson article appears in the February 1947 issue of *Harpers* magazine, and is reproduced almost entirely in Stimson/Bundy, *On Active Service*, Chapter XXIII, pp. 612-633.

⁶⁴ The Pacific campaign figure and the Normandy figures are from Skates, *Invasion of Japan*, p. 78-79. The Battle of the Bulge figures are from Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, p. 134.

VI. The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb

On the evening of 16 June—Truman's second day at Potsdam—he received a cryptic notification that the atomic bomb had been successfully tested early that morning at Alamogordo, New Mexico. On 21 July he received via special courier a detailed report on the test results from Gen. Leslie Groves.⁶⁵ (This was the same day the Military Intelligence Service reported that the number of identified combat divisions on Kyushu had jumped to nine.) Three days later Gen. Carl Spaatz headed to Guam as the new head of Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, carrying written instructions for his new command to deliver the first "special bomb" as soon after 3 August as weather permitted. The document said the instructions were issued "by direction and with the approval of" Stimson and Marshall.⁶⁶ According to General Arnold, the dispatch that initiated the drafting of these instructions was sent to Washington from Potsdam via courier as early as 22 July.⁶⁷

On the morning of the 31st, President Truman was given a cable from Stimson requesting approval of a draft public statement planned for release immediately after the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan. Stimson's message included an apology for his "haste," but it added that "the time schedule on General Groves' project is progressing so rapidly that it is now essential that [a] statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August."

Truman penciled his response on the back of the Stimson cable, and it was sent immediately to Washington. It said: "Suggestion approved. Release when ready but not sooner than August 2" (i.e., after Truman's departure from Potsdam).⁶⁸ The President gave this go-ahead two days before the Military Intelligence Service issued its report on "eleven divisions" that was cited in the Joint War Plans Committee's recommendation for studying "Alternates to OLYMPIC."

This sequence of events is consistent with the weight of evidence from archival documents and from statements and memoirs of the participants in the Potsdam discussions indicating that for *all practical purposes the decision on whether to use the nuclear weapon*

*[On 31 July]
Truman penciled
on the back of the
Stimson cable . . .
"Suggestion
approved.
Release [the
atomic bomb]
when ready
but not sooner
than August 2."*

⁶⁵ See *FRUS*, Vol. II, pp. 1360-1370 for copies of the initial reporting cables, the Groves report, and notes from Stimson's diaries regarding his delivery of these messages to the President at Potsdam.

⁶⁶ A copy of Spaatz's instructions can be found in Stanley Weintraub, *The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II* (NY, 1995), p. 192, and Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), p. 544. Spaatz received the directive while in Washington on the eve of moving from his position as General Arnold's deputy to take command of air forces in the Pacific. The directive was given to him by Gen. Thomas Handy, Acting Army Chief of Staff while Marshall was in Potsdam. Spaatz carried it with him to Guam on 24 July (the 25th in the Far East), with instructions to pass one copy each to MacArthur and Nimitz. Thus archival listings vary, from the copy addressed "Thomas T. Handy to Carl Spaatz," 25 July 1945, Box 21, Spaatz Papers, Library of Congress (a copy of which is also attached to James L. Cate to HST, 6 Dec. 1952, Box 112, Truman Library) versus Spaatz's transmission to MacArthur and Nimitz, cited by Drea in *MacArthur's ULTHA*, chapter 8, footnote 27, as COMGENUSASTAF, Eyes Only to MacArthur and Nimitz, 25 July 1945, RG 30, Box 7, Folder 7, MMBA.

⁶⁷ Arnold, *Global Mission*, p. 589.

⁶⁸ Copies of the Stimson cable and Truman's handwritten note on the back are on pp. 174-75 of Merrill, *Documentary History*... Vol. I. Stimson's cable was sent late on 30 July and was handed to Truman at about 7:30 a.m. on the 31st. A copy of the cable carrying Truman's reply can be found in the National Archives. ("President to Secretary of War," 31 July 1945, File 74, Roll 6, Harrison-Bundy Files.) Stimson's cable said he was sending a copy of the new text by courier; it arrived later on the 31st. See Merrill, *Documentary History*... Vol. I, p. 181-193. The 31 July date on both Truman's response and the courier package can be interpreted to mean that Truman was responding to the couriered text, (e.g., Alperovitz, *Decision to Drop the Bomb*, p. 596), but in fact he gave his okay before the text arrived by courier. The text of the statement ultimately released on 6 August is in *FRUS*, Vol. II, p. 1376.

The "Interim Committee" [a high-level group of advisers from government, industry, and science] had recommended to the President that the bomb be used as soon as possible, against a military-industrial target in Japan, and without prior warning.

against Japan had already been reached by the time the President arrived in Potsdam. On this point virtually all scholars who have studied the issue seem to concur, however much they may disagree on the motives for its use and whether its use was justified.⁶⁹

On 1 June the "Interim Committee"—a group established by Truman and chaired by Stimson that included political advisers in and out of the government, scientists, and industrialists, with Marshall and Groves also involved—had recommended to the President that the bomb be used as soon as possible, against a military-industrial target in Japan, and without prior warning. This was the governing concept during all of the Committee meetings over the next five weeks. The meetings also featured discussions of drafts and re-drafts of Presidential public statements to be made when the bomb was used.⁷⁰

Debate continued over whether to provide a warning and perhaps a demonstration of the weapon's devastating power. Some scientists outside the Interim Committee dissented altogether from the idea of using the new weapon. But the record shows that Truman agreed with the course of action recommended by the Committee and had every intention of implementing it.⁷¹

⁶⁹ This statement is based on reading the documents, memoirs, and scholarly presentations listed in Appendix A. A suggestion of late input from developments at Potsdam might be inferred from Alperovitz, *Decision to Drop the Bomb* (pp. 557-9), which raises questions about the fact that the Truman documentary records show a gap in the President's Potsdam diaries for the dates 21-24 July and 27-29 July 1945. Alperovitz's interpretations as to what might have been withheld from disclosure, however, bear more on motives vis-a-vis the USSR.

⁷⁰ Merrill, ed. *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. I, pp. 19-43, 94-101, and 106-110. Includes copies of the minutes of the Interim Committee meetings from mid-May through 6 July. See esp. p. 46, fourth paragraph.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 534-540 contains a chronology prepared in 1957 by a Truman archivist, laying out the consultative path to the use of the bomb. It provides many page-specific citations from official documents and memoirs and is a useful research guide into the discussions preceding the Potsdam Conference.

The record of documents and memoirs also shows that, from the time that word of the successful test arrived in Potsdam, the internal discussions there focused on (1) how soon it would be possible to use the weapon—including whether it might be ready before the USSR formally entered the war against Japan; (2) what would be the first target or targets (from a short list that had been already drawn up); (3) the wording of what would become known as the "Potsdam Declaration", which warned the Japanese of the consequences of not surrendering "unconditionally" and outlined in general terms what that meant (but did not warn specifically about the atomic bomb); and (4) the public statement the President should release immediately after the bomb was dropped. The news of the test also sparked further discussion on whether the USSR's commitment to the war was still needed and whether and how to inform Stalin of the bomb. There are, however, no explicit references to the Japanese defensive buildup as a factor in any of these discussions, and no indications that it affected any of the actions taken.⁷²

Whether any formal decisionmaking meeting took place among the key Potsdam participants on the subject of using the bomb is itself a question for which the evidence is at best tenuous and conflicting. A Truman biographer has pointed to 24 July, when Truman and Churchill met jointly with their military chiefs, as the day of the "critical moment." But there is no evidence that this subject came up at that meeting.⁷³

Some sources have suggested that a key meeting took place on 22 July, the day after

⁷² *FRUS*, pp. 1360-1378 show the exchange of cables between Potsdam and Washington from 16 to 30 July. Also included are several excerpts from Stimson's diary describing the discussions in Potsdam coincident with the cable exchange. Pp. 1265-1289 provide similar detail on the evolution of the final wording of the "Potsdam Declaration." Discussions pertaining to the USSR are described on p. 1324, and in Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 419.

⁷³ McCullough, *Truman*, p. 142. His comments can be compared to the record of the meeting. *FRUS*, Vol II, p. 339ff.

Truman received the Groves report on the test results, and that this meeting may have been the occasion when the President asked the question of Marshall that resulted in the "quarter of a million" statement.⁷⁴ All references to this meeting appear to be based on Truman's statement in his January 1953 letter to the Air Force historian—and also in his memoirs—that after receiving the "report" (presumably a reference to the Groves document), he called together all his advisers. The records and memoirs clearly establish that Truman did have a private meeting with Churchill that day, with Marshall and Leahy in attendance, to discuss use of the bomb.

A detailed review of the Potsdam records, however—along with accounts of the activities that day of the officials Truman claimed were present at a larger and more formal meeting—suggest that while the President may have engaged in separate consultations with individual advisers at different times, there was no gathering of the whole group as has been sometimes claimed. Based on the record, it seems more accurate to describe the events in Potsdam regarding the atomic bomb as a series of ad hoc "consultations," probably stretching over a few days following the President's receipt of news of the successful test.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, p. 266-267. In their chapter notes, however, they also point to discrepancies regarding the time and attendance of this alleged meeting.

⁷⁵ *FRUS*, Vol. II, p. 243 gives the date and a list of attendees, but cites as a source Truman's memoirs. See also the letter to James Cate, cited in footnotes 61 and 63. Sources for the Truman-Churchill meeting include *FRUS*; Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 419; and Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI, *Triumph and Tragedy* (London, Cassell and Co., 1954), p. 668. Records of Truman's own schedule, including the meeting with Churchill, and the accounts and schedules of others for that day (e.g., Stimson and Arnold) given in *FRUS*, Vol. II, p. 1373, and of Byrnes' attendance at a Foreign Ministers' meeting at 11:10, *FRUS* Vol. II, p. 226, seem to rule out a larger meeting with all his advisers, unless it was very brief. No person Truman listed as being at the meeting has described it. Stanley Weintraub, who has researched the day-to-day schedule meticulously, flatly says the meeting did not occur (*The Last Great Victory*, p. 175). It may be that Truman conflated recollections of separate conversations. That does not mean he did not ask what he said he asked, but rather that if he did, the setting in which this occurred is different from what his memo implied.

A conclusion that no such formal gathering took place is not an argument that concern over the casualty cost of an invasion of the Japanese homeland was not a central consideration in the decisions regarding the use of the bomb. The concern over casualties is clearly reflected, for example, in the discussions between the President and his advisers on 18 June, including Admiral Leahy's questioning of the merits of paying such a price for unconditional surrender.⁷⁶

A further example is Secretary Stimson's memorandum to the President on 2 July, which ultimately evolved into the Potsdam Declaration. As initially drafted by Stimson, this memo was much more explicit than the version adopted at Potsdam on conceding to the Japanese the right to maintain the institution of the emperor. Stimson described his intentions as seeking Japan's surrender without incurring the high casualties he feared would result from an invasion.⁷⁷

Nor should the evidence be construed as indicating that concern over casualties was the only factor exerting critical force on the A-bomb decision. What the evidence does indicate is that the view of the bomb as a potential way to end the war quickly—in the hope of (1) avoiding the need for an invasion with resulting casualties that by any standard would be of intimidating proportions, (2) minimizing the USSR's postwar leverage, and (3) not having to confront debate over concessions on the terms of unconditional surrender—was the driving force in the minds of the US leadership team before Potsdam, and before the acquisition of intelligence showing much-larger-than-expected Japanese forces on Kyushu. Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible that the buildup disclosed by early August reinforced the belief that the decision to use the bomb was the path of least resistance.

⁷⁶ *FRUS*, Vol. I, pp. 909-910.

⁷⁷ Stimson's letter and draft statement are in *FRUS*, Vol. I, pp. 889-894.

The evidence indicates that the view of the bomb as a way to end the war quickly . . . was the driving force in the minds of the US leadership . . . [even] before the acquisition of intelligence showing much-larger-than-expected Japanese forces on Kyushu.

VII. What If the A-Bomb Had Not Been Ready?

The impact of signals intelligence on the decisions at the end of the war thus falls into the "what if" category. There are of course libraries of "what if" analysis on the dropping of the atomic bomb. In this case, however, the "if" question can be narrowed to the specific issue of the impact of signals intelligence, and for that there is an empirical base.

The recommendation to examine alternative invasion sites, outlined in the 4 August memorandum by the Joint War Plans Committee, was explicitly tied to the intelligence derived through intercepted communications. Enclosed with this memorandum was a draft cable that the committee recommended be sent to MacArthur and Nimitz. The cable referred to highly classified reporting that

Indicated a strengthening of Japanese forces and measures in southern Japan [Kyushu] to an extent considerably in excess of that previously estimated as Japanese capability by OLYMPIC target date. While these measures ... are not yet considered to require change to your current directive it is desired that you... make alternative plans and submit timely recommendations. *Operations against extreme northern Honshu, against the Sendai area [in northeastern Honshu] and directly against the Tokyo Plain are under intensive study here.*⁷⁸ (Emphasis added.)

Although this cable, adhering to bureaucratic rules, would have told the Pacific commanders that it was not yet necessary to change their current operational plans, it also said clearly that they should begin preparing for such a turn of events. The question of making such a change was about to come before the Joint Chiefs.

On 6 August—the morning after the A-bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima,⁷⁹ and while the results were still being evaluated—Marshall was notified that, as a consequence of the concerns expressed by the Joint Planning Staff, the next meeting of the Joint Chiefs probably would address the issue of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu and examine alternatives to the planned invasion.⁸⁰ There is every reason to believe that, *if the atomic bomb had not been ready and used when it was, this JCS meeting would have been held.*

Had the meeting taken place, the earlier arguments for avoiding an invasion altogether, relying instead on sea and air strangulation and destruction, almost certainly would have been revived. Such arguments by Admiral King and General Arnold had never really been overridden; advocates of this position had simply been placated. If the bomb had not been available, King's and Arnold's views would have been buttressed by the SIGINT evidence indicating a potential escalation of the estimated costs of an invasion.

Re-Evaluation of the Casualty Estimates?

There is no record that any revised casualty estimates were actually produced as a result of the dramatically changed SIGINT picture of the opposing forces that an invasion would have encountered. But a meeting held specifically in response to intelligence showing a much-larger-than-expected buildup of opposition forces would not have been able to duck the casualty implications of that information.

The original estimates by the Joint War Plans Committee and by MacArthur's staff had been produced when both groups were forecasting opposing forces only half the size that now

The recommendation to examine alternative invasion sites... was explicitly tied to the intelligence derived through intercepted communications.

⁷⁸ *Idem* JWPC 397, Appendix to Enclosure A.

⁷⁹ 6 August (Tokyo time) is usually identified historically as the date for the dropping of the first A-bomb (on Hiroshima). In Washington time, the event occurred on 5 August.

⁸⁰ Skates, *The Invasion of Japan*, p. 142.

By the first week in August, the estimated total of Japanese Army and naval ground combat troops on Kyushu was more than six times what it had been on Okinawa.

awaited them. And even those casualty estimates had been purposely excluded from the briefing of a President who had said he planned to "make his decision...with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives."

The most recent US experience bearing on the casualty question in the Pacific war was Okinawa. Japanese regular Army troops and naval ground-based defense forces on that island when it was invaded by US forces in April 1945 totaled some 75,000. Also on hand were about 25,000 civilian-paramilitary defenders and an unknown number of additional civilian volunteers. By the beginning of August the US casualties in the ongoing struggle on Okinawa had reached 49,000.⁸¹

Attacking Kyushu would have meant invading an island many times larger than Okinawa; southern Kyushu alone is well over twice Okinawa's size in square miles. Kyushu was initially expected to be garrisoned by Japanese ground combat forces roughly three-and-one-half times the size of the forces on Okinawa.⁸² Kyushu also had a civilian augmentation potential many times greater than Okinawa's. The initial estimates by the Joint War Plans Committee and MacArthur's staff of casualties that would be incurred in capturing southern Kyushu (105,000-106,000) were a little more than twice the Okinawa total.

By the first week in August, the estimated total of Japanese Army and naval ground combat troops on Kyushu was more than six times what it had been on Okinawa. Intercepted communications had been showing Japanese preparations to employ the same kinds of suicide attacks and other unconventional tactics and devices that had caused so many casualties in the Okinawa operation. The number of US Army and Marine troops to be

committed in the landing was about three times the force that had been launched against Okinawa.⁸³

These figures would have given some senior officials—including Admiral Leahy, who had already challenged the earlier presentation—a powerful case that a plausible casualty estimate had to be significantly more than double the Okinawa level. Leahy had supported the blockade-and-bomb strategy in earlier debates, and he was the only participant in the 18 June White House meeting recorded in the minutes as saying that he did not think unconditional surrender was worth a high cost in American casualties.

It is not clear at what stage Secretary of War Stimson might have been drawn into the debate. His concerns about casualties, however, had also been clearly reflected in the 18 June meeting and in his efforts on the Potsdam Declaration.⁸⁴

The Argument for Staying the Course

The opposite pole of the debate would doubtless have been the position supported by MacArthur. He favored going ahead with the Kyushu invasion as planned.

When told that alternatives to Kyushu would be the main issue at a coming JCS meeting, Marshall sent a personal cable to MacArthur soliciting his views.⁸⁵ Marshall emphasized the large Japanese land and air buildup on Kyushu

⁸¹ Allen/Polmar, *Codenamed Downfall*, p.97.

⁸² To avoid exaggerating the Okinawa-Kyushu comparisons, Air Force ground personnel are excluded. Some 100,000 were estimated to be on Kyushu.

⁸³ Allen/Polmar, *Codenamed Downfall*, p.98 gives total US troops in the initial land assault on Okinawa as 100,000, and about 25,000 were landed as reinforcements. As noted in footnote 32, the US total for Kyushu was 350,000.

⁸⁴ Leahy... *FRUS*, Vol. I, p. 909. Stimson... *FRUS*, Vol. I, p. 889.

⁸⁵ Message, WAR 45369, Marshall to MacArthur, 7 August 1945. Described in Skates, *The Invasion of Japan*, p. 142; Allen/Polmar, *Codenamed Downfall*, p. 223; and Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 222. Skates gives the location as the Nimitz Command Summary, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. Allen and Polmar list the MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives, WD1104. (The date is for Far East time, apparently because the available copies are from files there.)

Postwar information showed that there had been 14 Japanese combat divisions on Kyushu—and that intercepted communications had identified all of them.

that had been reported in intelligence, noting that, if the Japanese were in fact deployed in such numbers there, US landing forces risked heavy losses in their amphibious attacks. Pointing out that the buildup on Kyushu had been carried out at the expense of reductions in other locations, Marshall queried MacArthur about "possible alternative objectives" at less defended sites, pointing to the three that the Joint War Plans Committee's 4 August memo had characterized as "under intensive study here."

MacArthur's response was dismissive of the reported buildup:

- He said he did "not, repeat not, credit the heavy strengths reported to you in southern Kyushu."
- He reiterated that airstrikes would cut off Japanese reinforcement, despite reports from his own intelligence staff—and from the Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington—that so far this had demonstrably not occurred.
- He rejected the alternatives suggested by Marshall as either not feasible without air bases closer to the homeland (in the case of the Tokyo Plain) or requiring substantial delay for preparations (in the Northern Honshu case).

MacArthur argued that "there should not, repeat not, be the slightest thought of changing the OLYMPIC operation. Its fundamental purpose is to obtain air bases under cover of which we can deploy forces to the northward into the industrial heart of Japan. The plan is sound and will succeed." He concluded: "Throughout the Southwest Pacific Area campaigns, as we have neared an operation, intelligence has invariably pointed to greatly

increased enemy forces. Without exception, this buildup has been found to be erroneous."⁸⁶

It is worth noting that MacArthur did not argue that the buildup—if true—should not be viewed as threatening the success of OLYMPIC. Instead he tried to impeach the accuracy of the reporting. This tactic could be interpreted as an indication that he recognized that if SIGINT reflecting the buildup was accurate—or if it was accepted as accurate by Washington—it would indeed have significant implications for the invasion plan.

MacArthur's practice was to not allow intelligence to interfere with his aims, and his history of complaints about Willoughby's reports resulted mainly from their contradiction of his own estimates and preferred courses of action. His denigration of the reported buildup on Kyushu directly contradicted the performance record of his G-2 under Willoughby. In those instances during MacArthur's Pacific campaign when the ULTRA-derived assessments were not entirely accurate, the errors tended to be on the low side.⁸⁷

In this instance, postwar information would show that there had in fact been 14 Japanese combat divisions on Kyushu—and that intercepted communications had identified all of them. The exact locations of a few of the newest arrivals had not been determined at the time of the war's end, but it is quite likely that, once their existence on Kyushu had been confirmed, finding their locations would have been accomplished within a few weeks at

⁸⁶ See Skates, *The Invasion of Japan*, p. 142-3; Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, pp. 223-4; and Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 222-3—all citing Message C31897, MacArthur to Marshall: CINCPAC to WARCOS 5 August 1945. Naval Historical Center and MacArthur's Bureau of Memorial Archives. WD1106.

⁸⁷ See Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 223 and Allen/Polmar, *Codename Downfall*, p. 224.

A middle ground between an invasion of Kyushu and a blockade-and-bomb strategy would have been the approach proposed by the War Plans Committee, . . . which sought a target less well defended than Kyushu.

most. Japanese documents obtained after the war showed that at the time the US Military Intelligence Service was estimating 600,000 troops on Kyushu, there were 900,000 soldiers assigned to its defense.⁸⁸

Looking for a Middle-Ground Strategy

A middle ground between an invasion of Kyushu and a blockade-and-bomb strategy would have been the approach proposed by the War Plans Committee, apparently with some support from Marshall. The Committee continued to insist on an invasion of the Japanese homeland but sought a target less well defended than Kyushu.

The views of General Marshall and most of the Joint War Plans Committee on the obstacles to achieving unconditional surrender would have made it difficult for them to abandon their advocacy of an invasion of the Japanese homeland. The unconditional surrender objective was about much more than the status of the Emperor. Indeed, the latter issue was the easiest to resolve. While some Allied governments, especially the Australians and Chinese, remained opposed to retention of the Emperor, many key UK and US officials—including some members of the JCS—were not only willing to allow the Emperor to remain, but actually favored doing so in the belief that this would facilitate the administration of Japan by a postwar occupation force.⁸⁹

The more important Allied objectives of unconditional surrender were the unrestricted

occupation of Japanese territory, total authority in the governing of Japan, dismantlement of Japan's military and military-industrial complex ("demobilization"), a restructuring of Japanese society ("demilitarization"), and Allied-run war crimes trials—in effect doing to Japan what was being done to Germany. Abandoning these goals would mean Japan would not suffer the same consequences as Germany. Truman's consciousness of the political side to this issue was indicated in his meeting with his military advisers on 18 June, in which he said that he was deliberately leaving the door open to a modification of the surrender terms but that the initiative would have to come from Congress.⁹⁰

Achieving the surrender and "unrestricted occupation of the entire national territory of an opponent steeped in a warrior tradition and a history as a great power, without having captured any portion of that territory, posed an extraordinary challenge. It had not been achieved in Germany without invasion:

- The historical record shows that after the bomb was dropped, the Japanese civilian leadership was willing to settle for only one concession by Japan's conquerors—the Emperor's continuity.
- The Japanese military, however, held out on the very issues that defined the Allies' unconditional position, insisting that there be no security occupation of Japan, that disarmament and demobilization be left in Japanese hands; and that war criminals be tried by Japanese tribunals.
- Inasmuch as none of these concessions had been granted to Germany, Allied leaders doubtless would have had great difficulty in gaining political support at home for granting any of them to Japan.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA*, p. 222. Drea cites as his sources Boeicho, *Boei kenshujo*, [Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies], ed., *Senshi soshu*, Vol. 57: *Hondo kessen jumbi: Kyushu no boei* [Official Military History, Vol. 57, Preparations for the Decisive Battle of the Homeland: Defense of Kyushu] (Tokyo, 1972); and Hayashi Saburo, *Taiheiyō senso rikusen gaishi* [An Overview of Army Operations in the Pacific War], Tokyo, 1951).

⁸⁹ See for example *FRUS*, Vol. II, p. 1268-69 for JCS views on this point.

⁹⁰ *FRUS*, Vol. I, p. 909

⁹¹ Asada, Sadao, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender," Manuscript, 1997; Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb," p. 240.

Whether the Allies' demands could be achieved without capturing any part of the Japanese homeland was really what the debate between invasion and bomb-and-blockade was all about. By early August the casualty costs of an invasion would have added credibility to the case for bomb-and-blockade. That strategy's downside was time: how much destruction had to be imposed, and for how long, and how many more thousands of Japanese had to be killed by bombing or starvation to achieve unconditional surrender?

Implications of Soviet Entry Into the Pacific War

By this time (early August), the prospect of Soviet entry into the war against Japan would have provided arguments to both sides. For those favoring a bomb-and-blockade approach or even just a postponement of any invasion, Soviet entry could have been cited as an additional reason why surrender could be obtained without invading the main Japanese islands.⁹²

On the other hand, if Japan's surrender did not take place until after the Soviets had been in the Pacific war for some length of time, and if there were no US forces on Japanese territory (because no US invasion had occurred), how could the United States and its Allies acquire the control over occupation that they were seeking? Unless the mere entry by the USSR somehow caused an immediate surrender on the unconditional terms being demanded by Washington, the Potsdam experience was likely to reinforce the tendency among at least some US officials to see any gain resulting from Soviet entry as also carrying a serious potential cost—the possible emergence of a Far Eastern version of the Soviet hegemony that was beginning to be imposed on Eastern Europe.

Weighing Alternatives

These considerations supported the idea of searching for an alternative that still involved capturing some Japanese homeland territory. The appreciation that Marshall and many members of the Joint War Plans Committee would have had for the casualty implications of the Japanese buildup probably would have led them—MacArthur's views notwithstanding—to look for alternative invasion sites.

In addition to the choices suggested in Marshall's cable to MacArthur and in the Joint War Plans Committee paper of 4 August, there was the option of keeping Kyushu as the target but postponing the ground invasion so as to allow the increased air power from bases being set up on Okinawa to administer an extended pounding. Such an intensified air bombardment campaign had been slated to begin in mid-September; the Army Air Forces at MacArthur's request had already accelerated this timetable by 30 days because of Willoughby's recommendation based on the buildup that had been observed.

Timing and weather posed potential problems for the option of choosing an alternative invasion site. Such a major change in plans at this time presumably would have forced a delay in launching the invasion. As noted earlier, the date for invading Kyushu had already been moved up from 1 December to 1 November in response to concerns expressed by MacArthur and Nimitz, among others, over the greater chance of adverse weather during an invasion that did not begin until December and the possibility that such conditions could set the invasion back to spring 1946.

From this perspective, there was little difference between seeking new invasion alternatives and opting for a bomb-and-blockade strategy. Each involved putting the invasion on hold and engaging in an intensified air and sea attack; if that did not produce a

⁹² The USSR declared war against Japan on 8 August 1945.

surrender within the next six months, the invasion issue might or might not be back on the planning board. The military alternative to this course of action was to go ahead with the invasion and risk the high casualties. The political alternative was to relax the terms for surrender.

Japanese Perspectives

This was exactly the dilemma that Japanese military leaders had sought to force the United States and its Allies to face. They wanted to buy time in the hope that war-weariness in the Allied countries, in combination with concerns about high casualties, would produce a softening of the unconditional surrender demands. Even for the Japanese, the issue was not whether they would be forced to surrender, but rather on what terms. The best leverage for Japan's leadership was to raise the cost perceptions—both military and political—for Allied decisionmakers.

The downside for the Japanese from Allied decisions dragging out the war would not only have been the devastation and loss of life that would have resulted from bombing and sea strangulation. The longer the war lasted, the longer and deeper Soviet participation would become. And attaining a satisfactory postwar settlement once the inevitable surrender did take place would probably have been more problematic.

* * *

Any attempt to conclude how the debate among US leaders over invading Japan would have come out if the atomic bomb had not been available to end the Pacific war abruptly would be a matter of guesses and probably preferences. The planned JCS meeting that was to examine alternatives to an invasion of Kyushu did not take place because the atomic bomb was dropped at the very time the meeting was being scheduled.

This potentially historic meeting had been proposed in direct response to the picture of an accelerating Japanese buildup portrayed by signals intelligence. Had the bomb not been ready when it was, and had the meeting gone ahead, history may well have judged this critical re-examination of strategic choices as one of the most pivotal contributions of SIGINT to the outcome of the Pacific war.

Appendix A

References

Archival Sources

Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, Vol. I: The Decision to Drop the Bomb on Japan (Dennis Merrill, ed.). University Publications of America, 1995.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers—The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, Vols. I and II. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1960.

Record Group 165, *Records of War Department General and Special Staffs*. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland:

- JIC 191/1, 24 June 1944, *Japanese Reaction to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JWPC 235/3, 4 September 1944, *Plan For Operations Against Kyushu*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-C, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JIC 210/3, 5 September 1944, *Effects on Enemy Strategy of Operations Against Kyushu or Hokkaido*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JLC/1, 12 October 1944, *Logistics Plan For Operations Against Kyushu*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JWPC 235/4, 16 November 1944, *Plan For Operations Against Kyushu*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JCS 1259/4 and 1259/5, 3 April 1945, *Command and Operations Directive For the Pacific*. ABC 381 Pacific Ocean Area (29 January 1943) Sec. 3.
- JIS 146/D, 10 April 1945, *Request for Intelligence Estimate of Japanese Reaction to an Attack on Northern Kyushu*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JIC 284, 30 April 1945, *Japanese Reaction to an Assault on the Fukuoka-Yawata Area of Kyushu*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- USAFPAC, MIS G-2, *Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu in November 1945*. (Disseminated 25 April 1945) Entry 418, Box 1842.

- JCS 924/15, 25 April 1945, *Pacific Strategy*. ABC Pacific (17 January 1943) Entry 421, Box 457.
- JCS 158/M9, May 1945, *Request for Intelligence Assessment of Japanese Reaction to an Attack on Southern Kyushu*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 384.
- JIC 191/7, 16 May 1945, *Japanese Reactions to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu*. AEC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JCS 1331/1, 30 April 1945, *Note to Joint Chiefs* (MacArthur and Nimitz re amendments). ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JCS 1331/2, 14 May 1945, *Directive for Operation OLYMPIC: Report by the Joint Staff Planners* (on resolving disagreements). ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JCS 1331/3, 25 May 1945, *Directive to Commander in Chief, US Army Forces Pacific; Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet; Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JCS M, 23 May 1945, (Request for Assessment) *Japanese Reaction to an Assault on Certain Areas of Japan* (on Honshu). ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.
- JPS 697/D, 14 June 1945, *Details of the Campaign Against Japan* (Leahy Memorandum re 18 June meeting with the President). ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428.
- *Memorandum for the Record of Telephone Conversation*, 14 June 1945 (Duncan-Lincoln). ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428.
- JWPC 369/1, 15 June 1945, *Details of the Campaign Against Japan*. Response to JPS 697/D. ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428.
- JCS 1388, 16 June 1945, *Details of the Campaign Against Japan* (JPS Version of 369/1). ABC Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428.
- *Memorandum For the Chief of Staff*, 17 June 1945, *Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President* (from Hull to Marshall). ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428.

- JCS 1388/1, 20 June 1945, *Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan* (from King). ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428.
- Joint Staff Study, 18 June 1945, *Operation OLYMPIC*. Entry 418, Box 1843.
- Sixth Army Paper, 1 August 1945, *G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation: Operation OLYMPIC*. Entry 418, Box 1843.
- JWPC 397, 4 August 1945, *Joint War Plans Committee: Alternates to OLYMPIC*. ABC 384 Kyushu (4 July 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 434.

Record Group 457, *Records of the National Security Agency*,
NARA, College Park, Maryland:

- *MAGIC Far East Summaries*—Entry 9001:
 - Box 5, Folder 14 (SRS 381-410, 5 April through 5 May 1945).
 - Box 6, Folder 15 (SRS 411-444, 6 May through 7 June 1945).
 - Box 6, Folder 16 (SRS 445-490, 8 June through 23 July 1945).
 - Box 7, Folder 17 (SRS 491-503, 24 July through 5 August 1945).
- SRH 195, *Studies in Cryptology 1917-1977: War Department Military Intelligence Service, Japanese Ground Order of Battle Bulletins (Weekly)*, Entry 9002:
 - Box 76: 7 April through 2 June 1945.
 - Box 77: 9 June through 11 August 1945.
- *MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries*—Entry 9006: Boxes 13 through 16, SRS 1610 through 1750 (18 March through 5 August 1945).

Books

Allen, Thomas B. and Polmar, Norman, *Codename Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan – and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.

Alperovitz, Gar, *The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.

Andrew, Christopher, *For the President's Eyes Only*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1992.

Arnold, H.H., *Global Mission*. New York: Harper and Bros., 1949.

Byrnes, James, *Speaking Frankly*. New York, Harper and Bros., 1947.

Churchill, Winston, *The Second World War: Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy*. London: Cassell and Co., 1954.

Cline, Ray S., *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1951.

Drea, Edward, *MacArthur's ULTRA: Code Breaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992.

Ferrell, Robert H., *Off the Record: Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*. New York: Harper and Row, 1980.

Hayes, Grace Pearson, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Leahy, William D., *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made At the Time*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950.

Lewin, Ronald, *The American MAGIC: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan*. London: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1982.

McCloy, John J., *The Challenge to American Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.

McCullough, David, *Truman*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Milles, Walter, ed, *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.

Skates, John Ray, *The Invasion of Japan: Alternatives to the Bomb*. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1995.

Stimson, Henry, and Bundy, McGeorge, *On Active Service in Peace and War*. New York: Harper and Bros., 1947.

Truman, Harry S., *Memoirs: Vol. I: Year of Decision*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1956.

Walker, J. Samuel, *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of the Atomic Bomb Against Japan*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

Weintraub, Stanley, *The Last Great War: The End of World War II*. July-August 1945, New York: Penguin, 1996.

Winterbotham, F. W., *The ULTRA Secret*, New York: Harper and Row, 1974.

Articles

Asada, Sadao, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender." Manuscript submitted to *National Security*.

Bernstein, Barton, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender." *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 227-274

Bix, Herbert P., "Japan's Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation." *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 197-226

Eisey, George M., "Some White House Recollections." *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 12, Summer 1988, pp. 357-364.

Pape, Robert A., "Why Japan Surrendered." *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 154-201.

Walker, J. Samuel, "History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb." *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 319-328.

Appendix B

Data Annex

This appendix describes the chronology of the signals intelligence discovery path for the Japanese force buildup on the island of Kyushu from mid-April through early August 1945. The detailed source references for the increments to the military estimates are shown in the chronology table that follows the narrative.

* * *

Intercepted messages confirmed on 18 April 1945 that the **57th Division**, previously identified in Manchuria, was part of a large movement of Japanese forces being shifted from the Asian mainland and that components of this division were already arriving on Kyushu. At about the same time, US military intelligence learned that the **3rd Amphibious Brigade**, a unit designed for countering amphibious invasions, was moving from the Kurils to somewhere in Japan's main islands. Analysts began to pick up evidence that this brigade was headed for Kyushu, but its actual presence there would not be confirmed until mid-May.

The movement of the **25th Division** from the Korean Peninsula during the latter part of May was disclosed in a series of messages between a Japanese headquarters in Korea and a new communications entity in southern Kyushu. Completion of the move was confirmed in early June. In mid-June the transfer to Kyushu of the **77th Division** was disclosed in messages to a unit on Kyushu employing what was known to be that division's communications codename. This division had been previously identified at a location on the northern island of Hokkaido. Its movement would be completed by the end of the month.

Signals analysis disclosed the presence of a Japanese headquarters on Kyushu in mid-May; its identity as **57th Army** headquarters was confirmed around the end of the month.

This discovery stemmed from several weeks of intercepting and tracking message traffic sent by an unknown entity in southern Kyushu that was using an identification code indicative of Army-level headquarters and interacting with addressees at the echelon of Army headquarters or above.

By the end of the first week in June, intercepted message traffic had exposed the presence of a second new Army-level headquarters—this one in northern Kyushu. The US War Department's Military Intelligence Service suspected that this was the **56th Army** headquarters, inasmuch as the Service had recently identified newly created Japanese armies numbered 55th, 57th, and 58th. It would be some time before this suspicion would be confirmed. The analysts also had presumed that their projected deployments of three Japanese divisions in northern Kyushu and three in the south would create a requirement for an Army headquarters in each area. They therefore viewed the discovery of these two headquarters as tending to confirm their long-held estimates.

A fifth division on Kyushu was confirmed in communications a few days after President Truman's meeting with his advisers on 18 June. Its specific identity was not determined for another two weeks, when a message disclosed its designator as the **206th Division**. This was a newly created division. It also was one of the first identified as carrying a numerical designator in the "200" series, indicative of the "levy" on existing military units that the Japanese were undertaking for the creation of new divisions. Until then, the divisions discovered on Kyushu had been existing ones that had been transferred intact from previously known locations.

On 13 July, shortly after the identity of the 206th was confirmed, the presence of the **212th Division** on Kyushu was disclosed. The addition of these two divisions and completion of the 77th Division's move from Hokkaido

prompted the Military Intelligence Service to raise its manpower estimate for Kyushu to 375,000.

On 21 July the Military Intelligence Service's daily summary on Japanese military forces reported that three more divisions had suddenly been discovered on Kyushu. Within the next few days these were identified as the **146th, 154th, and 156th Divisions**, and the presence of another new division, the **145th**, was disclosed. This brought the total on Kyushu to ten combat divisions and two depot divisions. In addition, intercepted communications provided tenuous evidence that an eleventh combat division was being moved to Kyushu from Honshu.

According to the data compiled by the Military Intelligence Service, two of the identified Japanese combat divisions (the 57th and 145th) were based well to the north. One (the 206th) was carried at that time in north-central Kyushu, positioned for reinforcement of critical areas in the south. The other seven identified divisions and most of the independent brigades were in southern Kyushu. This meant that the number of combat divisions and equivalent forces in southern Kyushu was already more than double the number originally forecast for that part of the island, and in fact exceeded what had been forecast for all of Kyushu by 1 November 1945, the planned invasion date.

By the end of July intercepted communications had apparently indicated the presence of two more divisions, designated the **216th and 303rd**. Analysts were uncertain as to whether this information might have reflected some misinterpretation of signals from divisions already detected, so they did not immediately add them to their estimate.

On 1 August intercepted messages unambiguously disclosed that the **312th Division** was in the process of moving to a site in northwestern Kyushu. The identification of

divisions in a "300" series also represented another layer of the Japanese "levy," and was seen by the analysts as yet another indication of more to come. By this time communications had also identified the **4th, 5th, and 6th Tank Brigades** on Kyushu.

On 4 August, the same day that the Joint War Plans Committee circulated a memorandum citing the much-larger-than-expected buildup on Kyushu and recommending examination of alternative invasion sites, intercepted messages confirmed that another new division was moving onto Kyushu—the **351st**. The intercepts also revealed that the 206th Division was moving from its position in the central area to the southern part of the island.

During the next few days the analysts would confirm that the 216th and 303rd divisions were at least in the process of deployment on Kyushu. The 303rd appeared headed for southern Kyushu. This would bring the number of divisions there to nine—three times what had been forecast for that area by invasion day. These deployments resulted in a hike of the Kyushu manpower estimate to 549,000. A short time later, when the full manpower of the 351st, 303rd, and 216th divisions was believed to be in place, the estimate would be raised to nearly 600,000.

The following chronology is constructed mainly from Military Intelligence Service reports on Japanese force deployments and estimated troop strengths on Kyushu. With two exceptions, the figures are taken from NSA Special Reporting Series (SRS) daily reports and Special Research History (SRH) weekly summaries contained in Record Group 457, NARA.

One of the exceptions is the information from the initial JIC report of June 1944, which included the force projection that would remain the conventional view until late July 1945, when SIGINT proved it wrong. The other exception is the information from the

25 April 1945 report by MacArthur's intelligence staff, which is included for purposes of illustrating the extent to which the operational commands were constructing SIGINT-based estimates similar to—albeit with small differences from—the MIS in Washington.

The dates given for specific force estimates should be read with the understanding that the daily reports sometimes gave findings that were too close to the publication date of the weekly report to be incorporated into that week's edition and instead appeared in the following week's report. See, for example, the SRS Daily for 20 July and the SRH Weekly for 21 July.

Chronology of Japanese Buildup

Date* (Source)	Total	Army- Ground	Navy- Ground	Air- Ground	Key Information Reported
24 Jun 1944 (JIC 191/1)					86th Division, 2 Depot Divisions; Forecast: 6 combat, 2 depot divisions; could be further reinforced by up to 4 combat divisions.
12 Apr 1945 (SRS 388)					Large numbers moving from mainland.
18 Apr 1945 (SRS 394)					57 th Division moving to Kyushu?
20 Apr 1945 (SRS 396)					57th Division confirmed.
25 Apr 1945 (SWPA G-2 Rept)	228,250 ^a	112,750	25,000	90,500	MacArthur's G-2 includes 86 th , 57 th Division.
28 Apr 1945 (SRH 195, #s 60, 62, 66)	230,000 ^b	(112,000)	(25,000)	(93,000)	MIS includes only 86 th Division—not yet 57 th .
12 May 1945 (SRH 195, #s 62, 66)	246,000	128,000	(25,000)	(93,000)	MIS adds 57 th Division (Differs from G-2 report of 25 April).
16 May 1945 (SRS 422)					57th Army at Takanabe; later learned it was there as of 20 Apr.
18 May 1945 (SRS 424)					3rd Amphibious Brigade confirmed.
25 May 1945 (SRS 431)					25th Division confirmed. (Parts still in transit.)
6 Jun 1945 (SRH 195, #66)	281,000	144,000	45,000	92,000	MIS adds 25 th Division, some naval-ground forces; reassesses air-ground forces.
7 Jun 1945 (SRS 444)	281,000				Evidence of Japanese Army at Izuka; later identified as 56 th .
15 Jun 1945 (SRS 452)					Suspect 77 th Division from Hokkaido.
16 Jun 1945 (SRH 195, #67)	300,000	160,000	45,000	95,000	MIS adds miscellaneous brigades; air-ground again reassessed.
23 Jun 1945 (SRH 195, #68)	329,000	181,000	50,000	98,000	New unidentified Division confirmed; would later be identified as 206th ; includes part of 77th Division , some naval guards; air-ground again reassessed.
30 Jun 1945 (SRH 195, #69)	340,000	190,000	50,000	100,000	Resubordination of units from outer Ryūkyūs. ^c
9 Jul 1945 (SRS 476)	350,000	200,000	50,000	100,000	206 th Division identified; MIS adds balance of 77 th Division.
13 Jul 1945 (SRS 480; SRH 195, #72)	375,000	225,000	50,000	100,000	Increase includes confirmation of 212th Division.
20 Jul 1945 (SRS 487)	380,000				MIS adds 126th Independent Mixed Brigade ; also includes manpower from 212 th Division.

Chronology of Japanese Buildup (continued)

Date* (Source)	Total	Army- Ground	Navy- Ground	Air- Ground	Key Information Reported
21 Jul 1945 (SRS 488)	455,000	305,000	50,000	100,000	MIS adds 3 unidentified divisions; will learn they are 146th , 154th , 156th , and have been there since May-Jun.
26 Jul 1945 (SRS 490,492,493)	525,000	350,000	75,000	100,000	Includes manpower from newly discovered 145 th Division and 122 nd Independent Mixed Brigade.
27 Jul 1945 (SRS 494)					40th Army Headquarters identified.
28 Jul 1945 (SRH 195, #73)	525,000	350,000	75,000	100,000	Weekly; includes 145 th , 146 th , 154 th , 156 th Divisions, 126 th Independent Mixed Brigade, 56 th Army Headquarters, miscellaneous.
30 Jul 1945 (SRS 497)					Tentative evidence of 216 th and 303 rd Divisions; 4th, 5th, 6th Tank Regiments confirmed.
2 Aug 1945 (SRS 500)	545,000	355,000	90,000	100,000	MIS adds beginnings of 312th Division , more naval guards; still not 216 th and 303 rd .
4 Aug 1945 (SRS 502)					351st Division confirmed ; still not 216 th or 303 rd .
8 Aug 1945 (SRH 195 #75)	560,000	370,000	90,000	100,000	MIS begins adding parts of 216th, 203rd , along with elements of 351 st .

Note: Boldface used in the table above signifies the first *confirmation* of a unit's existence on Kyushu, even if the unit's title/designator was still unknown at the time. Order-of-Battle dates are "as of" dates taken from maps that appear in the various reports. Often, therefore, they carry a date a few days earlier than the dissemination date of the bulletin itself.

^aThe reports from MacArthur's G-2 used categories of mobile combat, base support, naval-ground, and air-ground forces. The text and tables indicate that the combined total of mobile combat and base support equated to the category listed in the MIS reports as "Army-ground." The totals of the G-2 and the MIS for estimates prepared in April 1945 appear virtually the same. However, the G-2 figures incorporate the 57th Division, while the MIS did not incorporate this division until a few weeks later, and when it did so its totals were about 18,000 higher than the G-2 estimate. The difference appears to be attributable to different holdings for Army ground force support elements.

^bSome of the earlier reporting on Kyushu did not give consistent detailed breakdowns. Thus, putting together the figures in this table required some reconstruction through comparing the figures from several reports. The figures in parentheses are the product of this reconstitution. The total manpower figure in the Daily Report for this date is given in Bulletin #60 (28 April) as 229,000, but without a breakdown. Bulletin #62 (12 May) says the addition of the 57th Division (16,000 men) increases the Army-ground force total to

128,000, and the overall manpower total from 230,000 to 246,000. Because the entire 16,000 increase went to Army-ground forces, the Army-ground number before the addition of the 57th Division would have been 112,000. Neither Bulletin #60 or 62 gives a breakdown other than for Army-ground. However, subtracting the Army-ground total from the new overall total leaves 118,000 for Navy- and air-ground. A later bulletin (#66 of 6 Jun) breaks this down to 25,000 and 93,000. Combining these with the Army-ground figures makes possible a reconstruction of the breakdowns of the Bulletin 60 and 62 figures, but produces a total for 28 April of 230,000 rather than 229,000.

^cThe higher figures given in this report of 30 June were not a result of increases in the forces on Kyushu, but rather from Japanese resubordination of 11,000 troops (9,000 Army ground and 2,000 air ground) located on the outer Ryukyu Islands to the 16th Area Army Headquarters, located on Kyushu. This was done by the Japanese after it was clear that Okinawa headquarters, to which these units had previously been subordinated, was going to fall to the US. For consistency when comparing the estimates on Kyushu, therefore, the 11,000 should be "netted out" of the MIS figures used in the daily and weekly reports disseminated after 30 June 1945.

Appendix C

Selected Archival Documents

Appendix C is composed of verbatim copies of selected US Government documents that have been declassified and served as key source materials in the preparation of this monograph. This cover note to the Appendix is intended as a summary and guide for readers of these documents.

The first two documents deal with the MacArthur-Nimitz rivalry over command responsibilities. This issue is discussed in section I of the monograph.

Document 1: "Directive for Operation OLYMPIC." JCS 1331/2, 14 May 1945. This is a report prepared by the Joint Staff and sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It points to issues that still had to be settled in order for agreement to be reached on a directive for the final campaign in the Pacific. The document focuses in particular on the "who is to be in charge" question discussed in section I of the monograph. It and document 2 below are cited in footnote 9 of the monograph.

Document 2: "Directive for Operation OLYMPIC." JCS 1331/3, 25 May 1945. This is the last version of the directive for the final Pacific campaign, as dispatched to the Pacific commanders. It contains the decision on overall command of the operation. As the document indicates, a directive to prepare for the operation had already been issued to MacArthur and Nimitz on 3 April. This document is presented here, out of chronological order, because its contents are so closely related to those of document 1.

Document 3: "Japanese Reaction to An Operation Against Southern Kyushu." JIC 191/7, 16 May 1945. This was the eighth version of a report on anticipated Japanese reaction to an invasion of southern Kyushu. This version is included here because it was the latest iteration prepared prior to the dispatch of the directive discussed in documents 1 and 2 above. The document is discussed in section II of the monograph and is

cited in footnote 11. (Footnote 10 cites one of the earlier versions, dated 24 June 1944.)

This document demonstrates the consistency of the "six combat divisions, two depot divisions" projection for Japanese units on Kyushu Island by 1 November 1945. That estimate, first made more than a year earlier, formed the basis for the figures that would be given to President Truman on 18 June 1945. This projection remained in place right up to the eve of the Potsdam conference in July. The projected Japanese manpower figure for 1 November in this document was 390,000, rather than the 350,000 figure that was used in most of the previous versions of the report. (MacArthur's staff, for its part, estimated the number at 300,000.) The differences did not relate to combat strength but rather to numbers of support forces and naval and air-ground troops.

Document 4: "Details of the Campaign Against Japan." JPS 697/D, 14 June 1945. This memorandum from Admiral Leahy set up the 18 June meeting with President Truman that would review plans for bringing the war with Japan to an end. The document is discussed in section III of the monograph and is cited in footnote 21. It was forwarded to the Joint Planning Staff (JPS), which directed the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) to draft a response. On the document's distribution list, four of the ten names are those of members of the Joint Planning Staff—two Army and two Navy officers. One of these Army representatives, Brig. Gen. Charles Cabell, was an Army Air Force (the Air Force was then part of the US Army) officer who would later go on to serve as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Two other members of the JPS—Rear Adm. B.H. Bieri and Brig. Gen. J.E. Hull, the Army's Chief of Plans—were de facto co-chairmen of the JWPC.

Document 5: Details of the Campaign Against Japan. JWPC 369/1, 15 June 1945. This is the JWPC's response to the JPS request for a draft reply to Admiral Leahy's memo of

14 June. It is discussed in section III of the monograph and is cited in footnote 24. Upon receiving this document, the JPS made some modifications and submitted it to the Chiefs as JCS 1388. The JPS revisions in document 5 included deletions that the author of the monograph has marked with brackets; the most noteworthy of these are marked on pages 7 and 9. This is an especially important document because it demonstrates the military planners' sensitivity about confronting the President over casualty estimates. It does give a total estimate of roughly "a quarter of a million," which was consistent with the casualty data used by the staffs of both MacArthur and Nimitz.

Document 6: Details of the Campaign Against Japan. JCS 1388, 16 June 1945.

This is the JPS version mentioned above. It too is discussed in section III of the monograph, and it is cited in footnote 25. In addition to the deletions noted above, the "enclosure" attached at the end of this JCS paper is noteworthy. This enclosure, apparently prepared after the main draft was written, proposes further changes. One of these was language to replace the casualty estimate deleted from the JWPC version; this language offers the figures that General Hull had requested on 16 June for the 18 June meeting with the President. Hull's request presumably was prompted by the deletion of the JWPC figures and a belief on his part that, given the language of Admiral Leahy's memo, some figures had to be offered for the President.

Document 7: Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Amplifying Details on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President. Undated—presumably 17 or possibly 18 June 1945. Prepared by General Hull after he received the response to his request for casualty figures from various Pacific operations. (See section III of the monograph.) This is a summary of JCS 1388 (described in document 6 above), for use by General Marshall in briefing the President at the 18 June meeting.

Document 8: Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday 18 June 1945, at 1530. Document 598 of *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*. Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), 1945. Vol. I (Washington, DC, GPO 1960, pp. 902-911). General Marshall read into the record the summary offered by General Hull (document 7 above). These minutes of the 18 June meeting with the President are discussed in section III of the monograph and in several of that section's footnotes. Tables from JCS 1388 were used at the meeting. Because some disagreement persisted over the specific language of JCS 1388, the document itself was not given to the President at that time. In fact, the agreed version was not completed until 11 July, when it was included in the background papers for the Potsdam Conference.

Document 9: Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan. JCS 1388/1, 20 June 1945. This document shows (a) that agreement still had not been reached on JCS 1388 by the time of the 18 June meeting with Truman (prompting Gen. Hull to prepare his summary for the President) and (b) that the casualty issue continued to be debated, with Nimitz's estimates remaining close to those offered by MacArthur's staff and by the JWPC. (See section III and footnote 33 of the monograph.)

Document 10: Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan. Memorandum For The Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff, 25 June 1945. This document shows that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, apparently supported Admiral Nimitz's recommendations. It also shows, however, that the War Department did not accept these recommendations, and that the disagreement continued at least through late June.

Document 11: Map—Estimated Japanese Dispositions on Kyushu, 21 July 1945. From MAGIC Far East Summary of 21 July (the same day the Groves report on the successful atomic bomb test arrived in Potsdam). SRS 488.

Document 12: Cables to Potsdam Regarding the A-Bomb Test of 16 July. *FRUS*, Vol. II, Documents 1303, 1304, and 1305, pp. 1360-1369. The footnotes in these documents are particularly useful.

Document 13: Instruction to General Carl Spaatz on Use of the Atomic Bomb Against a Japanese Target. 25 July 1945. Discussed in monograph section VI and footnote 66. This document can be found in many sources. Spaatz reportedly carried it with him when he departed for the Far East on 24 July (Far East time) to take over a newly created Air Force command role. He was under instructions to deliver the document personally to MacArthur and Nimitz.

Document 14: Map—Estimated Distribution of Japanese Forces on Kyushu. 25 July 1945. From MAGIC Far East Summary on that date, SRS 492.

Document 15: Map—Estimated Disposition of Japanese Forces on Kyushu. 26 July 1945. Also attached is a table (Document 15A) showing estimated Japanese air strength. Both items were from the MAGIC Far East Summary of 26 July, SRS 493.

Document 16: Cable from Stimson to Truman, AGWAR Washington to Tripartite Conference, Babelsberg, Germany. 30 July 1945. This message underscored the need for President Truman's agreement on the language of a statement that would be released as soon as the atomic bomb was used. The message alerted Truman to a text being dispatched by courier that Stimson wanted the President to approve as quickly as possible.

Truman, however, either misunderstood the request or consciously used the occasion to give his guidance on the dropping of the bomb itself. His handwritten message on the back of the cable said "no sooner than August 2" (i.e., after he had left Potsdam). This note was typed and sent to Stimson immediately, before Truman received—later that same day—the couriered text of the public statement to which Stimson had referred in his cable. The dates of these messages have generated much misinterpretation. The records are in the Truman documents collection compiled by historian Dennis Merrill. (See monograph section VI and footnote 68.)

Document 17: Alternatives to OLYMPIC. JWPC 397, 4 August 1945. This subject is addressed in sections IV and VII of the monograph, and this document is cited in footnote 51. Some interesting comments were handwritten on the document by unidentified readers. One such reader wrote, "Sec'y told we non-concur." Two other handwritten notes that appeared to accompany this document reflect concern at the senior level of the military planning groups. One of these is addressed to General Lincoln, the senior Army representative on the Joint War Plans Committee. The other refers to the views of General Cabell, the Army Air Force representative on the Joint Planning Staff.

Documents: 18 and 18 A Through F: On the President's response to a query from Air Force Historian James Cate regarding Truman's role in the orders to use the atomic bomb. December 1952-January 1953. These documents are from the Truman records compiled by Dennis Merrill. They include Cate's letter of request and Truman's handwritten draft response—a personal note in which he said General Marshall had told him that the invasion would have cost "at a minimum a quarter of a million casualties" (Discussed in section V of the monograph and in footnotes 61 and 63.)

14. *Transmitted by 11/15/45*
Sec 1-B
EmC

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 770076*
By *SP* NARA Date *1/15/69*

DOCUMENT 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 38

J.C.S. 1331/2

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

14 May 1945

Pages 5 - 8, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION "OLYMPIC"

- References: a. J.C.S. 1331
b. J.C.S. 1259/4
c. J.C.S. 1259/5

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed report of the Joint Staff Planners is submitted for consideration.

A. J. MCFARLAND,
E. D. GRAVES, JR.,
Joint Secretariat.

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO.


Admiral Leahy	1
General Marshall	2 & 5
Admiral King	3
General Arnold	4
General Handy	6
Admiral Edwards	7
Admiral Cooke	8
General Hull	9
General Kuter	10
Admiral Duncan	11
General Lindsay	12
General Lincoln	13
Captain Campbell	14
Secy., JCS	15
Secy., JPS	16
Secy., JWPC	17
Secy., JSSC	18

~~SECRET~~

Carded *10/2/51*
Indexed *2/13*

55

ENCLOSURE

DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION "OLYMPIC"Report by the Joint Staff Planners

1. Plans and preparations for the invasion of Japan were directed in J.C.S. 1259/4. The attached directive, prepared pursuant to J.C.S. 1331, directs the execution of these plans and preparations for the initial operation (OLYMPIC).

2. The directive (Appendix) is agreed by the Joint Staff Planners except for the wording of paragraph 1 c (1) (page 7) in which the point in question is considered of sufficient importance to call it to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff. The Navy Planners recommend the wording "...and will coordinate his plans with CINCPAC-CINCSWPA's plan for the campaign on land." The Army Planner and Army Air Forces Planner recommend the wording "...in conformity with CINCPAC-CINCSWPA's plan for the campaign on land."

3. The Army Planner and Army Air Forces Planner consider that OLYMPIC must be treated as a single, integrated operation, requiring a single primary responsibility. They believe it unsound to treat the phases of OLYMPIC as separate and distinct matters. Considering the OLYMPIC objectives, the battle in Kyushu is primary and all phases of the campaign must be built back from and must be adjusted to support this battle. Accordingly, while recognizing CINCPAC's responsibility for the naval and amphibious phases of the campaign, they believe that the conduct of these phases should be in conformity with CINCPAC's over-all plan. They consider that their wording does not take away from CINCPAC any power of decision which is inherent in his responsibility. It is clearly recognized and standard practice that in joint operations the Army commander must obtain concurrence of the Navy commander in the landing areas and in those portions of his battle plan which involve the Navy.

Abbreviations: CINCPAC--Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific
CINCSWPA --Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
CINCPAC --Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPAC --Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas

TOP SECRET

4. The Navy Planners consider that adequate integration of the phases of the OLYMPIC operation is assured by directing Admiral Nimitz to "coordinate his plans" for the naval and amphibious phases with General MacArthur's plan for the campaign in Kyushu and to "cooperate with and assist CINCPAC in his plans and preparations. . . etc." (paragraph 1 c) (2)). The Navy Planners recognize that plans and preparations must be built back from the land campaign plan adopted, and that the plans for the naval and amphibious phases of the campaign must take account of and support the plans for the land campaign. They consider also, however, that the land campaign adopted must be one that fits in with the practical aspects and possibilities of the amphibious operations. They do not consider that the wording of the subparagraph in question, proposed by the Army Planner and Army Air Forces Planner provides for the adjustment of the plans of each commander to those of the other, in accordance with the terms of the directive for plans and preparations for the invasion of Japan set up in J.C.S. 1259/4 (Enclosure "B", subparagraph a (6) and b (4)) which directive was made pursuant to the general provisions of Enclosure "A", J.C.S. 1259/4, was agreed by the Joint Staff Planners and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and accepted by the commanders in the field, and according to which plans and preparations are proceeding. They feel that the effect of the wording proposed by the Army Planner and Army Air Forces Planner would be to remove from Admiral Nimitz all control as to decision on a plan for the success of which he is responsible.

RECOMMENDATION

5. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff decide the point of difference in subparagraph 1 c (1) of the attached directive and issue the directive immediately.

TOP SECRET

A P P E N D I X

D R A F T

DIRECTIVE TO CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA,
CINCPAC-CINCPHA, AND CG, 20TH AIR FORCE

1. Pursuant to and in furtherance of directives contained in J.C.S. 1259/4 and J.C.S. 1259/5, the following directive is issued and is effective on receipt:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the invasion of Kyushu (operation OLYMPIC), target date 1 November 1945, in order to:

- (1) Intensify the blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan,
- (2) Contain and destroy major enemy forces,
- (3) Support further advances,

for the purpose of establishing the conditions favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan.

b. CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA:

(1) Is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the campaign in Kyushu.

(2) Will make plans and preparations for the continuance of the campaign in Japan and cooperate with CINCPAC in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases thereof.

c. CINCPAC-CINCPHA:

(1) Is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the naval and amphibious phases of the OLYMPIC operation,

(Navy). . . and will coordinate his plans with CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA's plan for the campaign on land.

(Army). . . in conformity with CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA's plan for the campaign on land.

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 770076
By	SP NARA Date 1/15/99

TOP SECRET

(2) Will cooperate with and assist CINCAFPAC in his plans and preparations for the campaign in Japan.

d. The Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force will cooperate in the plans, preparations and execution of operation OLYMPIC and in the con' nuance of the campaign in Japan. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Twentieth Air Force will come under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of operations directed above.

134 Hughes (4 July 45) Sec 7-B

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/00

DOCUMENT 2

~~SECRET~~

J.C.S. 1331/3

25 May 1945

Pages 9-10, incl.

OCT 1 1945

COPY NO. 24

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION "OLYMPIC"

Note by the Secretaries

By informal action on 25 May 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the enclosed directive which was dispatched the same day.

A. J. McFARLAND,
E. D. GRAVES, JR.,
Joint Secretariat.

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO.

Admiral Leahy	1
General Marshall	2 & 5
Admiral King	3 & 6
General Arnold	4
General Handy	7
Admiral Edwards	8
Admiral Cooke	9
General Hull	10
General Kuter	11
Admiral Duncan	12
General Lindsay	13
General Lincoln	14
Captain Campbell	15
Secy., JCS	16
Secy., JPS	17
Secy., JWPC	18
Secy., JSSC	19

Carded MB
Indexed MB

JCS 1331/3

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/99

E N C L O S U R E

DIRECTIVE

TO

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDING GENERAL, TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

1. Pursuant to and in furtherance of directives contained in WAR 62773 and WAR 62774, dated 3 April 1945 (J.C.S. 1259/4 and J.C.S. 1259/5), the following directive is issued and is effective on receipt:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the invasion of Kyushu (Operation OLYMPIC), target date 1 November 1945, in order to:

- (1) Intensify the blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan,
- (2) Contain and destroy major enemy forces,
- (3) Support further advances,

for the purpose of establishing the conditions favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan.

b. CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA:

(1) Is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of operation OLYMPIC including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commander.

(2) Will make plans and preparations for the continuance of the campaign in Japan and cooperate with CINCPAC in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases thereof.

c. CINCPAC-CINCPOA:

(1) Is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the naval and amphibious (subject to paragraph 1 b (1) above) phases of the OLYMPIC operation, and will correlate his plans with CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA.

~~SECRET~~

(2) Will cooperate with and assist CINCAFPAC in his plans and preparations for, and the conduct of, the campaign in Japan.

d. The land campaign and requirements therefor are primary in the OLYMPIC operation. Account of this will be taken in the preparation, coordination and execution of plans.

e. COMMANDING GENERAL, TWENTIETH AIR FORCE, will cooperate in the plans, preparations, and execution of operation OLYMPIC and in the continuance of the campaign in Japan. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Twentieth Air Force will come under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of operations directed above.

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 770076
By	SP NARA Date 1/15/98

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 31

J.I.C. 191/7

DOCUMENT 3

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

16 May 1945

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
(Service Members)

JAPANESE REACTIONS TO AN OPERATION AGAINST SOUTHERN KYUSHU

References: a. J.I.S. 158/M
b. J.I.C. 191/5

Note by the Secretary

The enclosed revision of J.I.C. 191/5, prepared by the Service Members of the Joint Intelligence Staff in response to reference a, is submitted for informal consideration by the Service Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Copies of this paper are being forwarded to the Joint War Plans Committee as a preliminary response, pending consideration by the Service Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTIONCopy No.

Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
File (Col. Peck)
Secy, JCS
Secy, JIS
Secy, JWPC
Secy, JSSC
Secy, JPS
Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Plans
Chief, Strat. and Policy Group, OPD

1 & 7
2 & 8
3 & 9
4
5
6, 10-20
21-27
28
29
30
31

rded
axed
TOP SECRET
JIC 191/7

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770 076</u>
By <u>OP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/88</u>

TOP SECRET

E N C L O S U R E

JAPANESE REACTION TO AN OPERATION AGAINST SOUTHERN KYUSHU

Report by the Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate Japanese capabilities and reaction to an assault on southern Kyushu about 1 November 1945.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. a. We have consolidated our present positions in the Philippines, Ryukyus and Bonins.

b. The U.S.S.R. has entered the war against Japan simultaneously with or shortly before the Kyushu assault.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS


3. General. The Japanese appreciate that from our present positions we will have the capability of major attack against Japan or China. Our occupation of islands in the Ryukyus intensifies their concern regarding the security of the Japanese homeland itself, and, from this time onward, primary consideration will be given to the strengthening of home defenses. However, in view of the Soviet threat, strengthening of ground forces in the homeland will not be made at the net expense of Manchuria. Soviet entry in the war simultaneously with or prior to our assault on Kyushu will cause no appreciable shifting of strength between the continent and Japan Proper.

The Japanese know that successful Allied lodgement in Kyushu would result in effective interdiction of communications between Kyushu, Honshu, Shikoku, and the Continent. Therefore, the Japanese will use all available ground, sea, and air forces to resist a landing on Kyushu and will defend desperately to prevent Allied consolidation on the island.

TOP SECRET
JIC 191/7

- 1 -

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

4. Ground. (See Appendix "A".) We estimate that at the time of Allied assault, 6 divisions plus 2 depot divisions plus army troops, making a total of about 390,000 men, would be deployed in Kyushu. Of this number a total of about 150,000 would be initially available in southern Kyushu. Substantial reinforcements would be immediately available from other nearby areas, but the Japanese capability for bringing in such reinforcements would depend upon Allied success in isolating the battle area.

5. Air. (See Appendix "B".) We estimate that by 1 November 1945 the Japanese air forces will have a maximum total strength of 2,300 combat aircraft in tactical units. In addition there may be some 1,200 combat type aircraft in operational training units and between 1,500 and 2,000 specially equipped non-combat trainer type aircraft might be available for suicide operations. Enemy air reactions would be extremely aggressive and suicide air attacks would be employed on a lavish scale. Taking all factors into consideration we believe that a maximum of 400 to 500 bomber and fighter sorties could be launched against us during any 24-hour period. Such a maximum effort would prove to be of short duration, capable of repetition on a declining scale following intervals of temporary recuperation. We now consider it possible that the enemy might continue his air effort against us in the Kyushu area until his air forces have been largely dissipated. Soviet entry into the war at this time probably would have no effect upon initial air reaction but would reduce further the enemy's capability for bringing in replacements.

6. Naval. (See Appendix "C".) Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers which are still operational at the time would probably be organized into suicide task forces and would endeavor to sortie in a desperate effort to oppose our landings. Submarines, midget-submarines, suicide and small surface craft would be employed in large numbers, but should offer no serious problem. Extensive minefields will probably be encountered.

TOP SECRET
JIC 19177

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "A"GROUND

1. General. Our operations in the Ryukyus and the Bonins has served as a warning to the Japanese of our impending attack on Japan Proper. However, though this is their primary concern, they cannot overlook the possibility of our assault upon the China Coast or the possibility of Soviet operations in Manchuria. Therefore, the Japanese will be forced to disperse their strength somewhat to counter all threats. Faced with the mounting Allied threat from the Pacific, the Japanese are currently engaged in strengthening the defenses of the Home Islands by the formation of new divisions and by limited withdrawals from the Continent. Most of these ^{later} units seem destined for Kyushu which the Japanese appear to consider the most likely target for an initial Allied assault on Japan Proper.

Soviet entry in the war simultaneously with or prior to our assault in Kyushu will cause no appreciable shifting of strength between the Continent and Japan Proper, since the Japanese will have already apportioned their forces between those two areas in accordance with their ^{capabilities and} estimated needs. Increased Allied air action prior to and following successful lodgement in Kyushu will reduce greatly Japanese capability to reinforce Japan from the Continent, even if troops can be spared in the face of Soviet threat or pressure. We consider it probable, therefore, that the troops in the Japanese Islands on D-day will be the only ones available for use against invading Allied forces.

2. Strength and dispositions. We believe current formations of new units plus transfers from the Continent will make the following forces available in Japan Proper (including Karafuto and the Kuriles) by 1 November 1945:

TOP SECRET
JIC 191/7

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 770076

By SP NARA Date 1/15/98

TOP SECRET

<u>Active Divs.</u>	<u>Depot Divs.</u>	<u>Total Divs.</u>	<u>Strength</u>
32	14	46	2,000,000

Of this strength we estimate that 6 active divisions, 2 depot divisions, plus army troops, or a total of about 390,000 men, will be located in Kyushu.

Divisional strength in Kyushu will probably be about equally divided between the areas lying north and south of the Sammyaku Range. The principal supply and depot establishments, however, as well as important areas requiring the principal antiaircraft defenses, lie in the north. Therefore, a greater personnel strength will be located in that area. Independent beach defense units and home guards, backed by divisional units, will be deployed to cover the principal landing beaches.

In addition to the regular armed forces, about ^{250,000}~~1,000,000~~ able bodied men of military age would be available in southern Kyushu for industry, agriculture, and assistance to the armed forces. About half of this number would be reservists with some military training and could be used as lightly armed home guard forces.

3. Reinforcement capabilities. Reinforcements probably would begin moving to Kyushu as soon as it became evident that the island was the object of a major attack. The rapidity of movement would depend upon logistical considerations and Allied effectiveness in interdiction of reinforcement routes.

Some 6 divisions could be made available initially from other parts of Japan for transfer to Kyushu without seriously depleting other areas of Japan Proper.

Reinforcements could begin arriving in Kyushu from Honshu on D plus 2. Thereafter, reinforcements could arrive at the rate of about 1/2 division per day; and, provided communications with Honshu were maintained, they would continue to do so until about 10 to 12 divisions were deployed on the island. Because

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 770076
By	OP NARA Date 1/15/98

TOP SECRET

of the nature of the terrain and the probable effective interdiction of communications, we believe that this number of divisions is the maximum number of troops that the Japanese could employ tactically against us in sustained action. The Japanese would make every effort to maintain this strength throughout the operations.

4. Japanese reactions. The Japanese would resist an attack on Kyushu to the limit of their capability. We believe that initial opposition would consist of small units in well prepared beach defenses. These forces would be built up quickly to the strength of a division and might be increased to 3 to 4 divisions within a period of 5 days and to a strength of 10 to 12 active divisions by D plus 14. Of these, we believe about 8 divisions would be committed against our forces in southern Kyushu. This number would be maintained until the Japanese capability for replacement of casualties was severely reduced by Allied interdiction of the routes leading to southern Kyushu. Divisions not committed to the action in the south would be held in reserve north of the Sammyaku Range.

TOP SECRET
JIC 191/77

- 5 -

Appendix "A"

(Page revised by Decision Amending - 22 May 1945)

68

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770 076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/80</u>

APPENDIX "B"

AIR

1. General. Analysis of recent operations of the Japanese air forces suggests that the Japanese may have decided that continued suicide attack against our shipping constitutes their only capability for preventing, or at least delaying, an invasion of the Home Islands. They seem to be sacrificing their present and potential air strength in this effort and may hope by such action to forestall invasion of Japan Proper. It would seem unlikely, however, that the Japanese will continue this policy, except in the defense of the homeland, after we have established adequate land based air units in the Ryukyus and our major task force units have been withdrawn from the area.

2. Overall strength and dispositions. Even if the Japanese should endeavor to conserve and increase their air strength during the period after we have secured our main objectives in the Ryukyus, they will not be able to avoid continuing attrition of aircraft as well as continued heavy damage to their aircraft industry, maintenance and repair facilities. We estimate that as of 1 November 1945 overall strength of combat aircraft in tactical units will total about 2300 aircraft disposed approximately as follows:

Kyushu--W. Honshu--Shikoku	300
Central Honshu	400
East Honshu	700
N. Honshu--Hokkaido--Kuriles	300
Manchuria--Korea--N. China	400
Elsewhere	200
TOTAL	2300

By 1 November 1945 practically all Japanese air strength south of Shanghai will be dissipated or recalled to the northern areas. Airfields in Kyushu will have been largely neutralized but a total of some 300 aircraft probably would continue to be based on this island and on adjacent airfields in Shikoku and western Honshu.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 770076
By	SP NARA Date 1/15/99

TOP SECRET

In addition to this combat strength in tactical units, overall strength of combat types in operational training units may amount to some 1,200 aircraft, of which number perhaps 50% will be located in Japan Proper. A large proportion of these aircraft will be made available for suicide attacks, and, in addition, there may be available between 1,500 and 2,000 biplane, monoplane, and seaplane trainers equipped for carrying bombs and possessing limited capabilities in suicide operations.


3. Initial reaction. Our pre-invasion air offensive will be reinforced by substantial land-based air strength in the Ryukyus, and hence should be more effective than in previous operations where dependence has been placed upon carrier strikes alone. By the time our landing operations are actually undertaken, the airfields on Kyushu should be neutralized except for difficult starting operations. In addition, the effectiveness of enemy air operations from nearby bases in Korea, Honshu, and Shikoku should be considerably reduced by our pre-invasion air attacks. We believe, therefore, that in the early stages of our landing operations the enemy will be unable to launch against our invasion forces more than 400-500 sorties during any 24-hour period. Initial reaction would be extremely aggressive and suicide attacks would be employed on a lavish scale. The scale and effectiveness of such suicide attacks will be limited not only by the availability of aircraft and pilots, but also by the availability of an air cover of sufficient size and effectiveness to get the suicide aircraft through to their targets. The employment of Baka bombs will be limited by their dependence upon suitable launching aircraft and orthodox air cover.

4. Reinforcement capabilities and subsequent reaction.

Reinforcements would be brought in rapidly from all adjacent

• • • • • areas; but because of reduced servicing and maintenance facilities and lack of reserves, we consider it unlikely that such

TOP SECRET
JIC 191/7

TOP SECRET

reinforcements could do more than provide temporary replacements for the heavy losses likely to be incurred. At no subsequent period will the total reaction be likely to exceed the initial capability of 400-500 sorties in a 24-hour period. Such an all-out effort could not be maintained for any length of time, but we may expect, as in the Ryukyus, recurring attacks of this nature following intervals of recuperation. We now consider it possible that the Japanese would continue such attacks against our shipping until their tactical units as well as training units had been largely dissipated and without regard for conserving strong air strength even for the defense of the Tokyo area.

5. Effects of Soviet entry into war. If the U.S.S.R. should enter the war simultaneously with or shortly before the Kyushu assault, we do not believe there would be any substantial difference in the initial air reaction to our operation. There would be some reduction in the reinforcements available for replacement purposes as air strength in Korea, North China, and Manchuria might be committed entirely against the U.S.S.R. In general, the enemy would be compelled to commit the bulk of his air strength against us and leave opposition to the U.S.S.R. primarily to ground forces.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

NAVAL

1. During the past year the Japanese Navy has sustained severe losses in combatant ships, bases, and personnel, resulting in the retirement of the bulk of their combatant ships to home waters, particularly in the Inland Sea. Some units are believed to be in the Sasebo area.

2. The present strength plus future completion of combatant units as of 1 November 1945 without allowance for attrition is estimated to be as follows:

<u>BB</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>CVL</u>	<u>CVE</u>	<u>CA</u>	<u>CL</u>	<u>DD (1500-2300)</u>	<u>DD (1000)</u>	<u>SS</u>
4	4	3	4	5-6	2	23	34	86

Of the strength shown above, ^{three}~~four~~ heavy cruisers and one large destroyer are in the Singapore area and their return to Empire waters is problematical. In addition, it is doubtful that the enemy would employ such carriers as might be available for defense of southern Kyushu, since the limited sphere of operations permits the more effective use of carrier air squadrons from land bases.

3. The battleships, cruisers, and destroyers then operational would probably be organized into suicide task forces and would attempt to sortie in a desperate effort to oppose our landings. Such opposition should be quickly eliminated by Allied air and naval power. This sortie could be from the Inland Sea through the Straits of Shimonoseki or the Bungo Straits, or even through Kii Channel, permitting in any case timely detection and interception by our forces.

4. The Japanese Navy will depend primarily upon its shore defenses (fixed and mobile artillery), submarines, midget submarines, suicide and small surface craft to protect the southern

TOP SECRET

Kyushu area from amphibious attack. These should offer no serious problem, however, judging from their ineffectiveness on past occasions.

5. The waters off the Kyushu beaches are mineable to a considerable degree. The harbor entrances and bays are easily mined and are probably already so protected. The exposed beaches could be protected by mines but to do so would require a large number to cover a long coast line. The beach gradings are suitable for considerable mining, the 100 fathom curve being from 5 to 8 miles off the coast. At the present time we have reliable information that the Japanese have minefields in the waters of Kagoshima Wan, Tanega Shima Strait, and Osumi Strait; and we may expect additional mining on an extensive scale prior to our assault.

TOP SECRET

22 May 1945

COPY NO. 31

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
(Service Members)

DECISION AMENDING J.I.C. 191/7

JAPANESE REACTIONS TO AN OPERATION AGAINST SOUTHERN KYUSHU

Note by the Secretary

The Service Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee have by informal action approved J.I.C. 191/7, subject to minor amendments which have been incorporated in the revised pages attached hereto, and the following additional amendments:

Page 3, Line 11 - Before "units" insert the word "latter".

Page 3, Line 18 - Before "estimated needs", insert "capabilities and".

Page 4, Line 14 - Change "1,000,000" to read "250,000".

Page 9, paragraph 2 - In the tabulation, under "CA", change "6-7" to read "5-6".

Page 9, paragraph 2 - In the first line following the tabulation, change "four heavy cruisers" to read "three heavy cruisers".

All holders of J.I.C. 191/7 are requested to make the above changes and to substitute the attached revisions, destroying the superseded pages by burning.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/99

Japan (29 May 44) Sec 1-B

DECLASSIFIED
Auth. NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/99

J.P.S. 697/D

14 June 1945

DOCUMENT 4

(SPECIAL DISTRICT)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

DIRECTIVE

~~RESTRICTED~~

DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

Reference: a. SM-2140

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure has been referred to the Joint Staff
Planners for preparation of a draft memorandum for presentation
to the President. It is desired that the draft memorandum be
submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff not later than 1800,
16 June 1945.

C. H. DONNELLY,

F. J. GREEN,

Joint Secretariat.

*Joint Staff
result was JWP 369/1
JCS papers
JCS 1388
SS study in SS - (12)*

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO.

Rear Admiral D. B. Duncan, USN	1
Brig. General C. P. Cabell, USA	2
Brig. General G. A. Lincoln, USA	3-4
Captain Colin Campbell, USN	5
Secretary, J.P.S.	6-7
Maj. General J. E. Hull, USA	8
Secretariat, J.W.P.C.	9
File (Exec. Sec., J.C.S.)	10
Rear Admiral B. H. Bierl, USN	11
Asst. Chief of Air Staff (Plans)	12

~~RESTRICTED~~
178

Recorded
Index

JPS 697/D

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11
770076
By NARA Date 1/15/99

~~TOP SECRET~~

E N C L O S U R E

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 June 1945

URGENT - IMMEDIATE ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

The President today directed me to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wishes to meet with the Chiefs of Staff in the afternoon of the 18th, in his office, to discuss details of our campaign against Japan.

He expects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and prospects in preparation for his discussions with Churchill and Stalin.

He will want information as to the number of men of the Army and ships of the Navy that will be necessary to defeat Japan.

He wants an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper.

He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air forces.

He desires to be informed as to exactly what we want the Russians to do.

He desires information as to what useful contribution, if any, can be made by other Allied nations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/98</u>

It is his intention to make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives.

Economy in the use of time and in money cost is comparatively unimportant.

I suggest that a memorandum discussion of the above noted points be prepared in advance for delivery to the President at the time of the meeting in order that he may find time later to study the problem.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

124 Japan (3 May 44) Sec 1-D

J.W.P.C. 369/1

15 June 1945

Indefinite

COPY NO. 3

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

DOCUMENT 5

JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE

DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

References: a. J.P.S. 697/D.
b. J.P.S. Memo Directive
of 14 June 1945.

Note by the Secretaries

1. The Joint War Plans Committee recommends that the enclosed memorandum be presented to the President at his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Joint War Plans Committee has assumed that the questions brought up by the President will be answered and discussed orally at the conference, and that the purpose of the memorandum is for the President to have available an aide memoire which he could examine at his convenience and possibly use at the forthcoming tripartite conferences.

3. Representatives of the Joint Intelligence Staff have been consulted in the preparation of this report.

J. T. HILLIS,

C. C. GOODE,

JOINT SECRETARIES.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
Admiral D. B. Duncan	1 - 2
General G. A. Lincoln	3 - 4
General C. P. Cabell	5, 16
Captain Colin Campbell	6
Secretary, J.P.S.	7
Secretary, J.W.P.C.	8 - 12

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Campaign against Japan.

1. Strategy. Throughout the series of staff conferences with the British, we have agreed that the over-all concept for the prosecution of the war included provision "to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan." We believe that the only sure way, and certainly the quickest way to force the surrender of Japan is to defeat her armies on the main Japanese islands. Hence, at recent staff conferences we have proposed-- and the British have agreed--that the over-all objective of the Japanese war is "to force the unconditional surrender of Japan by (1) lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; (2) invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan."

[Since "unconditional surrender" is foreign to the Japanese nature,] it is by no means certain that a formal acknowledgment thereof by a Japanese government will be recognized by Japanese armies everywhere. If, following such an acknowledgment, her armies elsewhere do not surrender, their position will be so seriously weakened as to facilitate their defeat in detail. However, the possibility must be faced that the Japanese armies everywhere must be defeated.

2. Presently planned campaign. Our agreed concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific war is:

"Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

"An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

"The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain."

Our campaign plans have therefore been designed to seize positions progressively closer to the Tokyo Plain--the political, industrial and communication center of Japan--with a view to isolating the Japanese islands and providing sufficient bases from which, by sea and air bombardment, conditions will be created which will make ultimate invasion of the Tokyo Plain acceptable and feasible. We have also endeavored so to design the campaign that the Japanese cannot fail to see and feel the results of its rapidly increasing tempo and magnitude, with the thought that at some stage of the campaign they will admit defeat in order to avoid further destruction.

Thus far in this campaign we have seized and developed air and naval bases in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, the Philippines and Okinawa. No further operations in the Ryukyus after completion of the Okinawa campaign are now contemplated; all available resources are being utilized to develop air and naval bases in Okinawa to maximum capacity by November 1945. By then it is expected to have about 2700 land-based aircraft operating from this area and to have completed an advanced fleet base and anchorage. The map, Tab "A", shows the land-based aircraft expected to be based within range of Japan by that time and the areas they can reach. Meanwhile every effort is also being made to transport to the Pacific from Europe the added means estimated to be required for a rapid and decisive campaign. In general the units needed to build the required bases are being moved first, followed by the required additional combat units, air and ground.

Already we have eliminated practically all Japanese sea traffic between their main islands and points to the southward of Shanghai, and severely restricted her traffic to Shanghai and Yellow Sea ports. By November 1945, when air operations from Okinawa are in full swing, there should remain to the Japanese only those sea routes across Tsushima Strait to Korea and across the Sea of Japan. It should be noted that our air and submarines are already operating in these areas on a limited scale. By November 1945 the Japanese situation is expected to be critical; their fleet units in home waters have already been so reduced as to no longer constitute a strategic factor; their air arm is already committing training planes to combat and will probably continue to concentrate

on maximum suicide tactics; their ability to move ground forces to Japan from Asia or vice versa is already strictly reduced. The map, Tab "D", shows the estimated Japanese dispositions of ground and air forces about 1 November 1945.

In order to obtain bases still closer to the Tokyo Plain from which to augment sea and air bombardment, complete the isolation of the main Japanese islands and to provide direct air cover and support for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, should that prove necessary, we have directed General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to invade southern Kyushu about 1 November 1945.

We have not yet directed the execution of any operations after the invasion of southern Kyushu, feeling that decision would better await further developments. However, plans and preparations are being made to invade the Tokyo Plain--the political, industrial and communication center of Japan--about 4 months after the southern Kyushu operation, or about 1 March 1946. We consider that this operation should be decisive. By planning and preparing for a supreme operation of this magnitude, we shall be in a position to undertake any lesser operation should developments warrant.

In the period prior to the planned invasion of the Tokyo Plain, every effort will be made to exploit the blockade and bombardment of Japan. In this period, from bases presently and prospectively available, more bombs will be dropped on Japan than were delivered against Germany during the entire European war. If the blockade and bombardment concept is capable of achieving decisive results, these will, in all probability, be brought about by this scale of effort prior to the planned date for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain. However, in the event this invasion is not considered feasible and acceptable on the planned date, a course of action to extend bombardment and blockade is open to us.

3. Examination of the map, Tab "A", shows that bases on the Asiatic mainland other than in Korea are too distant to be of value in augmenting the sea and air bombardment of Japan and in cutting the remaining Japanese sea routes across Tsushima Strait and the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, the blockade of the Yellow Sea and the sea areas to the southward is now virtually effective. There is



DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/60</u>

also the likelihood that any operation in China, with its vast area and numbers of Japanese ground forces, will develop into a vacuum requiring ever more and more U.S. forces. We therefore discarded, as unnecessary and diversionary, operations to seize additional bases on the China coast. The best areas from which to complete the isolation of Japan are obviously either in Korea or in the southwestern part of the Japanese Archipelago. We considered three possibilities: Korea, the northwestern part of Kyushu, and southern Kyushu. Tabs "F" and "G" show the salient facts and estimates for campaigns in Korea and northwestern Kyushu.

We discarded Korea as a possible operation to follow Okinawa because of its longer sea approach, the paucity of good beaches and exits therefrom, the rugged terrain back of the beaches, the few airfield sites available for development after seizure, and the greater reinforcement capabilities of the Japanese from their fine and as yet untouched army in northern China; further, we would have difficulty both in interfering by air action with the arrival of these reinforcements and in providing adequate air cover and support to the assault because of the distance to Okinawa bases. The campaign is estimated to require about the same commitment of forces as for the invasion of southern Kyushu (14 divisions, 766,700 men). *left out 1388*

Similarly we discarded northwestern Kyushu as a possible objective area following Okinawa because the sea approaches to the best landing area are restricted, well fortified and heavily mined; and because of Japanese capability to reinforce the area from two directions--from southern Kyushu and from Honshu. The forces required for such an operation are estimated to be in excess of those for southern Kyushu. The operation may, however, prove desirable as a development and exploitation of the landing in southern Kyushu, when it is estimated that it could be done with 12 divisions (510,000 men).

The seizure of southern Kyushu has been directed because:

- a. Its occupation is essential to, and will materially further, the isolation of Japan from Korea and the mainland of Asia;
- b. It is the most logical extension of our operations in the Ryukyus, since shore-based tactical air support can be furnished

from Okinawa and lines of communication are shorter than for any other practicable objective;

c. Airfields on which to base approximately 40 groups (over 2,000 aircraft) can be developed, from which the air bombardment of the remainder of Japan can be greatly intensified in preparation for the invasion of Honshu, should this prove to be necessary;

d. It will contribute toward the defeat of Japanese armies in the Japanese homeland;

e. It may well prove to be the decisive operation which will terminate the war.

4. As to other areas, Admiral Mountbatten in the Southeast Asia Command plans to seize a position in the Port Swettenham-Port Dixon area on the Malay Peninsula in the latter half of August 1945 and to follow this up with a campaign to recapture Singapore beginning probably in December-January. General Wedemeyer has advised that, in China, the Generalissimo plans to launch an overland advance with Chinese forces on the Canton-Hong Kong area beginning about 1 September 1945 and to follow up any Japanese withdrawals northward along the railroad route in central China.

5. Plans for the period after the invasion of the Tokyo Plain cannot be made with firmness at this time. If the Japanese continue to resist, plans must provide for further operations in the main islands and for possible operations on the mainland of Asia. We hope that U.S. commitments on the mainland can be kept to a minimum, with maximum effort by the Chinese, and by the Russians if they should enter the war. Hence, plans provide for continued U.S. aid to Chinese forces, the scale of which can probably be materially increased later in the campaign. Should the Japanese unconditionally surrender or concede defeat during the campaign in Japan proper, there will still remain the sizable task of disarming their forces everywhere, assembling them at ports, and returning them to their home islands.

6. Forces required for presently planned campaign. Estimate's of the forces required to execute the invasion of southern Kyushu

and of the Tokyo Plain are shown on the map, Tab "E". The maps, Tabs "B" and "C", show the deployment of land-based aircraft planned upon the completion of each of these two operations. The ultimately expected coverage of the Asiatic mainland and sea routes thereto is of note.

For the campaign as planned through the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, it is expected there will be in the Pacific by the spring of 1946 a total of 39 Army divisions and ¹²⁷~~116~~ Army Air groups (8512 land-based aircraft) or a grand total in Army forces of about ^{3,000,000}~~2,600,000~~ men. General MacArthur has indicated that if operations are necessary after the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, plans should provide for the movement of additional divisions from the U.S. to the Pacific at a rate of about 4 additional divisions per month, up to the limit of a planned strategic reserve of 17 divisions.

By 1 March 1946 the following number of major combat ships are scheduled to be fully operational in the Pacific Fleet:

10 BB	26 CA
13 OBB	33 CL
2 CB	8 CL (AA)
22 CV	364 DD
2 CVB	326 DE
9 CVL	189 SS
74 CVE (43 combat)	

The above figures make no allowance for attrition. Three months after the Kyushu operation it is estimated that approximately 10% will either have been lost or still undergoing repairs to damage received in this operation. Of the operational ships in service 75% will normally be constantly available for any single operation. Others will be either undergoing operational repairs or be otherwise employed.

It is estimated that approximately 3,818 carrier-based aircraft will be available on 1 March 1946.

7. Casualties. The cost in casualties of the main operations against Japan are not subject to accurate estimate. The scale of Japanese resistance in the past has not been predictable. Casualty expectancy rates based on experience in the Pacific vary greatly

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/99

from the short bloody battle of Tarawa to the unopposed landing at Lingayen. It would be difficult to predict whether Jap resistance on Kyushu would more closely resemble the fighting on Okinawa or whether it would parallel the battle of Leyte.

Certain general conclusions can, however, be reached. The highest casualty rate occurs during the assault phase of an amphibious operation; casualties in land warfare are a function of the length of campaign and of the scale of opposition encountered. Naval casualties can be expected to vary directly with the number of amphibious operations involved and with the length of the campaign. Casualties can be kept to a minimum, then, by terminating the war at the earliest possible time by means of the fewest possible assault operations and by conducting land campaigns only in decisive areas. The presently planned campaign, which involves two assaults followed by land campaigns in the Japanese homeland, is in conformity with this principle. [Further, the extent of the objective area gives us an opportunity to effect surprise as to the points of landing and, once ashore, to profit by our superiority in mobility and mechanized power through maneuver. Should it be decided to follow the southern Kyushu operation by another operation such as against northern Kyushu in order to exploit bombardment and blockade, and should this bring about capitulation of the Japanese, the casualties should be less than for the presently planned campaign. We consider that at this time it would be a pure gamble that the Japanese would admit defeat under such conditions. If they do not, invasion of the Tokyo Plain might still be required with resultant increased total casualties.

The best estimate of casualties for these possible sequences of operations follows. For the reasons stated above, it is admittedly only an "educated guess".

	Killed in Action	Wounded in Action	Missing in Action	Total
Southern Kyushu, followed by Tokyo Plain, to mid-1946	40,000	150,000	3,500	193,500
Southern Kyushu - Northwestern Kyushu	25,000	105,000	2,500	132,500
Southern Kyushu - Northwestern Kyushu - Tokyo Plain	46,000	170,000	4,000	220,000

8. Time. Under the campaign as planned, it is estimated that the defeat of the Japanese in the Tokyo Plain area and the seizure of ports on Tokyo Bay would be completed by mid-1946. Should it prove necessary to execute other operations prior to invading the Tokyo Plain, the earliest date by which the latter operation could take place is estimated to be October 1946, because of adverse weather and ground conditions and the necessity of further mobilizing resources. In either case, the war should be over not later than the end of 1946. On the other hand, we are unable to estimate the time required or the losses that will result in an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade and bombardment without invasion, because of our inability to predict at what stage thereof the Japanese might concede defeat, and because of the possibility that invasion of the Tokyo area would ultimately be necessary. We feel that at best, this strategy will lead to a long war, which would have an adverse effect upon the U.S. position vis-a-vis other nations who will, in the meantime, be rebuilding their peacetime economy.

9. In summary, our planned course of action is:

- a. To proceed with an operation against southern Kyushu on 1 November 1945, as presently directed.
- b. To plan an invasion of the Tokyo area with a target date of 1 March 1946.
- c. To exploit to the utmost in the interim periods the possibilities of blockade and air bombardment of Japan from positions in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, the Ryukyus and Kyushu.
- d. To make preparations during the period following the assault on southern Kyushu for the invasion of the Tokyo area about 1 March 1946, or the extension of blockading positions to northwestern Kyushu on the same date.
- e. To base the decision as to operations following southern Kyushu on developments.

Defer
from
Jes

10. Russian participation in the war. In previous discussions and correspondence with the Russians they have indicated generally their plan of campaign should they enter the war; that they would probably require about three months for concentration of troops and

(4 Aug)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/99

supplies on their eastern front; that maintenance of the Pacific supply route would be necessary; and that it might be possible for the United States to base limited forces in Kamchatka and air forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area. In these discussions we were guided by the following basic principles:

Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations. The U.S. will provide maximum support possible without interfering with our main effort against Japan.

The objective of Russia's military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with U.S. air forces based in eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic between Japan and the mainland of Asia.

Nothing that has happened since is believed to require any change to these principles, except to note that we believe that we can defeat the Japanese in the main islands regardless of Russian entry, because of our own estimated ability to restrict movement of Japanese reinforcements from Asia. However, the defeat of the Japanese army in north China is still considered to be the best contribution that the Russians can make. (We should insist that the appropriate U.S. command direct and control any Russian part in operations against Japanese sea traffic to Japan and in the air bombardment of Japan.)

As to basing U.S. forces in Russian territory, this is no longer considered absolutely necessary, and we therefore propose to bring this subject up only if necessary in connection with Russian discussion of opening a sea route to other Pacific ports.

Opening a sea route to Russian ports may well be a resultant requirement of Russian entry into the war. We estimate that it might be satisfactorily accomplished by U.S. convoy of cargo ships in small groups without the necessity for our seizure of Japanese

territory or of basing forces in Russian territory other than an advanced anchorage at Petropavlovsk and minor base facilities at the Russian termini. However, it should be noted that a more desirable plan would be to route the convoys through Tsushima Strait once it is under our control, thus avoiding the ice conditions of the northern straits. We should avoid by all possible means U.S. commitment to costly operations in the Kuriles-Karafuto area for this sole purpose.

In general, we believe that the best policy is not to press the Russians for further information or for any commitment, but merely to declare our readiness to receive and fully consider any proposals which they may wish to make.

11. Participation by other nations.

a. China. By the fall of 1945, the Chinese National Army will consist of about 2,500,000 men, of which only 36 divisions, now being trained under U.S. supervision, can be considered reasonably effective. There are approximately 500,000 unarmed recruits in training under the Chinese, and an estimated provincial and local militia totaling about 1,000,000. In addition, guerrillas under nominal control of the Central Government total about 300,000. The regular forces of the Chinese Communist Armies amount to about 500,000.

It is estimated that Japanese strength in China in the fall, excluding Manchuria, will be about 900,000 men. Therefore, it is considered that the major share of the task of defeating the enemy in China south of Manchuria should fall to China.

b. British Empire forces.

Army: 1 Canadian, 1 New Zealand, and 3 Australian Imperial Divisions will be deployed in the Pacific; approximately 23 divisions will be deployed in Southeast Asia, including English, Indian and African units.

Air Forces: Negotiations are in progress to make use of 10 squadrons of British bombers in the Pacific, with a possible ultimate employment of 20 squadrons. The RAF will provide the air units found necessary for operations in Southeast Asia.

Naval Forces: Elements of the British Fleet will support

operations in Southeast Asia; 3 naval assault forces, comprising amphibious lift for about 3 divisions, will be available to the Southeast Asia Command. The British Pacific Fleet, consisting of 4 battleships, 5 carriers, accompanying light naval forces and train, is currently operating under Admiral Nimitz.

Estimated Japanese strength in Southeast Asia and Malaysia, excluding the Philippines, in the fall of 1945, is about 600,000 men. The British should be assigned the primary responsibility for the defeat of these forces. The British Pacific Fleet and elements of the RAF mentioned above will participate in the invasion of Japan.

c. France. Certain French naval vessels are now under operational control of the Southeast Asia Command. It does not appear practicable to support French naval vessels in Pacific operations. The French have offered a corps composed of two Colonial Divisions for operations in the Pacific. The question of where these divisions can be best employed is now being examined. The Southeast Asia Command includes minor French forces for clandestine operations in Indo-China.

d. Italy. From a military point of view Italian participation in the war against Japan is of negligible, if any, advantage to over-all conduct of the war.

e. Mexico. The 201st Mexican Fighter Squadron is now operating in the Southwest Pacific area.

f. Portugal. If so desired by the Allies, Portugal stands ready to provide minor forces for occupation of Portuguese Timor.

g. The Netherlands. Dutch forces may fulfill a minor role in recapture of areas in the Netherlands East Indies.

We believe that offers from any nation of military and naval assistance in the Pacific war should be considered on their military merits, and should be accepted only in case the forces offered are trained and equipped to meet U.S. standards of combat efficiency, can be effectively employed in planned operations against Japan, are reasonably self-supporting, and operate under U.S. control.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 770076

By SP NARA Date 1/15/68

12. In conclusion we desire to point out that throughout previous staff discussions with the British we have emphasized that control and direction of the war against Japan lies with the U.S. We believe that we should continue to follow that policy and that efforts to bring the direction of the Pacific war under the laborious, argumentative and time-consuming system of combined control should be vigorously opposed.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 770076
By	SP NARA Date 1/15/98

TAB "A"

AIR COVERAGE AFTER DEVELOPMENT OF
OKINAWA BASES

(One Photostat)

TOP SECRET

TAB "B"

AIR COVERAGE AFTER COMPLETION OF
DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN KYUSHU BASES

(One Photostat)



DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/98

TOP SECRET

TAB "C"

AIR COVERAGE AFTER COMPLETION OF
DEVELOPMENT OF TOKYO PLAIN BASES

(One Photostat)


TOP SECRET

TAB "D"

ESTIMATED JAPANESE DISPOSITIONS

1 NOVEMBER 1945

(One Photostat)




TOP SECRET

TAB "E"

GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(One Photostat)

TOP SECRET



TOKYO PLAIN - March 1946

- 14 Division Assault
- 11 Division Follow-up
- 12 Air Groups in Assault
- 38 Air Groups in Follow-up

TOTAL TROOPS: 1,026,000
TOTAL AIRCRAFT: 3,328

NAVAL ASSAULT LIFT
 To float 14 Divisions at 33,000 personnel and 43,500 dead weight tons each

SOUTHERN KYUSHU - 1 November 1945

- 12 Division Assault
- 2 Division Follow-up
- 8 Air Groups in Assault
- 32 Air Groups in Follow-up

TOTAL TROOPS: 766,700
TOTAL AIRCRAFT: 2,794

NAVAL ASSAULT LIFT
 To float 12 Divisions at 33,000 personnel and 50,750 dead weight tons each

20 Combined Operations Communications Headquarters Ships

MOUNTING AREA

- 1 Division for Southern Kyushu
- 4 Divisions for Tokyo Plain

Hawaii is Mounting Area for 3 Divisions for Southern Kyushu

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB "F"

SALIENT FACTS AND ESTIMATES

CAMPAIGN IN KOREA

1. Physiography and Climate. Rugged terrain in central and eastern parts with limited coastal plains on west. Only feasible approach is via Yellow Sea to west coast. Changsan-got (90 miles SW of Heijo) is only suitable landing area for large force. Climate allows military operations throughout the year.

2. Enemy strength and capabilities.

a. Air. About 5000 planes of all types. Present Japanese policy of employing suicide tactics permits use of all types of planes. Doubtful if effort in Korea would ever exceed 200 sorties per day. This would fall off rapidly since all out effort not expected.

b. Naval. Submarines and suicide craft would be employed in large numbers but use of heavy units not probable.

c. Ground. In Korea 6 divisions of fresh troops. These could quickly concentrate in objective area since only one feasible landing area exists. 25 divisions in Manchuria. Their use depends on Russia.

3. Strategic considerations.

a. Advantages.

(1) Occupation of even a limited area would go far towards completing the isolation of Japan.

(2) A beachhead area capable of basing 800-1000 planes could be seized and held.

(3) Aircraft could operate effectively against enemy lines of communication in North China, Manchuria, Korea and the Yellow Sea and assist in strategic bombing of Japan.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Requires a large scale amphibious assault without benefit of land-based air against a region virtually unaffected by the war.

(2) Would risk involvement with Kwantung and North China armies in a position relatively difficult for us to reinforce.

(3) It would require the employment of 12-15 divisions in active defense of even a limited beachhead and a logistic strain for the support of such a force which would affect our capabilities for subsequent action.

4. Conclusion. The results to be obtained by an attack on Korea are not commensurate with the costs.

TOP SECRET

TAB "G"

SALIENT FACTS AND ESTIMATES

CAMPAIGN IN NORTHWESTERN KYUSHU
As an Operation Following Okinawa

1. Physiography. Terrain is suitable for establishment of a base of operations for:

a. Air and naval blockade of Yellow Sea, Tsushima Strait, and Sea of Japan.

b. Opening a sea route to Russian ports.

c. Destroying enemy forces in northern Kyushu.

2. Initial Objective. Fukuoka Area.

3. Enemy Forces.

a. 3 divisions and 2 depot divisions in northern Kyushu.

b. 2 divisions in southern Kyushu.

c. 125,000 lightly armed and partly trained reservists.

d. Reinforcements - possibly 6 divisions.

e. Maximum air effort - 400 to 500 sorties in any 24-hour period.

f. Naval forces chiefly submarines, midget submarines, and small suicide surface craft.

Enemy will make desperate effort to defend this area.

4. Own Forces Required.

a. 17 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 2 airborne divisions.

b. Air forces - 37 groups or 2,600 aircraft.

c. Naval forces.

(1) 155 major combatant units.

(2) 426 light combatant units.

(3) 255 light vessels for minesweeping, etc.

(4) Simultaneous transport lift for 12 divisions (180 APAs, 72 AKAs, plus smaller types).

Forces to be landed in first 30 days - 365,000.

Total forces to be landed - 850,000.

5. Discussion. In the restricted waters of this area, carrier-borne aircraft cannot meet requirements of an operation of this size. There must be land-based fighters within 300 miles. Okinawa is 520 miles from Fukuoka.

6. Conclusion. Northwestern Kyushu is not suitable as an invasion objective until land-based fighters are established within 300 miles.

ADD 384
TOP SECRET
RESTRICTED
16 June 1945
Pages 1 - 19, incl.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/68

DOCUMENT 6

COPY NO. 48
(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

The Joint Staff Planners recommend that the Enclosure
be presented to the President.

~~RESTRICTED~~

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO.

COPY NO.

Admiral Leahy	1	General Norstad	11
General Marshall	2 & 5	Admiral Duncan	12
Admiral King	3 & 6	General Cabell	13
General Arnold	4	General Lincoln	14
General Handy	7	Captain Campbell	15
Admiral Edwards	8	Secy, JCS	16
Admiral Cooke	9	Secy, JPS	17
General Hull	10	Secy, JWPC	18

Carded WBM
Indexed WBM
1388

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By PA4 NARA Date 4/6/68

~~RESTRICTED~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/49</u>

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Campaign against Japan.

1. Strategy. Throughout the series of staff conferences with the British, we have agreed that the over-all concept for the prosecution of the war included provision "to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan." We believe that the only sure way, and certainly the quickest way to force the surrender of Japan is to defeat her armed forces in the main Japanese islands. Hence, at recent staff conferences we have proposed--and the British have agreed--that the over-all objective of the Japanese war is "to force the unconditional surrender of Japan by (1) lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; (2) invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan."

It is by no means certain that a capitulation by a Japanese government will be recognized by Japanese armed forces everywhere. If, following such an acknowledgment, her forces do not surrender, their position will be so seriously weakened as to facilitate their defeat in detail. However, the possibility must be faced that the Japanese forces everywhere must be defeated.

2. Presently planned campaign. Our agreed concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific war is:

"Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

"An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

~~RESTRICTED~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/18/99

"The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain."

Our campaign plans have therefore been designed to seize positions progressively closer to the Tokyo Plain--the political, industrial and communication center of Japan--with a view to isolating the Japanese islands and providing sufficient bases from which, by sea and air bombardment, conditions will be created which will make ultimate invasion of the Tokyo Plain acceptable and feasible. We have also endeavored so to design the campaign that the Japanese cannot fail to see and feel the results of its rapidly increasing tempo and magnitude, with the thought that at some stage of the campaign they will admit defeat in order to avoid further destruction.

Thus far in this campaign we have seized and developed air and naval bases in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, the Philippines and Okinawa. No further operations in the Ryukyus after completion of the Okinawa campaign are now contemplated; all available resources are being utilized to develop air and naval bases in Okinawa to maximum capacity by November 1945. By then it is expected to have about 2700 land-based aircraft operating from this area and to have completed an advanced fleet base and anchorage. The map, Tab "A", shows the land-based aircraft expected to be based within range of Japan by that time and the areas they can reach. Meanwhile every effort is also being made to transport to the Pacific from Europe the added means required for a rapid and decisive campaign. In general the units needed to build the required bases are being moved first, followed by the required additional combat units, air and ground.

Already we have eliminated practically all Japanese sea traffic between their main islands and points to the southward of Shanghai, and severely restricted their traffic to Shanghai and Yellow Sea ports. By November 1945, when air operations from Okinawa will be in full swing, there should remain to the Japanese only those sea routes across Tsushima Strait to Korea.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 770076

By OF NARA Date 1/15/99

RESTRICTED

and across the Sea of Japan. It should be noted that our air
marines are already operating in these areas on a limited
scale. By November 1945 the Japanese situation is expected to
be critical. Their fleet units in home waters have already been
so reduced as to no longer constitute a ^{controlling} strategic factor. Their
air arm is already committing training planes to combat and will
probably continue to devote much of their remaining air power
to suicide tactics. Their ability to move ground forces to
Japan from Asia or vice versa is already reduced and is estimated ^{by 1 November}
to be not more than one division a month. The map, Tab "D",
shows the estimated Japanese dispositions of ground and air
forces about 1 November 1945.

In order to obtain bases still closer to the Tokyo Plain
from which to augment sea and air bombardment, complete the
isolation of the main Japanese islands and to provide land based
air cover and support for the invasion of the Tokyo plain, should
that prove necessary, we have directed General MacArthur and
Admiral Nimitz to invade southern Kyushu about 1 November 1945.

We have not yet directed the execution of any operations
after the invasion of southern Kyushu, feeling that decision
would better await further developments. However, plans and
preparations are being made to invade the Tokyo Plain--the polit-
ical, industrial and communication center of Japan--about 4
months after the southern Kyushu operation, or about 1 March 1946.
We consider that this operation should be decisive. By planning
and preparing for a supreme operation of this magnitude, we shall
be in a position to undertake any lesser operation should develop-
ments warrant.

In the period prior to the planned invasion of the Tokyo
Plain, every effort will be made to exploit the blockade and
bombardment of Japan. In this period, from bases presently and
prospectively available, more bombs will be dropped on Japan than
were delivered against Germany during the entire European war.
RESTRICTED
If this blockade and bombardment achieve decisive results, these
will, in all probability, be brought about by this scale of
effort prior to the planned date for the invasion of the Tokyo

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By GP NARA Date 1/15/92

Plain. However, in the event this invasion is not considered feasible and acceptable on the planned date, a course of action to extend bombardment and blockade is open to us.

3. Examination of the map, Tab "A", shows that bases on the Asiatic mainland other than in Korea are too distant to be of value in augmenting [our present capabilities for] sea and air bombardment of Japan and in cutting the remaining Japanese sea routes across Tsushima Strait and the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, the blockade of the Yellow Sea and the sea areas to the southward is now virtually effective. There is also the likelihood that any operation in North China, with its vast area and large numbers of Japanese ground forces, will develop into a vacuum drawing over more and more U.S. forces into an indecisive and costly campaign. We therefore discarded, as unnecessary and diversionary, operations to seize bases on the coast of North China. The best areas from which to complete the isolation of Japan are obviously situated in Korea or in the southwestern part of the Japanese Archipelago. We considered three possibilities: Korea, the northwestern part of Kyushu, and southern Kyushu. Tab "F" shows the salient facts and estimates for campaigns in Korea.

We discarded Korea as a possible operation to follow Okinawa because of its longer sea approach, the paucity of good beaches and exits therefrom, the rugged terrain back of the beaches, the few airfield sites available for development after seizure, and the great reinforcement capabilities of the Japanese from their fine and as yet untouched army in northern China. Furthermore, because of the distance from Okinawa bases, we would have great difficulty in interfering by air action with the arrival of Japanese reinforcements and in providing adequate air cover and support to the assault. The campaign is estimated to require about the same commitment of forces as for the invasion of southern Kyushu (14 divisions).

Similarly we considered northwestern Kyushu unsuitable as an initial objective area following Okinawa because the sea approaches to the best landing area are restricted, well fortified

RESTRICTED

~~RESTRICTED~~

and heavily mined; and because of Japanese capability to reinforce the area from two directions--from southern Kyushu and from Honshu. The forces required for such an operation are estimated to be in excess of those for southern Kyushu.

The seizure of southern Kyushu has been directed because:

- a. Its occupation is essential both for decisive assault on the Tokyo Plain and strangulation of Japan through bombardment and through isolation from Korea and the mainland of Asia;
- b. It is the most logical extension of our operations in the Ryukyus, since shore-based tactical air support can be furnished from Okinawa and lines of communication are shorter than for any other practicable objective;
- c. Airfields on which to base approximately 40 groups (over 2500 aircraft) can be developed, from which we can practically sever Japan's last remaining communication with the mainland of Asia and from which the air bombardment of the remainder of Japan can be greatly intensified;
- d. It will contribute toward the defeat of Japanese armies in the Japanese homeland;
- e. It may well be that Japanese capitulation will be forced by this operation.

4. As to other areas, Admiral Mountbatten in the Southeast Asia Command plans to seize a position in the Port Swettenham-Port Dixon area on the Malay Peninsula in the latter half of August 1945 and to follow this up with a campaign to recapture Singapore beginning probably in December-January. General Wedemeyer has advised that, in China, the Generalissimo is to launch an overland advance with Chinese forces on the Canton-Hong Kong area beginning about 1 September 1945 and to follow up any Japanese withdrawals northward along the railroad route in central China.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

5. Plans for the period after the invasion of the Tokyo Plain cannot be made with firmness at this time. If the Japanese continue to resist, plans must provide for further operations in the main islands and for operations by ourselves or our allies on the mainland of Asia against those Japanese forces which continue to resist. We are striving to keep U.S. commitments on the mainland to a minimum, through encouraging and supporting maximum effort by the Chinese, and by the Russians if they should enter the war. Hence, plans provide for continued U.S. aid to Chinese forces, the scale of which can probably be materially increased later in the campaign. Should the Japanese unconditionally surrender or concede defeat during the campaign in Japan proper, there will still remain the sizable task of disarming their forces everywhere, assembling them at ports, and returning them to their home islands.

6. Forces required for presently planned campaign. Estimates of the forces required to execute the invasion of southern Kyushu and of the Tokyo Plain are shown on the map, Tab "E". The maps, Tabs "B" and "C", show the deployment of land-based aircraft planned upon the completion of each of these two operations. It is obvious from the maps that this air power will cover Japan and the approaches thereto with a blanket of destruction.

For the campaign as planned through the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, it is expected there will be in the Pacific theaters, India-Burma and China, by the spring of 1946 a total of 39 Army divisions and 127 Army air groups (8,500 land-based aircraft) or a grand total in Army forces of about 3,000,000 men. General MacArthur has indicated that if operations are necessary after the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, plans should provide for the movement of additional divisions from the U.S. to the Pacific at a rate of about 4 additional divisions per month, from a planned strategic reserve of 17 divisions in the U.S.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/99

By 1 March 1946 the following number of major combat ships are scheduled to be fully operational in the Pacific Fleet:

10 BB (Battleships)	26 CA (Heavy Cruisers)
13 OBB (Old Battleships)	33 CL (Light Cruisers)
2 CB (Large Cruisers)	8 CL (AA) (Light Cruisers) (Antiaircraft)
22 CV (Aircraft Carriers)	364 DD (Destroyers)
2 CVB (Aircraft Carriers (Large))	326 DE (Destroyer Escort Vessels)
9 CVL (Aircraft Carriers (Small))	
74 CVE (43 combat) (Aircraft Carriers, Escort)	189 SS (Submarines)

The above figures make no allowance for attrition. Three months after the Kyushu operation it is estimated that approximately 10% will either have been lost or still undergoing repairs to damage received in this operation. Of the operational ships in service 75% will normally be constantly available for any single operation. Others will be either undergoing operational repairs or be otherwise employed.

It is estimated that approximately 3,600 carrier-based aircraft will be available on 1 March 1946.

plw
[As a general statement it may be said that the forces of all arms which are required for the operations we contemplate are all those which can be effectively employed and supported in the theater within the means which will be available to us. We feel that the unremitting application of this maximum force is essential to defeating Japan at the least possible cost in lives and resources.]

7. Casualties. The cost in casualties of the main operations against Japan are not subject to accurate estimate. The scale of Japanese resistance in the past has not been ~~unstable~~ ~~RESTRICTED~~ Casualty expectancy rates based on experience in the Pacific

RESTRICTED
~~TOP SECRET~~

vary greatly from the short bloody battle of Tarawa to the unopposed landing at Lingayen. It would be difficult to predict whether operations on Kyushu would more closely resemble the fighting on Okinawa or whether it would parallel the battle of Leyte. However, it may be pointed out that the extent of the objective areas in both Kyushu and Honshu gives us an opportunity to effect surprise as to the points of landing and, once ashore, to profit by our superiority in mobility and mechanized power through maneuver.

Certain general conclusions can, ~~however~~, be reached. The highest casualty rate occurs during the assault phase of an amphibious operation; casualties in land warfare are a function of the length of campaign and of the scale of opposition encountered. Naval casualties can be expected to vary directly with the number of amphibious operations involved and with the length of the campaign. Casualties can be kept to a minimum, then, by terminating the war at the earliest possible time by means of the fewest possible assault operations and by conducting land campaigns only in decisive areas. The presently planned campaign, which involves two assaults followed by land campaigns in the Japanese homeland, is in conformity with this principle.

8. Time. Under the campaign as planned, it is estimated that the defeat of the Japanese in the Tokyo Plain area and the seizure of ports on Tokyo Bay would be completed by mid-1946. Should it prove necessary to execute other operations prior to invading the Tokyo Plain, the earliest date by which the latter operation could take place is estimated to be October 1946, because of adverse weather and ground conditions and the necessity of further mobilizing resources. In either case, the war should be over not later than the end of 1946.

RESTRICTED

~~RESTRICTED~~

On the other hand, we are unable to estimate the time required or the losses that will result in an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade and bombardment without invasion, because of our inability to predict at what stage thereof the Japanese might concede defeat, and because of the possibility that invasion of the Tokyo area would ultimately be necessary. We feel that at best, such strategy would lead to a longer and probably more costly war.

9. In summary, our planned course of action is:

- a. To proceed with an operation against southern Kyushu on 1 November 1945, as presently directed.
- b. To plan and prepare for an invasion of the Tokyo area with a target date of 1 March 1946.
- c. To exploit to the utmost in the interim periods the possibilities of blockade and air bombardment of Japan from positions in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, the Ryukyus and Kyushu.
- d. To base the decision as to operations following southern Kyushu on developments.

10. Russian participation in the war. In previous discussions and correspondence with the Russians they have indicated that they would probably require about three months after VE-Day for concentration of troops and supplies on their eastern front. We have considered that Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ~~RESTRICTED~~ to engage in offensive operations is highly desirable to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations and that the primary objective of Russia's military effort should be to contain and destroy Japanese forces in Manchuria.

~~RESTRICTED~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/68

We believe that we can defeat the Japanese in the main islands regardless of Russian entry, because of our own estimated ability to restrict movement of Japanese reinforcements from Asia. However, the defeat of the Japanese army in North China including Manchuria would be a valuable contribution to the early and economical termination of the war.

As to basing U.S. forces in Russian territory, this is no longer considered necessary, and we therefore suggest that this subject be discussed only if necessary in connection with Russian discussion of opening a sea route to ~~the~~ Pacific ports.

Opening a sea route to Russian ports may well be a resultant requirement of Russian entry into the war. We estimate that it might be satisfactorily accomplished by U.S. convoy of cargo ships in small groups without the necessity for our seizure of Japanese territory or of basing forces in Russian territory other than an advanced anchorage at Petropavlovsk and minor base facilities at the Russian termini. However, it should be noted that a more desirable plan would be to route the convoys through Tsushima Strait once it is under our control, thus avoiding the ice conditions of the northern straits. We should avoid by all possible means U.S. commitment to costly operations in the Kuriles-Karafuto area for this sole purpose.

In general, we believe that the best policy is not to press the Russians for further information or for any commitment, but merely to declare our readiness to receive and fully consider any proposals which they may wish to make.

11. Participation by other nations.

a. China. By the fall of 1945, the Chinese National Army will consist of about 2,500,000 men, of which only ~~RESTRICTED~~ ^{one} million, now being trained under U.S. supervision, can be considered reasonably effective. There are approximately 500,000 unarmed recruits in training under the Chinese, and an estimated provincial and local militia totaling about 1,000,000.

~~RESTRICTED~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/98</u>

In addition, guerrillas under nominal control of the central Government total about 300,000. The regular forces of the Chinese Communist Armies amount to about 500,000.

It is estimated that Japanese strength in China in the fall of 1945 excluding Manchuria, will be about 900,000 men. Therefore, it is considered that the major share of the task of defeating the enemy in China south of Manchuria should fall to China.

b. British Empire forces.

Army: 1 Canadian, 1 New Zealand, and 3 Australian Imperial Divisions will be deployed in the Pacific; approximately 23 divisions will be deployed in Southeast Asia, including English, Indian and African units.

Air Forces: Negotiations are in progress to make use of 10 squadrons of British bombers in the Pacific, with a possible ultimate employment of 20 squadrons. The RAF will provide the air units found necessary for operations in Southeast Asia.

Naval Forces: Elements of the British Fleet will support operations in Southeast Asia; 3 naval assault forces, comprising amphibious lift for about 3 divisions, will be available to the Southeast Asia Command. The British Pacific Fleet, consisting of 4 battleships, 5 carriers, accompanying light naval forces and train, is currently operating under Admiral Nimitz.

Estimated Japanese strength in Southeast Asia and Malaysia, excluding the Philippines, in the fall of 1945, is about 800,000 men. The British should continue their primary responsibility for the mop-up of these forces. The British Pacific Fleet and elements of the RAF mentioned above will participate in the invasion of Japan.

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND770076
By SP NARA Date 1/15/98

c. France. Certain French naval vessels are now under operational control of the British East Indies Fleet. It does not appear practicable or desirable to employ French naval vessels or air forces in Pacific operations. The French have offered a corps composed of two Colonial divisions for operations in the Pacific. The question of where and when these divisions can be best employed is now being examined. Arrangements for the French must include adequate provisions against any repetition in the Pacific of the French refusals, which have occurred in Europe, to obey military orders. The Southeast Asia Command includes minor French forces for clandestine operations in Indo-China.

*Deleted
Index
P. 100*

d. Portugal. If so desired by the Allies, Portugal stands ready to provide minor forces for occupation of Portuguese Timor.

e. The Netherlands. Dutch forces may fulfill a minor role in recapture of areas in the Netherlands East Indies.

We believe that offers from any nation to contribute token or minor assistance in the Pacific war should be considered on their military merits. The acceptance of any forces should be on the bases that they are to be trained and equipped to meet U.S. standards of combat efficiency, can be effectively employed in planned operations against Japan, are reasonably self-supporting, and will operate as determined by the U.S..

12. Control and Command in the Pacific War.

Throughout previous staff discussions with the British we have taken the position that control, command and direction of the war in the Pacific lies with the U.S. ~~which thus far have committed their forces under this arrangement and have followed U.S. lead and policy.~~ We believe that we should continue to follow that policy and that any efforts which may be made to bring the direction of the Pacific war under the laborious, argumentative and time-consuming system of combined control should be vigorously opposed.

173

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 770076
By 07 NARA Date 1/15/99

E N C L O S U R E

PROPOSED REVISION OF J.C.S. 1388
"DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN".

Replace last 4 subparagraphs of paragraph 6, page 7
with the following. (Additions underscored,
deletions lined out).

By 1 March 1946 the following number of major combat ships
are scheduled to be fully operational in the Pacific Fleet. By
1 March 1946 the following major naval vessels are scheduled
for deployment in the Pacific:

10 BB (Battleships)	26 CA (Heavy Cruisers)
13 OBB (Old Battleships)	33 CL (Light Cruisers)
2 CB (Large Cruisers)	8 CL (AA) (Light Cruisers) (Antiaircraft)
22 CV (Aircraft Carriers)	364 DD (Destroyers)
2 CVB (Aircraft Carriers (Large))	326 DE (Destroyer Escort Vessels)
9 CVL (Aircraft Carriers (Small))	189 SS (Submarines)
74 CVE (43 combat) (Aircraft Carriers, Escort)	799 LST (Tank Landing Ships)
17 AGC (Operations and Command Headquarters Ships)	491 LSM (Medium Landing Ships)
223 APA (Attack Transport Ships)	
108 AKA (Attack Cargo Ships)	

The above figures make no allowance for attrition. Three months after the Kyushu operation it is estimated that approximately 10% will either have been lost or still undergoing repairs to damage received in this operation. Of the operational ships in service 75% will normally be ~~constantly~~ available for any single operation. Others will be either undergoing operational repairs or be otherwise employed. It is worthy of note that the amphibious resources listed above will permit simultaneous assault landings on a scale never before thought possible.

TOP SECRET

It is estimated that approximately 3,600 carrier-based aircraft will be available on 1 March 1946.

As a general statement it may be said that the forces of all arms which are required and which should be employed for the operations we contemplate are all those which can be ~~effectively-employed-and~~ supported in the theater within the means which will be available to us and which can be effectively employed. We feel that the unremitting application of this maximum force is essential to defeating Japan at the least possible cost in lives and resources.

Replace Paragraph 7, Pages 7 and 8, with following paragraph.


7. Casualties. Our casualty experience in the Pacific war has been so diverse as to throw serious doubt on the validity of any quantitative estimate of casualties for future operations. The following data indicate results of experience.

<u>Campaign</u>	<u>U.S. Casualties Killed, wounded, missing</u>	<u>Jap Casualties Killed and Prisoners (Not including wounded)</u>	<u>Ratio U.S. to Jap</u>
Leyte	17,000	78,000	1:4.6
Luzon	31,000	156,000	1:5.0
Iwo Jima	20,000	25,000	1:1.25
Okinawa	34,000 (Ground 7,700 (Navy)	81,000 (not a complete count)	1:2
Normandy (1st 30 days)	42,000	- - -	- - -

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

The nature of the objective area in Kyushu gives maneuver room for land and sea operations. For these and other reasons it is probable that the cost in ground force casualties for the first 30 days of the Kyushu operation will be on the order of that for Luzon. Naval casualties will probably be at about the

TOP SECRET



divisions) are being trained under U.S. supervision and can be considered reasonably effective for offensive operations. Some of the balance of the Chinese Armies are capable of defensive or occupation operations while the large remainder, for logistical, political and other reasons, are ineffective. Increase of supply to the Chinese Armies is dependent on the opening of a sea route to a major China coast port. Though we are planning to send several ship loads of supplies to General Wedemeyer this summer, contingent upon his seizing a harbor, no substantial diversion of ships and men for this purpose can be made until the campaign in Japan will permit.

It is estimated that Japanese strength in China in the fall of 1945 excluding Manchuria, will be about 900,000 men. Therefore, it is considered that the major share of the task of defeating the enemy in China south of Manchuria should fall to China.

Replace paragraph 11 b, page 11 with the following paragraph.

b. British Empire (Commonwealth) Forces.

Army: 1 Canadian division has been accepted for participation in CORONET. 3 Australian Imperial divisions are currently being employed in Southwest Pacific Area under U.S. command. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed (C.C.S. 889) a further contribution of 3-5 British Commonwealth Divisions to participate in the final phase of the campaign in Japan, all to operate under U.S. command. The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on this proposal have been requested by the British Chiefs of Staff, but not yet received. The British intend deploying Commonwealth forces to the extent of 21 divisions and 16 brigades (probably including the

116

TOP SECRET

above 3-5 divisions) in the Southeast Asia-East Indies area. Under separate consideration is acceptance by the U.S. of 1 Australian division to participate in operations against Japan proper; acceptance of the British offer in C.C.S. 889 will probably eliminate this offer.



Air Forces: Negotiations are in progress to make use of 10 squadrons of British bombers in the Pacific, with a possible ultimate employment of 20 squadrons. Also a force of approximately 15 tactical squadrons have been offered for support of the 3-5 divisions indicated above. The RAF will provide air units found necessary for operations in Southeast Asia.

Naval Forces: Elements of the British Fleet will support operations in Southeast Asia; 3 naval assault forces, comprising amphibious lift for about 3 divisions, will be continuously available to the Southeast Asia Command, should these elements not be used in the main operations against Japan. The British Pacific Fleet, consisting of 4 battleships, 5 carriers, accompanying light naval forces and train, is currently operating under Admiral Nimitz. In addition, elements of the East Indies Fleet are offered for support of the 3-5 divisions proposed above.

Estimated Japanese strength in Southeast Asia and Malaysia, excluding the Philippines, in the fall of 1945, is about 600,000 men. The British should continue their primary responsibility for mopping-up the Japanese in SEA and the East Indies, exclusive of the Philippines. Acceptance of the latest proposed British Commonwealth contributions

TOP SECRET

to the final phase of the war against Japan (C.C.S. 889) should not prejudice early accomplishment of this task provided the assault lift available to SACSEA is not employed elsewhere. The British Pacific Fleet, elements of the Royal Air Force, one Canadian division and possibly the Commonwealth force proposed in C.C.S. 889 will participate in the operation for invasion of Japan. It is the intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to turn over to British command certain portions of the SWPAC area including Australia, the Solomons, New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Netherlands East Indies.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

DOCUMENT 7

SUBJECT: Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President.

The following points are arranged seriatim in accordance with the appearance of the same subjects in the paper the Planners propose for presentation to the President:

1. Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

2. General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

- a. If we press preparations we can be ready.
- b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.
- c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.
- d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

3. An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large

~~TOP SECRET~~

and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

4. The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

5. We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with: (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

6. With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalise the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

7. Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worth-while position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of

~~TOP SECRET~~

specific operations, the following data is pertinent:

Campaign	U.S. Casualties Killed, wounded, missing	Jap Casualties Killed and prisoners (Not including wounded)	Ratio U.S. to Jap
Leyte	17,000	78,000	1:4.6
Luzon	31,000	156,000	1:5.0
Iwo Jima	20,000	25,000	1:1.25
Okinawa	34,000 (Ground) 7,700 (Navy)	61,000 (not a complete count)	1:1.2
Normandy (1st 30 days)	42,000	---	---

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. It was this basic difficulty with the Prime Minister which clouded and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

8. An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

9. In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

J. E. H.

~~TOP SECRET~~ 176-44 E. Hall

No. 596

740.00119 Control (Japan)/7-945

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1945

The present system of military control in Japan must be uprooted and not allowed again to assert itself.

The people of Japan shall be given an opportunity to control their destinies along peaceful lines.²

¹ Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. This memorandum constitutes a redraft of two sentences of document No. 594, to which this paper is attached.

² The second paragraph has been revised by hand by Dunn to read: "When the people of Japan have convinced the peace loving nations that they are going to follow peaceful lives [lines] they shall be given an opportunity to control their destinies along peaceful lines."

No. 597

740.00119 P. W./7-1345

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing the text of the statement which I made to the press on July 10 regarding Japanese peace feelers so that you may know just how the land lies. My purpose in doing this was twofold. First, to put a stop to the growing speculation in this country, as indicated in speeches, editorials, et cetera, as to whether the Japanese Government had or had not made a bona fide peace offer. This trend of public thinking seemed to me to be dangerous, as tending to weaken the war morale of the country and also to create in Japan the belief that the American people are getting ready for a compromise peace and all the Japanese have to do is to continue to fight. Secondly, I believe that my statement will have created in Japan a situation where anything that the President may say as to what unconditional surrender will mean and what it will mean will have maximum effect. In other words, my statement will not have contributed to creating in the Japanese mind any belief as to what, if anything, they can hope for, and if the President, either individually or jointly with others, now conveys the impression that unconditional surrender may not be as bad a matter as they had previously believed, the door may well be opened to an early surrender. This course is guesswork but it seems to us to be sound guesswork. I may say that my statement was unanimously approved by the

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

102 ¹ Text in Department of State Bulletin, vol. XIII, p. 84.

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

DOCUMENT 8

Secretary's Staff Committee, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of War Information.

I hope that early action may be taken on the proposed statement by the President which I gave you before your departure² spelling out a little more definitely what unconditional surrender will mean.

With the very best of wishes to the President and yourself in the great job which you are about to undertake at TERMINAL, I am [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ See document No. 594.

**BASIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES IN THE
WAR AGAINST JAPAN**

No. 598

C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

TOP SECRET

**MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY,
18 JUNE 1945 AT 1530¹**

Present[:] The President
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
General of the Army G. C. Marshall
Fleet Admiral E. J. King
Lieut. General I. C. Eaker (Representing
General of the Army H. H. Arnold)
The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson
The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal
The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. McFarland

1. DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had called the meeting for the purpose of informing himself with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan set out in Admiral Leahy's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 14 June.² He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present situation with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with

¹ i. e., 3:30 p. m.

² Not printed herein. Text in "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945" (Washington, Department of Defense, processed, 1955), p. 76.

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J. C. S. 1388):¹

Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

- a. If we press preparations we can be ready.
- b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.
- c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.
- d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan [*Pusan*] in the southeast corner and Keijo [*Seoul*], well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears as equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worthwhile operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential both to tightening our strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon of all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan.

¹ Memorandum not printed. Apparently it was never presented to the President.

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific War is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data are pertinent:

<i>Campaign</i>	<i>U. S. Casualties Killed, wounded, missing</i>	<i>Jap Casualties Killed and Prisoners (Not including wounded)</i>	<i>Ratio U. S. to Jap</i>
Leyte	17, 000	78, 000	1:4.6
Luzon	31, 000	156, 000	1:5.0
Iwo Jima	20, 000	25, 000	1:1.25
Okinawa	34, 000 (Ground) 7, 700 (Navy)	81, 000 (not a complete count)	1:2
Normandy (1st 30 days)	42, 000	—	—

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U. S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. . . .

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific for which the British wish to raise at the next conference,⁴ we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 174, and *post*, p. 921.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of non-decisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable alone to put the Germans out. General Eaker and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. Against the Japanese scattered through mountainous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with a firm determination to see it through.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's views and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. It was a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should do Kyushu now, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must aim now for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. If preparations do not go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started, however, they can always be stopped if desired.⁵

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland.

⁵ Cf. Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York, 1952), p. 605, footnote 2.

Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. It was agreed that this would have considerable influence.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY recalled that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of the casualties to be expected. He was interested therefore in finding out how many troops are to be used in Kyushu.

ADMIRAL KING called attention to what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the total assault troops for the Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared for the President as 766,700. He said, in answer to the President's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, that it was estimated at eight Japanese divisions or about 350,000 troops. He said that divisions were still being raised in Japan and that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful.

THE PRESIDENT asked about the possibility of reinforcements for Kyushu moving south from the other Japanese islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was expected that all communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

ADMIRAL KING described in some detail the land communications between the other Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island. It was crossed by a mountain range, which would be difficult for either the Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu opera-

[No. 598]

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

tion, in effect, contemplated the taking of another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT expressed the view that it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan, to which the Chiefs of Staff agreed.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable⁶ in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air casualties are averaging 2 percent per mission, about 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT said that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after weighing all the possibilities of the situation and considering all possible alternative plans were still of the unanimous opinion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STIMSON agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He felt that he was personally responsible to the President more for political than for military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them and to develop any possible influence they might have before it became necessary to come to grips with them.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He asked if the invasion of Japan by white men would not have the effect of more closely uniting the Japanese.

MR. STIMSON thought there was every prospect of this. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being the best.

⁶ Not printed.

thing to do, but he still hoped for some fruitful accomplishment through other means.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for the views of the Secretary of the Navy.

MR. FORRESTAL pointed out that even if we wished to besiege Japan for a year or a year and a half, the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be time thereafter to consider the main decision in the light of subsequent events.

MR. McCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely all possible means of bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible.⁷ To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with those who said to him that unless we obtain the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary.

THE PRESIDENT stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.

THE PRESIDENT said he considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can do this operation and then decide as to the final action later.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

⁷ Cf. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 314-315, 322-323, 411.

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all command in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

THE PRESIDENT and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.⁸

⁸ This paragraph may refer to discussion of a suggestion that the Japanese should be warned, before an atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, that the United States had such a weapon. See document No. 592, footnote 2.

No. 599

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 880/4

[WASHINGTON,] 29 June 1945

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific:—

a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

¹ Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 193d Meeting, July 1945. See vol. II, p. 38. Cf. appendix A to document No. 1381, printed in vol. II.

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.

2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of southern Kyushu is avoided.

3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed:—

a. The invasion of Kyushu, target date 1 November 1945.

b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the Western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective.

d. The seizure of Balikpapan, target date 1 July 1945.

e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu is continuing on the basis of meeting a target date of 1 March 1946 for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments.

5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing at small cost, without delaying the supreme operations, upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater.

6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:—

a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports.

b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender.

[No. 599]

BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY

NOV-10 1945

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 770076

By SP NARA Date 1/15/99

DOCUMENT 9

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 38

J.C.S. 1388/1

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

20 June 1945

Pages 20 - 22, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

2384 Japan (3 May 44) Sec 1-B Auto No.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST JAPAN

Reference: J.C.S. 1388

Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations

FF1/A16-3

Serial: 001573

20 June 1945



1. I consider J.C.S. 1388 satisfactory for purposes of discussion with the President, but consider that it should be changed in certain respects, enumerated below, before it is given to the President.



2. I recommend that page 7 of J.C.S. 1388 be modified as follows:

a. Change the first sentence of the first paragraph to read "By 1 March 1946 the following major naval vessels are scheduled for deployment in the Pacific:" Add to the list of vessels shown: 17 AGC (Operations and Command Headquarters Ships), 223 APA (Attack Transport Ships), 108 AKA (Attack Cargo Ships), 799 LST (Tank Landing Ships), 491 LSM (Medium Landing Ships).

DISTRIBUTIONCOPY NO.COPY NO.

Admiral Leahy	1	General Norstad	11
General Marshall	2 & 3	Admiral Duncan	12
Admiral King	3 & 3	General Cebell	13
General Arnold	4	General Lincoln	14
General Handy	7	Captain Campbell	15
Admiral Edwards	8	Secy, JCS	16
Admiral Cooke	9	Secy, JPS	17
General Hull	10	Secy, JWPC	18





~~TOP SECRET~~

b. In the fifth line of the second paragraph delete the word "constantly".

c. Modify the second and third line of the fourth paragraph to read, "all arms which are required and which should be employed for the operations we contemplate are all those which can be supported."

3. Paragraph 7, page 7, on casualties is not satisfactory. Admiral Nimitz in his study of OLYMPIC has estimated that there will be 49,000 casualties in the first thirty days. It appears to me that the Chiefs of Staff will have to give an estimate of the casualties expected in the operation. As regards naval casualties I believe that a fair estimate is that they will continue at approximately the same rate as they have occurred in the Okinawa operation. The statement in paragraph 7 that the highest casualties occur during the assault phase of the operations has not, of course, been borne out in the latest operations in the Pacific where the Japanese have chosen not to defend the beaches.

4. In paragraph 11 a, page 10, the description of the Chinese Army is somewhat confusing and may leave the President in doubt as to the number of effective troops. Paragraph 11 a should emphasize that the effectiveness of any Chinese troops will be largely dependent on the assistance the United States is able to give in supplying and equipping those troops.

5. Paragraph 11 b on page 11 does not stress sufficiently what is expected of the British. The last two sentences of this paragraph should be changed to read:

"The British should continue their primary responsibility for mopping up the Japanese forces in Southeast Asia and the East Indies exclusive of the Philippines. The British Pacific Fleet and elements of the Royal Air Force and First

TOP SECRET

Canadian Division mentioned above will participate in the operations for the invasion of Japan. It is the intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to turn over to British command certain portions of the Southwest Pacific Area including Australia, the Solomons, New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Netherlands East Indies."

6. I recommend that, before the memorandum in J.C.S. 1388 is presented to the President:

- a. It be amended as indicated in paragraphs 2 and 5 above.
- b. The Joint Staff Planners be directed to rewrite paragraphs 7 and 11 and thereof in the light of the comments in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.

Japan (3 May 44)
Sec 1-B

DOCUMENT 10

25 June 1945

nmr

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, WDGS:

SUBJECT: Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan
(JCS 1388/1)

Admiral King points out certain changes he considers should be made in JCS 1388 and recommends:

- a. Amendments be made.
- b. Joint Staff Planners rewrite two of the paragraphs in the light of his comments.

JCS 1388, which Admiral King recommends be revised, is a proposed memorandum for the President embodying the views of the JCS on conduct of the campaign against Japan and giving the course of action they plan to follow. It is to be furnished the President in preparation for the coming conference of Heads of State.

On 18 June the President met with the JCS and Secretaries of War and Navy and, while JCS 1388 was not presented to the President, the discussion was based on it.


Since some of the changes proposed by Admiral King are not acceptable, the Chief of Staff should put his views on record in order that they may be taken into account when the Planners revise the paper. A memorandum, setting out the Chief of Staff's views and reasons therefor has been prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since this memorandum is fully explanatory, its subject matter is not repeated in these notes.

Action Recommended by OPD

Sign and dispatch the attached memorandum to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Coordination

AAF



~~TOP SECRET~~

DOCUMENT 11

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD Doc 52001R


By OP NARA Date 1/16/88

ESTIMATED JAPANESE DISPOSITIONS IN KYUSHU

21 July 1945

ESTIMATED STRENGTH:

Army Ground 305,000
 Navy Ground 50,000
 Air Ground 100,000
 TOTAL: 455,000



British Embassy here is communicating with London and shortly after return to Washington of JCS officers now at Potsdam Dept hopes to be able to prepare joint statement with British giving Salazar present status of planning.²

GREW

J[ohn] D H[ickerson]

² No communication was actually given to the Portuguese Government on this subject until after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference.

USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 1303

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee*¹ (Harrison) to the
Secretary of War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 16 July 1945.

URGENT

WAR 32887. For Colonel Kyle's EYES ONLY from Harrison for Mr. Stimson.

Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted.²

¹ Concerning the establishment and membership of this Committee, of which Stimson was Chairman, see Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, p. 616.

² Stimson's diary entry for July 16 concludes: "... At 7:30 PM Harrison's first message concerning the test of the S-1 bomb arrived and I took it at once to the President's house and showed it to Truman and Byrnes who of course were greatly interested, although the information was still in very general terms." Concerning a further discussion of the message between Stimson and Byrnes, see document No. 1236, footnote 6.

No. 1304

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the
Secretary of War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 17 July [19]45.

PRIORITY

WAR-33556. TopSec Secretary of War from Harrison.

Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the LITTLE BOY is as husky as his big brother.¹ The light in his¹ eyes dis-

¹ i. e., FAT MAN.

cernible from here to Highhold ^{1a} and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm.²

^{1a} Stimson's home on Long Island.

² At Upperville, Virginia.

Stimson's diary entry for July 18 includes the following: "Harrison's second message came, giving a few of the far reaching details of the test. I at once took it to the President who was highly delighted. . . . The President was evidently very greatly reenforced over the message from Harrison and said he was very glad I had come to the meeting. . . ."

No. 1305

Department of the Army Files

The Commanding General, MANHATTAN DISTRICT Project (Groves) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) ¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 18 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: The Test.

1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.

2. At 0530,² 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the im-

¹ Stimson's diary entry for July 21 contains the following information relating to this document:

" . . . At eleven thirty-five General Groves' special report was received by special courier. It was an immensely powerful document, clearly and well written and with supporting documents of the highest importance. It gave a pretty full and eloquent report of the tremendous success of the test and revealed far greater destructive power than we expected in S-1. . . .

"At three o'clock I found that Marshall had returned from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to save time I hurried to his house and had him read Groves' report and conferred with him about it.

"I then went to the 'Little White House' and saw President Truman. I asked him to call in Secretary Byrnes and then I read the report in its entirety and we then discussed it. They were immensely pleased. The President was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the Conference and being present to help him in this way."

Stimson showed Groves' report to Arnold on July 22 (see document No. 1310, footnote 3).

Concerning the discussion of the report with Churchill, see *ante*, pp. 203, 225. Truman later stated that, following receipt of news that the Alamogordo test had been successful, he had called together Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, Arnold, Eisenhower, and King and had asked them for their opinions as to whether the bomb should be used, and the consensus had been that it should. See Hillman, *Mr. President*, p. 248. Truman apparently also received at this meeting an oral estimate of the casualties to be expected in the assault on Japan if the new weapon were not used. See *ibid.*, and Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago, 1948-1958), vol. v, facsimile following p. 712 of a letter from Truman to Cate dated January 12, 1953.

² i. e., 5:30 a. m. All times in this memorandum are expressed in military style, i. e., from 0001 hours (12:01 a. m.) to 2400 hours (midnight).

plosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion. And what an explosion! . . . The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.

3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects. For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.

5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This

tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards.³ None of us had expected it to be damaged.

6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radioactive material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too comfortable about the situation.

7. For distances as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.

8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the

³ Neither reproduced.

scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held firm and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.

9. Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

"The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key assistants—Dr. Kistiakowsky, who developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

"For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second,

because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.

"Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by 'Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.' We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and Atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.

"In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted 'Now!' and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed 'This is it!' No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.

"Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian,⁴ threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

⁴ At this point is the following manuscript interpolation by Groves: "an American and Harvard professor for many years".

"As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

"The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized."

12. My impressions of the night's high points follow:

After about an hour's sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.

At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had

never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to me this tight rope had lasted for almost three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.

13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Dr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest.

14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.

15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report:

"There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire north-western sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.

"Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting

[No. 1305]

the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.

"We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor."

16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.

17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.

18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us⁵ and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

19. I know that Colonel Kyle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.

L R GROVES

[Enclosure 3]

BULLETIN⁶

Alamogordo, N. M., July 16—William O. Eareckson, commanding officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base, made the following statement today:

"Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning.

"A remotely located ammunition magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosive and pyrotechnics exploded.

"There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside of the explosives magazine itself was negligible.

"Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast may make it desirable for the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their homes."

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Identified in the source copy as a clipping from *The Albuquerque Tribune* for July 16, 1945.

[Enclosure 4]

TOP SECRET

[NEAR ALAMOGORDO AIR BASE?], July 16, 1945.

THOUGHTS BY E. O. LAWRENCE⁷

Our group assembled at a point 27 miles from the bomb site about two in the morning. We were on a plain extending all the way to the bomb and although I did not notice carefully the mountains seemed to be some miles away. We could see in the distance lights defining the position of the bomb and at about four a. m. our radio picked up conversations between the B-29s and the ground organization.

We soon learned that zero hour was 5:30 a. m. which was just break of dawn. Naturally our tenseness grew as zero hour approached. We were warned of the probable brilliance of the explosion—so bright it would blind one looking directly at it for sometime and there was even danger of sunburn!

I decided the best place to view the flame would be through the window of the car I was sitting in, which would take out ultraviolet, but at the last minute decided to get out of the car (evidence indeed I was excited!) and just as I put my foot on the ground I was enveloped with a warm brilliant yellow white light—from darkness to brilliant sunshine in an instant and as I remember I momentarily was stunned by the surprise. It took me a second thought to tell myself, "this is indeed it!!" and then through my dark sun glasses there was a gigantic ball of fire rising rapidly from the earth—at first as brilliant as the sun, growing less brilliant as it grew boiling and swirling into the heavens. Ten or fifteen thousand feet above the ground it was orange in color and I judge a mile in diameter. At higher levels it became purple and this purple afterglow persisted for what seemed a long time (possibly it was only for a minute or two) at an elevation of 20-25,000 feet. This purple glow was due to the enormous radioactivity of the gases. (The light is in large part due to nitrogen of the air and in the laboratory we occasionally produce it in miniature with the cyclotron.)

In the earlier stages of rise of the flame the clouds above were illuminated and as the flame rose it was a grand spectacle also to see the great clouds immediately above melt away before our eyes.

The final phases was the column of hot gases smoke and dust funneling from the earth into the heavens to 40,000 feet. The column was to me surprisingly narrow until high elevations were reached when it foamed out considerably. The great funnel was visible a

⁷ This memorandum, which bears an uncertified typed signature, has the following typed notation at the end: "This was written in an airplane and not corrected by the author."

DOCUMENT 13

C
O
P
Y

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

25 July 1945

TO: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.

/S/ THOS. T. HANDY
THOS. T. HANDY
General, G.S.C.
Acting Chief of Staff

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF DIVISIONS

IN JAPAN

25 July 1945

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DDO - 5201R

By CP NARA Date 1/16/48

Underlined divisions are newly identified.

u>


Estimated ground strength (Army, Navy, Air) for each sector shown in red.

1 Div may be in West Honshu instead of Oku; strength is carried in Shikoku.

TOTAL ESTIMATED GROUND STRENGTH IN JAPAN:

2,110,000

(Includes 10,000 for unlocated units)




DOCUMENT 14

ESTIMATED
SE DISPOSITIONS
ON KIOSHU


26 July 1945

ESTIMATED STRENGTH:

Ground	350,000
Ground	75,000
Ground	100,000
TOTAL:	525,000



**Military Map
symbol key:**

 = infantry/
mixed

[O] = armor

- x = brigade
- xx = division
- xxx = army corps
- xxxx = area army

20 0

100

DOCUMENT 15A

ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE AIR STRENGTH
TOTALS AS OF 26 JULY 1945

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DODD. 52001R
By CP NARA Date 1/16/88

(Figures in parentheses show changes from 19 July)

1. Combat Planes:

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighters	1233 (+131)	1306 (+ 82)	3142 (+193)
Bombers	532 (+ 26)	820 (+ 17)	1352 (+ 43)
Recon planes	432 (+ 30)	173 (+ 2)	605 (+ 29)
Floatplanes and flying boats		593 (+ 4)	593 (+ 4)
Total	<u>2220 (+197)</u>	<u>2952 (+ 81)</u>	<u>5772 (+263)</u>

2. Trainers:

Advanced	1545 (+200)		1545 (+200)
Utility	260 (+ 30)	400	660 (+ 30)
Elementary	1900 (--)	2200 (--)	4100 (--)
Total	<u>3705 (+230)</u>	<u>2600 (--)</u>	<u>6305 (+230)</u>

DOCUMENT 16

Document 25

Papers of George M. Elsey

HQ US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING ~~MESSAGE~~ MESSAGE

U R G E N T

FROM: AGWAR Washington

TO : Tripartite Conference Babelsberg, Germany

NO : WAR 41011

30 July 1945.

To the President from the Secretary of War.

The time schedule on Groves' project is progressing so rapidly that it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August. I have revised draft of statement, which I previously presented to you in light of

- (A) Your recent ultimatum,
- (B) Dramatic results of test and
- (C) Certain minor suggestions made by British of which Byrnes is aware.

While I am planning to start a copy by special courier tomorrow in the hope you can be reached, nevertheless in the event he does not reach you time, I will appreciate having your authority to have White House release revised statement as soon as necessary.

Sorry circumstances seem to require this emergency action.

ACTION: Gen. Vaughan

VICTORY-IN-733

(31 July 1945)

302217Z

50P

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Rev. 8/23 and 3/23 or 28

CSG letter May 2, 1973

447-HC, NAME Date 5-12-79

Note time received in Potsdam
7-1 NO

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DOCUMENT 16 A

Sec War

Reply to your 4.10.11
suggestions approved
Release when ready
but not sooner than
August 2.

HST

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT 17

COPY NO. _____

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

J.W.P.C. 397

4 August 1945

JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE

ALTERNATES TO "OLYMPIC"

Note by the Secretaries

The Joint War Plans Committee recommends that the Joint Staff Planners approve the enclosure and forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval.

J.I.C. 311 as amended and approved by the Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee, is attached hereto as Enclosure "B".

J. T. HILLIS,

D. M. GRIBBON,

Joint Secretariat.


DISTRIBUTION

Copy No.

Asst. Chief of Staff (Plans), COMINCH
Asst. Chief Air Staff/Plans
Chief, S & P Group, OPD, WDGS
Plans Div. COMINCH - Asst. Plans Officer
Secretary, J.P.S.
Secretary, J.W.P.C.

1 - 2
3 - 4
5 - 6
7
8
9 - 15

*Sey told me
not - concern
him*



TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/98</u>

ENCLOSURE "A"

ALTERNATES TO "OLYMPIC"

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

1. In Enclosure "B" (page 3) the Service Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee report a considerable strengthening of Japanese forces in southern Japan proper. Along with an increase in ground units deployed in southern Kyushu, a concentration of aircraft, including the bulk of Japanese suicide aircraft, and small suicide naval craft is reported in the area.

2. The possible effect upon OLYMPIC operations of this build-up and concentration is such that it is considered commanders in the field should review their estimates of the situation, reexamine objectives in Japan as possible alternates to OLYMPIC, and prepare plans for operations against such alternate objectives.

3. The Joint Staff Planners are preparing studies of alternate objectives in the light of current intelligence estimates. These studies are to be made available to theater commanders upon completion.

4. It is recommended that the enclosed message (Appendix to Enclosure "A", page 2) be dispatched to CINCPAC and CINCPACAF for action and to COMGENUSASTAF for information.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO CINCPAC AND CINCPACAF
INFORMATION TO CG, USASTAF

Copies of highly secret reports by the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C. 311, Defensive Preparations in Japan) have been furnished you. Report indicates strengthening of Japanese forces and defensive measures in southern Japan to an extent considerably in excess of that previously estimated as Japanese capability by OLYMPIC target date. While these measures on the part of the Japanese are not yet considered to require change to your current directive it is desired that you give continued consideration to the situation particularly as it affects the execution of OLYMPIC, make alternate plans and submit timely recommendations. Operations against extreme northern Honshu, against the Sendai area, and directly against the Kanto Plain are now under intensive study here.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/68</u>

ENCLOSURE "B".

DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS IN JAPAN

Report by the Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To summarize Japanese defensive preparations in the following areas:


Southern Kyushu
Northern Kyushu
Shikoku
Kanto Plain

and to determine the priorities of defense accorded by the Japanese.

GENERAL SUMMARY

2. In anticipation of Allied invasion of the Home Islands, the Japanese are making a maximum effort to strengthen their defensive capabilities in Japan Proper and to redeploy their forces in accordance with their own estimate of areas most likely to be invaded. Preparations for defense are substantiated by the following evidence: (a) ground forces are being expanded at a greatly accelerated rate; (b) a policy of rigid conservation of aircraft has been adopted, new airfields constructed, and air strength is being deployed to permit the most effective utilization against an invading force; (c) stress is being laid upon the extensive defensive mining of approaches to threatened areas and the establishment of small craft suicide attack bases in these areas; (d) emphasis is being given to coordinated ground and air action to frustrate our landing operations supplemented by small craft and ingenious weapons to be employed in suicidal tactics. We believe that the Japanese have accorded priority for defensive preparations in the following order: (1) Southern Kyushu; (2) Shikoku; (3) Northern Kyushu; and (4) Kanto Plain. Apparently, the

TOP SECRET



Japanese anticipate heavy destruction of their communication lines and are now attempting to concentrate the greatest part of the forces to be used for the defense of these vital areas in close proximity to the most threatened points of probable Allied assault.

PARTICULAR AREAS

3. There is every indication that the Japanese have been giving the highest priority to the defense of Kyushu and particularly to Southern Kyushu.

Since early 1945, ground forces deployed in Kyushu have been increased from 1 active and 2 depot divisions (totaling with army troops some 150,000 men), to a present strength of 11 active and 2 depot divisions (totaling with army troops about 545,000 men). During recent months, 2 divisions were brought in from Manchuria, 1 from Hokkaido, 2 from Honshu, and 1 from an unknown location in Japan, while 4 active divisions were formed locally from depot divisions. In addition, 1 independent mixed brigade and 3 tank brigades have been recently identified in Kyushu and one amphibious brigade has been transferred from the Kuriles to Southern Kyushu. In early 1945, about 75% of all ground forces on this island were located in Northern Kyushu, whereas now 7 of the 11 active divisions and about 60% of the total strength are deployed in Southern Kyushu.

Recent trends in the deployment of elementary biplane trainer type aircraft for suicide operations likewise point to the defensive priority which is being given to the Kyushu area by the Japanese. A total of 50 special bases for suicide aircraft are thus far known to have been designated in Kyushu, Honshu, and Shikoku west of 133° longitude. The Japanese naval air forces alone have deployed in this area 1,200 biplane trainers designated for suicide missions at the time of invasion. In comparison, only 32 such fields, 400 navy

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NN0770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/99</u>

biplane trainers and 400 navy monoplane trainers have been so designated in the area between 133° and 138°, while only 22 suicide bases and 600 navy biplane trainers are thus far located in the remainder of Honshu, which includes the Tokyo Plain.

Due to their greater range and mobility, the deployment of combat aircraft is less indicative of defensive priorities than in the case of elementary biplane trainers, but it is significant that the major portion of combat aircraft in Japan Proper is deployed or scheduled to be deployed at bases west of 138° E., thus placing tactical emphasis on the Kyushu-Shikoku area.

The trend of aircraft fuel accumulations seems to be generally in line with the present and prospective deployment of combat and trainer type aircraft.

The immobilization and destruction of practically all large combatant units of the Japanese Navy has permitted the release of personnel, possibly exceeding 100,000 men for other assignments. There is evidence that many of these men from the Kure and Sasebo area will be utilized for intensifying defensive preparations in Kyushu and nearby areas. Special naval landing forces are undergoing combat training to support army ground forces in defense against Allied landings. In addition, numerous suicide attack units are being formed and trained for employment in one-man torpedoes, midget submarines, small suicide boats, and as underwater swimming teams. There is also a strong possibility that a majority of Japan's remaining destroyers will be employed in suicidal missions against our surface forces.

Many defensive mine fields have been laid and there is considerable evidence that new types of mines which might be effective against Allied landing craft are being set out in waters of less than 15 fathoms along prospective landing beaches. A very high priority has been given to the Kyushu area, the most extensive mining taking place south of 33° latitude. We believe that these mining and other naval defensive preparations in

TOP SECRET

Southern Kyushu will be completed by September. Already, it is believed, an extensive mine field has been completed along the east coast of Kyushu from Tomitake to Miyazaki. In addition, other mine fields have been laid along the approaches to Ariake Wan, Kagoshima Wan, and Tachibana Wan.

4. Shikoku. Defensive preparations in Shikoku would seem to indicate that the Japanese estimate the probability of Allied landings on this island as being second only to invasion of Kyushu or Oculpart Island.

In early 1945 no active divisions were known to be located in Shikoku, the available ground troops at that time consisting of 1 depot division and miscellaneous units totaling some 50,000 men. In recent months, however, 1 division has been brought in from Manchuria and 2 from Central and Western Honshu, and 1 active division has been created locally. Present strength, including 4 active divisions, 1 depot division and miscellaneous units, totals about 150,000 men. Recent incorporation of the ground forces in Shikoku into an area Army headquarters indicates the importance which the Japanese attach to the defense of this island.

Present deployment of the Japanese air forces, as described in paragraph 3 above, afford the Japanese equal capability for the air defense of Shikoku as compared with Kyushu. From their present bases all of the aircraft based in Japan Proper west of 138° would be within range of our assault forces attacking Shikoku.

From the naval standpoint, the Japanese are believed to have established some bases for suicide attack units in the Kochi (Lat. 33° 33' N, Long. 133° 33' E) area. Mines have been laid in the waters along the south coast of Shikoku in the vicinity of Kochi and some of these mines may be of the shallow water type for defense against Allied landing craft approaching the beaches. Defensive minefields have also been laid in Bungo Suido between Kyushu and Shikoku.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/98</u>

5. Kanto Plain. While there is considerable evidence that the Japanese expect us to make initial landings in Kyushu, Shikoku or some other area of Japan Proper prior to an assault on the Kanto Plain, they do not exclude the possibility of amphibious operations against this latter area from our present positions.

In early 1945 there were only 4 active and 3 depot divisions, plus army troops totaling about 300,000 men, located in the vicinity of the Kanto Plain. Progressive reinforcement of the area has been carried out since March, 1 armored division having been brought in from Manchuria, 2 active divisions from other parts of Japan Proper, while at the same time 2 divisions were activated locally from depot divisions. Present strength in this area is estimated to be 9 active divisions, 3 depot divisions and army troops, totaling about 560,000 men. No information is available regarding any unusual recent activity in the strengthening of coastal defenses, although there is every reason to believe that here, as well as in other threatened areas of Japan Proper, fixed defenses are being constantly developed and improved.

From the air standpoint, while as stated in paragraph 3 above, there are at present only 22 special suicide bases known to be located east of 138°, it must be borne in mind that all trainer type aircraft as well as combat types based in Central Honshu would be within easy range of the Kanto Plain area. At least one large, specially concealed air base is being hastily constructed in the vicinity of Koriyama through which a large number of trainer-type aircraft could be staged, or at which 100 suicide trainers could be based. Thus, while tactical emphasis in aircraft deployment points towards the Kyushu-Shikoku area, it is obvious that large numbers of trainer-type as well as combat aircraft will be in a position to operate effectively in the defense of the Kanto Plain.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 770076</u>
By <u>SP</u> NARA Date <u>1/15/98</u>

Although some naval small craft and other suicide units have been recently formed for the added defense of this area, we believe that much less emphasis is being currently given to such defensive preparation than is the case in the general area of Kyushu and Shikoku. There is no recent information regarding the laying of additional mine fields in the vicinity of the Kanto Plain.

384 Request (4 July 44)
Dec 1 - 44

DEC 15 1944

Abe - Admiral Gandon has heard this and thinks we should get it out in a hurry. In view of your discussion of the matter with the Chief the other day, what do you think about it?

WLL

Col Bright (in New Cabeli office) buzzed you and asked you to buzz back. He wants to know what your plan is do with this paper T.

DOCUMENT 18

Document 54

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL LANDRY:

Attached is a letter from Professor Cate of the University of Chicago asking clarification of the precise circumstances under which the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

If this letter is to be answered, it may take some research in official files and discussion with the President. Since this is an Air Force project, perhaps it would be more appropriate if you checked into this thing.

If, when the information is available, you wish us to write a reply, we will be glad to do so.



Irving Perimeter
IRVING PERIMETER

Attachment

DOCUMENT 18 A

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1126 EAST 59TH STREET

December 6, 1952

The President *Truman*
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

For several years it has been my privilege to serve as one of the editors and authors of The Army Air Forces in World War II, a history published on a non-profit basis under the joint sponsorship of the U.S. Air Force and the University of Chicago. One of my tasks for the fifth volume, now in press, was to write an account of the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In respect to the decision to use the bomb I have been faced with an apparent discrepancy in the evidence which I have been unable to resolve, and, in spite of a reluctance to intrude upon the time of the President, I am turning to you for information for which you are the best and perhaps the sole authority.

I have read with great interest your own statements - that released on 6 August 1945 and that contained in your letter to Dr. Karl T. Compton, dated 16 December 1946 and published in the Atlantic Monthly of February 1947. I have read also the late Mr. Stimson's more detailed account in Harper's Magazine of February 1947 which is in perfect accord with yours - the gist being that the dread decision for which you courageously assumed responsibility was made at Potsdam "in the face of" Premier Suzuki's rejection of the warning contained in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July, and that the motive was to avoid the great loss of life that would have attended the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for November.

More recently I have seen a photostatic copy of the directive to Gen. Carl Spaatz ordering him to deliver the first atomic bomb against one of four designated targets; the document has been declassified and I am inclosing a true copy. The letter is dated at Washington on 25 July 1945 and bears the signature of Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff during General Marshall's absence at Potsdam. According to General Arnold's statement elsewhere [H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 589], this directive was based on a memorandum dispatched by courier to Washington after a conference on 22 July between himself, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall.

The directive contains an unqualified order to launch the attack "as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945."


The President

December 6, 1952

There is no reference to the Potsdam Declaration which was to be issued on the next day and no statement as to what should be done in the event of a Japanese offer to surrender before 3 August. It is possible that the written directive was qualified by oral instructions, or that it was intended that it be countermanded by a radio message if the Japanese did accept the Potsdam terms, or that the directive was an erroneous representation of Secretary Stimson's real intentions. Nevertheless, as it stands the directive seems to indicate that the decision to use the bomb had been made at least one day before the promulgation of the Potsdam Declaration and two days before Suzuki's rejection thereof on 28 July, Tokyo time. Such an interpretation is in flat contradiction to the explanation implicit in the published statements, that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

Because of the extraordinary importance of this problem, I am appealing to you for more complete information as to the time and the circumstances under which you arrived at the final decision, and for permission to quote your reply in the volume of which I have spoken. Your well-known interest in history has encouraged me to seek my information at the source, as the historian should, without apology other than for having intruded on your crowded schedule with a letter made overly long by my desire to state the problem accurately.

Very truly yours,


James L. Cate

James L. Cate
Professor of Medieval History

JLC:jm
Inclosure

DOCUMENT 18 B

C
O
P
Y

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

25 July 1945

TO: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.

/s/ Thos. T. Handy
THOS. T. HANDY
General, G.S.C.
Acting Chief of Staff

165

DOCUMENT 18 C

Document 55

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

30 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President, it would be very desirable, if you could do it, to let this historian have such information as could be used in the history that he is writing concerning the circumstances under which the first atomic bombs were dropped.


R. B. LANDRY
Major General, USAF

Incl

166

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

Document 24

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 31, 1952

My dear Professor Cate:-

Your letter of Dec. 6th 1952 has just now been delivered to me.

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and conjecture about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan.

The next day I told Prime Minister ~~Stalin~~ ^{of Great Britain} and Generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Prime Minister Stalin smiled and thanked me.

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

for reporting the explosion to him but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Sec. of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Sec of War, Mr. Stimson, Adm. Leahy, Gen. Marshall, Gen Eisenhower, the Sec of the Navy, Adm King and some others to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon.

I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plane and other places in Japan [It was his opinion that 1/4 million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy.]

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the other military and naval men present agreed.

I asked Sec. Stimson which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others.

We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was ignored.

I ordered atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the back from Potomac when we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

Dropping the bombs ended the war, saved lives and gave

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the free nations a chance
to face the facts.

When it looked as if Japan
would quit, Russia hurried
into the play ^{less than a week} before the
surrender so as to be in at
the settlement. No military
contribution was made by
the Russians toward victory
over Japan. Prisoners were
surrendered and Manchuria
occupied as was Korea north
of the 38th parallel.

[Russia in Asia has been
a great liability since]

DOCUMENT 18 E

Document 61

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At your request I have reviewed your draft letter to Professor Cate, and I have made a few slight revisions after checking the details.

In your draft, you state that General Marshall told you that a landing in Japan would cost a quarter of a million casualties to the United States, and an equal number of the enemy. Mr. Stimson, in his book written by McGeorge Bundy, says that Marshall's estimate was over a million casualties. Your recollection sounds more reasonable than Stimson's, but in order to avoid a conflict, I have changed the wording to read that General Marshall expected a minimum of a quarter of a million casualties and possibly a much greater number -- as much as a million.

Secretary Forrestal does not appear to have been at the Potsdam meetings until July 28, and your conferences about the atom bomb appear to have taken place early in the meeting, on July 22, 23 and 24. Accordingly, I have deleted the Secretary of the Navy from the list of those with whom you conferred.

I have also inserted a paragraph explaining why the orders to General Spaatz were dated July 25 rather than after the ultimatum. This has been checked with the historian of the Department of Defense.

Russian entry into the war was less than a week before the surrender.

I have deleted the last sentence of your draft, since I think that it might be unfairly used by the propagandists of the political opposition. It states a fundamental truth, but in a very restrained way, and it seemed to me that it might raise more problems than it would help.

I attach various memoranda to me on this subject from Kenneth Hechler who did the research.

David D. Lloyd
DAVID D. LLOYD

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1953

My dear Professor Gates:

Your letter of December 6, 1952 has just now been delivered to me.

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and conversation about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan.

The next day I told the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Premier Stalin smiled and thanked me for reporting the explosion to him, but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Eisenhower, Admiral King and some others, to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon.

I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed.

I asked Secretary Stimson which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others.

We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was rejected.

I ordered atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the way back from Potsdam, when we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive

to General Spaatz to prepare for delivering the bomb is dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final decision was in my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam.

Dropping the bombs ended the war, saved lives, and gave the free nations a chance to face the facts.

When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray less than a week before the surrender, so as to be in at the settlement. No military contribution was made by the Russians toward victory over Japan. Prisoners were surrendered and Manchuria occupied by the Soviets, as was Korea, north of the 38th parallel.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) HARRY S. Truman

Professor James L. Cate,
Department of History,
The University of Chicago,
1126 East 59th Street,
Chicago 37,
Illinois.